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1. Introduction:

Uncertain Change and Changing Uncertainty: the Brexit Referendum and the EU in the Eyes of the World

Speyer, Johanna; Chaban, Natalia; Niemann, Arne

Abstract: While the (upcoming) withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU) has been heavily discussed in Europe, this debate revolves mainly around the future of the UK and UK-EU relations. By contrast, little attention has been paid to the reactions of third countries and the effect of their perceptions on the role of the changing EU in the changing world. However, only if the EU is seen as attractive and its actions as legitimate, valuable, credible and coherent, European (public) diplomacy and external action will be effective. This volume investigates how the planning of the ‘divorce’ between the EU and the UK, and specifically the ‘period of uncertainty’ that ensued after the June 2016 referendum in the UK, impacted on third countries’ perceptions of the EU-27, on their policy options (with regard to the bilateral relationship with the EU), and on EU external policy-making. This introductory chapter will set the scene for the subsequent contributions that analyse perceptions of the EU-27 after the Brexit referendum in the key world regions as defined by the EU Global Strategy 2016: the Wide Atlantic, the Middle East, Asia, Africa as well as the EU’s neighbours to the East and South. We elaborate on the common conceptual approach that guides all contributions, specify the methods employed to explore perceptions in individual countries/regions, introduce the structure of the volume and outline the main arguments and key results of the contributions to this volume.

Introduction

In the morning of 24 June 2016 shock and incredulity were palpable across Europe and around the world. By a narrow majority of 51.89%, the British citizens had voted for their country's exit from the European Union (EU). While the outcome of the referendum represents the climax of a relationship that has long been described as "awkward" (Menon and Salter 2016, 1298; George 2010), it has raised more questions than it answered. It left the United Kingdom (UK) as well as the EU in turmoil and uncertainty. And although UK leaders have attempted to project some confidence, the then UK Prime Minister (PM) Theresa May's (2016) enigmatic statement that "Brexit means Brexit" could hardly alleviate the lingering uncertainty and fair amount of confusion in which the UK and the EU, as well as their global partners, found themselves. The prolonged and painful Article 50 Treaty on European Union (TEU) negotiations between the UK and the EU, the repeated postponements of the actual Brexit date and the domestic turmoil in the UK are just a few examples of it. A new UK PM Boris Johnson, a devoted Brexiteer, championed the slogan "Get Brexit done!" in the run-up to the elections on December 12, 2019. More than three years after the historic vote, it still remains to be seen whether this Brexit will be a hard and chaotic one – or based on a softer and well thought through deal. Perhaps unsurprisingly, advocates to revoke Brexit altogether have recently gained grounds in the UK.

For Donald Tusk, the outgoing European Council president, Brexit has been "one of the most spectacular mistakes" in the history of the EU (Rankin 2019). With Brexit, the EU would not only lose its second largest economy and its third most populated member state, but also one of its two military powers with permanent membership in the UN Security Council as well as an external action actor with a strong diplomatic corps and special relationships with the Commonwealth and the United States (US) (Adler-Nissen, Galpin and Rosamond 2017, 581; Henökl 2017, 2). Thus, besides triggering internal upheaval in the EU, Brexit affects the identity and capabilities of the EU as a global actor. The Eurocentric focus of the Brexit debate in the EU so far has overshadowed the global impact of Brexit.

In contrast, the global reactions to Brexit have largely escaped public and academic scrutiny.¹ Our volume addresses this gap.

Relevant literature in EU foreign policy studies has long argued that the EU's role in the world is influenced by how it is perceived externally (Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Chaban, Elgström and Holland 2006; Chaban and Holland 2014; 2019). Is the EU perceived as a capable global actor, a coveted partner, a model to be emulated or a self-interested hypocrite? External perceptions guide the assessment of the situation, inform foreign policy choices by the EU's international partners, and serve as a key element in understanding the effectiveness of EU external actions (Elgström 2007, 952; Elgström and Chaban 2015, 17–20). Perceptions form the basis of political elites' decision-making as they help politicians to reduce complexity and make sense of the world (Jervis 1976, 28; Elgström and Chaban 2015, 18–19). Brexit may deliver a detrimental blow to the EU's global image. This image is already under a lot of strain after the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis which has dented the Union's profile as an economic power and the refugee and asylum crisis which has questioned the normative identity of the EU and its ability to promote liberal values externally (Bachmann and Müller 2015, 4; Chaban and Holland 2014; 2019). Brexit has a potential to impact negatively on the EU's international reputation as an 'economic giant' as well as the normative appeal of the European integration project.

A negative change in external perceptions of the EU may occur not only in response to the actual exit of the UK from the EU, following either a 'soft' or 'hard' scenario. A year-long Brexit referendum campaign, the subsequent highly publicized British vote, the long period of heated negotiations (both between the EU and the UK and in the British Parliament), and the ongoing uncertainty about Brexit and its consequences may have already damaged the image of the EU (e.g. Haralambous 2016). Our volume tests this claim and asks how the Brexit referendum and the ensued uncertainty *before* the UK's actual departure from the EU have impacted images of the changing EU in the changing world. Our volume intends to inform scholarship on EU foreign policy and contribute to policy debate and European external action post-Brexit.

¹ Exceptions include works by Adler-Nissen, Galpin and Rosamond (2017), Henökl (2017) and Oliver (2015; 2016) which opened the discussion and offered first analytical insights into this issue.

To address these objectives, our volume undertakes a comprehensive approach and brings together contributions that reflect on the EU's perceptions at times of uncertainty in the key world regions as defined by the EU Global Strategy (European Union 2016, 10): the Wide Atlantic, the Middle East, Africa, Asia as well as the the EU's neighbours to the East and South. While each case is country- or region-specific, they are all united by a common conceptual approach as well as shared research focus. Each chapter addresses three research questions:

- (1) How do third countries perceive the EU after the Brexit referendum? Have these perceptions changed and if so, in what way? In how far does the country in question perceive Brexit to impact the EU's legitimacy, credibility and/or coherence?
- (2) What foreign policy options do these countries consider as a result, also with regard to the bilateral relationship with the EU?
- (3) What impact will this have on EU external policy? Which lessons can be derived for practitioners?

We set the scene for these investigations with an historical overview of the events around the UK's referendum in 2016 and tentatively explore how the Brexit vote and the UK's actual exit from the EU may impact EU external perceptions. In the subsequent section, we elaborate on the common conceptual approach that guides all contributions and detail the methods employed to explore perceptions in individual countries/regions. Finally, we introduce the structure of the volume and outline the main arguments and key results of the contributions to this volume.

Brexit and its 'unknowns'

The Brexit story

The UK's relationship with the EU has always been paradoxical (Startin 2015, 312-314; Wall 2008, 204-220) and has long been described as "awkward" (George 2010). Britain chose to stay distant from the first steps of European integration. Only when economic successes of integration had become

apparent by the 1960s, the UK sought to join the Community. It was, however, rebuffed twice by French president Charles de Gaulle. The UK's accession to the European Communities was thereby delayed until 1973. From the onset, the UK's EU membership has been marked by reservations, if not outright scepticism toward "Brussels" acquiring supranational powers. Consider, for example, the first "in or out" referendum in 1975 or PM Thatcher's belligerent call "I want my money back" which led to the contentious British rebate in 1984 (De Wilde 2012, 117). The UK supported integration, but mostly in those areas which were in line with its domestic preferences – e.g. the Single European Market, EU enlargement as well as intergovernmental projects such as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). These projects reflect the UK's priorities of free trade and democracy promotion or promise to inhibit further supranationalization. Where a further transfer of sovereignty was expected, however, the UK even opted out of such core European projects as Schengen and the Euro. Throughout the years of the UK's EU membership, the Union remained the ubiquitous 'scapegoat' for the British media and politicians, while Eurosceptic sentiments grew stronger across political parties both on the left and the right of the political spectrum (Carl, Dennison and Evans 2019; Copeland and Copsey 2017, 719-721; Oliver 2017, 2; Startin 2015, 316-320).

Nevertheless, the UK has always been rather successful in shaping European integration processes to suit its interests (Menon and Salter 2016, 1300–1301; Wall 2008, 204-220). This even holds true for the UK's push to renegotiate its membership in the EU at the EU summit of February 2016. British PM Cameron, harried by the Eurosceptic hardliners in his own Tory party, won the 2015 UK Parliamentary election on a pledge to secure a "better deal" for Britain in the EU. He also promised to call an 'in/out' referendum on the UK's membership in the EU. Cameron demanded renegotiation on such issues as competitiveness, the Single Market and the protection of the interests of non-Euro member states, a British opt-out from the notion of 'ever closer Union' and, importantly, "the 'problem' of intra-EU migration, particularly the rights of EU migrants to claim social security benefits in the UK" (Menon and Salter 2016, 1305; also Copeland and Copsey 2017, 709). Although the UK's demands were to some extent accommodated (European Council 2016, 1–2; Menon and Salter 2016, 1305), the outcome of the Council meeting fell short of establishing the (unrealistic)

“wholesale new settlement the Prime Minister had pledged” (Menon and Salter 2016, 1305–1306). While Cameron had tended to side with the Brexit hardliners prior to the February 2016 summit, he campaigned against Brexit in the now ensuing referendum campaign. His stance lacked credibility. In the British referendum on 23 June 2016, a narrow margin of 1,269,501 votes sufficed to precipitate an unprecedented event: the exit of a member state from the EU (Bloomberg 2016). Cameron’s “gamble on the outcome of his much-vaunted renegotiation proved reckless” (Menon and Salter 2016, 1297–1304).

The 2016 referendum – “the biggest vote for change this country has ever known” (May 2016) – revealed a country profoundly divided by class, wealth, education and geography (Menon and Salter 2016, 1297). While England, excluding the city of London, and Wales voted *Leave*, in Scotland and Northern Ireland, *Remain* prevailed. Furthermore, the result exposed a generational divide and demonstrated divisions along the lines of occupation and education (e.g. all 20 of the “most educated” communities in the UK voted to remain) (Goodwin and Heath 2016; Hoboldt 2016). The result was rationalized as a backlash of the ‘left-behinds’ and the ‘losers of globalization’ and an evidence of an increasingly acute cleavage between ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘nationalist’ identities, with both trends observed globally (Delanty 2017, 112; Oliver 2017, 3; but see Carl, Dennison and Evans 2019).

The Tory government hailed the UK’s decision to leave the Union as a recovery of Britain’s national pride and its global leadership role (Johnson 2016; May 2016). The VoteLeave campaign fed off the slogan to “take back control” and PM May’s (2016) assurance to “make a success out of” Brexit and to “give clarity [...] whenever possible and as quickly as possible”. Notwithstanding, the Brexit decision was a ‘leap in the dark’. The official ‘divorce negotiations’ with the EU based on Article 50 TEU progressed rather slowly (Henökl 2017). The deal that was eventually concluded was rejected three times by the British House of Commons, necessitating repeated postponements of the official Brexit date. At the time of writing, Britain is scheduled to leave the EU on 31 January 2020, 10 months after the original date of 29 March 2019. Meanwhile, the appointment of Boris Johnson as PM has seemingly increased the probability of a ‘hard’ Brexit (the UK’s exit without any deal between the

EU and the UK). This scenario would cancel the envisaged two-year transition period after the UK's exit, a period, which had been intended to buy time for negotiators and businesses on either side of the Channel. Inside the UK, Brexit stirs fears about a new Scottish independence referendum as well as the destabilization of the peace process in Northern Ireland, which relies crucially on the maintenance of the open border with the Republic of Ireland (Oliver 2017, 6).

Significantly, the uncertainty triggered by the Brexit vote stretches beyond its immediate effects on the UK and the UK-EU relationship. Its repercussions are felt in the whole EU as well as third states. As some scholars argue, "[...] Brexit is constructed and imagined from the outside" (Adler-Nissen, Galpin and Rosamond 2017, 573–574). Images and mental constructs of the EU beyond the Union's borders will impact upon international partners' foreign policy choices and contribute to the revision of the global order.

Brexit and foreign policy

In the run-up to the British referendum, a wide range of international voices, not least the then US President Barack Obama, warned of the potentially detrimental effects of Brexit both for the EU and the UK (Oliver 2016, 694). The UK's probable exit from the EU raised questions over "Britain's broader role and position within international relations and the international political economy" (Whitman 2016, 523). Brexit bears economic, geopolitical and security-related consequences and is hence argued to impact on external perceptions of the EU in a drastic way.

In economic terms, the EU (and the European Single Market) loses its second largest economy.ⁱ This is likely to lead to a decline in EU-UK trade and a loss of jobs on both sides of the English Channel (Lawless and Morgenroth 2019; Steinberg 2019; Vandenbussche, Connell Garcia and Simons 2019). External trading partners will also be hit by the walk-out of one of the largest national markets, which for some represented a 'gateway into Europe' (e.g. the Commonwealth nations). In addition, many less developed countries relied on preferential trading arrangements with the EU to gain access to the

British market (Adler-Nissen, Galpin and Rosamond 2017, 581, 585; Henökl 2017, 2). Moreover, Brexit has sown the fear that the EU, caught up in internal problems, will turn to more protectionist economic policy (Oliver 2015, 1325; Whitman 2016, 526).

In the eyes of the world, the EU's legitimacy, leadership aspirations and normative agenda have often been backed by its external perception as an 'economic giant' (Holden and Warren 2015, 58; Lucarelli 2014, 7; PPMI/NCRE/NFG 2015). However, even prior to Brexit, the EU's economic and financial crisis had raised doubts over the Union's economic and political future: "The [external] public at large tends not to regard the EU as a world power today, and even less so for the future" (Lucarelli 2014, 8). This perceptual pattern is likely to be reinforced by the EU-UK 'divorce', with the UK's economic assets out of the economic bloc. However, we can also expect that the EU27, once it successfully recovers from the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, will remain one of the most lucrative markets in the world, with high purchasing power. The EU has managed not to "spread" its crisis internationally (in contrast to the US) and saved its 'business as usual' with external partners. The number of third countries wishing to conclude free trade agreements (FTA) with the EU has not decreased following the Brexit vote.

Beside its economic repercussions, the outcome of the referendum raises questions over Britain's future international engagement and the country's membership in key international bodies (Chalmers *et al.* 2018, 15-19; Whitman 2016, 523). Along with France, the UK is one of the EU's key military powers possessing nuclear capabilities and a permanent membership in the UN Security Council (Henökl 2017, 2). While the EU's military profile and role are the subject of an on-going debate, one thing is already clear. The loss of the UK as a powerful military resource is likely to further constrain the EU's influence as a military actor, especially concerning the UN Security Council's decisions and deals a blow to the EU's aspirations to get its own permanent seat in this prestigious UN committee. In this regard, external perceptions studies have already pointed to a "gap between potential and actual leadership" (Lucarelli 2014, 8) of the EU. A sudden drop in military power and resources inflicted by Brexit is likely to decrease the EU's perceived potential for international leadership, raise doubts about

its future leadership capacity and reduce its credibility. Yet, it also seems possible that the remaining EU27 will consolidate their military resources, not least in the face of Russia's aggression towards Ukraine, the US' lukewarm support of NATO under Trump's administration and the sceptical attitude towards NATO among some European leaders (consider the infamous statement by French President Macron who called the 70-year alliance "brain dead" (*The Economist* 2019)).

The changes in perceptions we predict are likely to have geopolitical ramifications. On a more pragmatic, material level, Brexit will leave an EU budget hole of roughly €10-11 billion, constraining the Union's engagement in development aid and European neighbourhood policy initiatives (Henökl 2017, 8). According to an impact study commissioned by the European Parliament's Directorate General for External Policies, the Union's financial engagement in its neighbourhood will decrease by up to 4% (Olivie and Pérez 2017, 1). A similar drop in development aid would threaten the EU's position as the world's leading donor (Henökl 2017, 8). Likewise, the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) will suffer financial losses while being bereaved of highly-trained diplomats and internationally acknowledged expertise. As part of the EU, the UK has served as a bridge to the US and the Commonwealth states, which historically maintain special relationships with the UK. This link will be lost, too. As for the UK, after the Brexit vote, the then foreign secretary and current PM Boris Johnson (2016) presented plans for a new strategy of "Global Britain" – a vision of the UK returning to its historical position of strength at the heart of an "Empire 2.0". Even though these plans have been rejected by most of the Commonwealth members (The Commonwealth 2016a; 2016b), they reveal the UK's major aspirations for geopolitical reconfigurations.

A key element in the EU's self-image as well as a crucial prerequisite of its 'soft' power is the European 'success story' of peace and integration (Elgström and Chaban 2015, 31–32). The narrative of the EU as an actor for peace and security thus far remains an attractive narrative around the world (Chaban, Miskimmon and O'Loughlin 2017). However, if the European project is continuously associated with political, economic and social crises rather than seen as a prosperous model worth striving for, this will most certainly diminish the Union's attractiveness and its possibility to

effectively ‘lead by example’. Many arguments of the pro-Leave campaigners in the UK as well as rising populist parties in EU member states can be seen as an antithesis to the world view and values embodied by the EU (Adler-Nissen, Galpin and Rosamond 2017, 582). These voices pitch the slogan ‘take back control’ on a national level against uncontrolled globalization and the rule of foreign and technocratic elites (Menon and Salter 2016, 1314). Global actors observe the rise of nationalist and far-right sentiments in the EU, and tend to react negatively (PPMI/NCRE/NFG 2015).

In summary, Brexit threatens to add “to perceptions of the EU as a declining and fragmenting power” (Oliver 2016, 701), thus reducing the EU’s negotiating clout and damaging its image of ‘soft’ power. Brexit will have immediate repercussions on the EU’s perceived market power (Damro 2012) and its resources for international civil and military engagement (Henökl 2017, 4). Yet, “what Brexit means depends not only on who you are but also from where you see it” (Adler-Nissen, Galpin and Rosamond 2017, 578). Changes in perceptual patterns will be *location*-specific (Chaban *et al.* 2013). Moreover, given the myriad of open questions related to Brexit, the EU might be able to influence its external perceptions by its internal and external actions. We argue that those EU external actions that are informed and guided by a systematic account of external reception have a chance to amplify the EU’s influence. In this light, our volume offers a timely collection of analyses how Brexit *has started* influencing external perceptions of the EU. We aim to understand how Brexit will affect the room for manoeuvre of European foreign policy in the near future in the eyes of external observers, and what actions of the ‘new EU 27’ may bear the most positive impact in maintaining the EU’s dialogue with the world.

EU External Perceptions

Evolution of the Research Agenda

Research on external perceptions is rooted in a constructivist approach to foreign policy analysis. It assumes identity (Stark Urrestarazu 2015, 140; Wendt 1992) and roles (Elgström 2008; Harnisch, Frank and Maull 2011; Holsti 1970) to be a key determinant of states’ external action. External perceptions are mental structures formed from experience and knowledge about appropriate behaviour,

while also featuring important affective and normative/evaluative components (Elgström and Chaban 2015, 18–19; Hopmann 1996). External perceptions are theorized to impact upon foreign policy in two different ways. Firstly, external perceptions form the ‘alter part’ of an actor’s role in foreign policy. As such, they are a constitutive component of this role and have repercussions on the actor’s identity. Secondly, external perceptions constrain an actor’s room for manoeuvre in foreign policy as the policies this actor can effectively pursue depend on whether this actor is perceived as legitimate, credible and coherent (Elgström 2007, 952; Elgström and Chaban 2015, 17). The more an actor’s behaviour is seen as legitimate, credible and coherent, the more other actors will be inclined to follow (Elgström and Chaban 2015, 21–23). Such positive perceptions are particularly important when it comes to the assessment of the actor (the EU in our case) in terms of ‘soft power’ (Nye 2004), and ‘normative power’ (Manners 2002). We also argue that perceptions are important for the EU as an ‘economic’ and ‘market power’ (Damro 2012) to project a message of an attractive and beneficial partner as well as for its global political profile be it in international multilateral fora or at the negotiating table in peace talks. For all these ‘instances of power’, reputation and recognition become critical factors in understanding and ensuring the effectiveness of the EU’s foreign policy.

Research of external perceptions of the EU is a dynamic and growing area in the scholarship of EU foreign policy. In the early 2000s, the reconfiguration of international relations post-9/11 sparked interest in EU external perceptions as a new research agenda which aimed at investigating how the EU is recognized as an international actor and/or leader in a changing world. Ever since, EU external perceptions have been studied from a global comparative perspective (see e.g. Chaban and Holland 2008; 2013; 2014; 2019; Chaban, Holland and Ryan 2009; Chaban, Knodt and Verdun 2017; Holland and Chaban 2010; Holland *et al.* 2007; Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2009), inside international organizations (e.g. Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2009) as well as in multilateral settings (Elgström 2008 2007; 2014; Kilian and Elgström 2010). This research agenda has facilitated an “outside-in perspective” in EU foreign policy studies (Keuleers, Fonck and Keukeleire 2016) which had typically been overlooked by the relevant EU-centric scholarship. True to the interdisciplinary nature of the studied phenomena – perceptions and images – scholars in the area have advanced several

multidisciplinary models which have been informed by IR's role theory (Elgström 2007, 2008), image theory (Mišik 2013) and strategic narrative theory (Chaban, Miskimmon and O'Loughlin 2017; 2019), communication studies and cognitive linguistics theories (Chaban and Elgström 2018a; 2018b; Chaban and Holland 2008; 2013; Chaban and Zhabotynska 2018), social identity theories (Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2009; Didelon-Loiseau and Grasland 2014; Bachmann and Müller 2015) and the 'normative power Europe' theoretical approach (Larsen 2014; Pardo 2015).

Since the early 2000s, the research agenda of external perceptions studies has intensified and broadened in several respects. Firstly, it features a growing geography of inquiry, with new case-studies in locations both close to and far away from the EU's borders. Many studies undertook a comparative multinational approach (e.g. the GARNET project (Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2009), EuroBroadMap (online) and EUImagine (online); for multi-country Asia-Pacific perceptions research see e.g. Chaban and Holland 2013; Holland and Chaban 2014; Lisbonne de Vergeron 2011; Stumbaum *et al.* 2015). Other projects chose to proceed with a one-country setting.ⁱⁱ Secondly, the changing EU triggered new questions and thematic foci. The big Eastern enlargement in 2004 and 2007 inspired research on EU perceptions in the EU's neighbourhood (see e.g. Chaban, Knodt and Headley 2018; EuropeAid 2010; Bachmann and Müller 2015; Pardo 2015). In a different vein, focusing on issue-specific perceptions, the field has turned to images of the EU as a development actor (see EU Global Perceptions project (online), 2006-2007 phase), a destination for migration (EUImagine (online)) and a global energy governance actor (Chaban, Knodt and Verdun 2017; Knodt, Chaban and Nielsen 2017). The latest studies of EU perceptions reflected on new critical circumstances in Europe. While the prolonged Eurozone/ sovereign debt crisis has been continuing to dent the EU's external images, the post-Maidan events in Ukraine and the refugee and asylum crisis have also challenged the image of the EU (see e.g. Chaban, Knodt and Headley 2018; Chaban and Holland 2019; Chaban and Zhabotynska 2018; Chaban, Miskimmon and O'Loughlin 2019).

The growing research on EU external perceptions feeds into external action practice. The consultation process that informed the EU Global Strategy (European Union 2016) included a study of EU

perceptions in ten EU strategic partner countries commissioned by the European External Action Service (EEAS) (PPMI/NCRE/NFG 2015). The transnational research project *EU Global Perceptions* (online) has informed the Asia Europe Foundation's public diplomacy training of European and Asian diplomats (ASEF, online). Additionally, in 2017, the European Commission has initiated the first ever external Eurobarometer study of EU external perceptions in 11 countries, thus to some extent testifying to the fruitful results of the research on EU external perceptions (European Commission 2017).

Our volume adds to the studies of external perceptions of the EU. The volume is one of the first comprehensive attempts to identify the impact of Brexit on the EU's images around the world. The vast geography of its inquiry is informed by the EU Global Strategy 2016 which revisited the priorities assigned to different global regions. The volume follows the logic of the new Strategy and features case-studies from the Wide Atlantic, the Middle East, Africa, Asia as well as the EU's immediate neighbours to the East and South. Contributors to our volume provide unique systematic insights into the *change* of EU perceptions comparing them before and after the Brexit vote. Importantly, research into the evolution of EU external perceptions on the global scale remains rare.

Our volume also expands the arsenal of analytical tools in the area showcasing a number of theories and a range of methods employed to answer the three leading research questions. Theories informing individual cases come from political science, international relations, EU studies, psychology, social identity and communication studies. Theoretical diversity and synergies are to be expected. Relevant literature notes that external perceptions research in EU studies features a range of theories reflecting the multidisciplinary nature of the phenomena under observation (see Mišik 2013; Lucarelli 2014; Chaban and Elgström 2020). In order to compare across locations, all contributions to the volume engage with a set of overarching concepts instrumental in understanding external perceptions of the EU and their evolution at times of the Brexit crisis. These concepts are elaborated next.

Conceptualizing Research on EU External Perceptions

While it is important to track and examine perceptions, it is equally important to investigate how these perceptions came into existence. EU perceptions are argued to vary between *locations*, *issues* and *cohorts* (Chaban *et al.* 2013). Our volume ‘locks in’ one *issue* – looming Brexit – while inviting analyses of EU images from different *locations* – external partners from the areas designated by the EU Global Strategy to be of strategic importance to the EU. We expect that EU perceptions at times of the uncertainty triggered by the Brexit vote will differ between countries – but perhaps display similarities among those who belong to the same geo-political region, justifying the EU Global Strategy’s logic to single out a set of key regions. We also expect that different *cohorts* within each country will see the impact of the impending Brexit – on the EU, their country and immediate region – differently. How political leaders perceive the impact of Brexit may differ from how the general public, civil society, newsmakers or business circles see it. Mapping divergences and convergences between locations and cohorts will illuminate paths for a more effective and efficient EU external action and dialogue with international partners.

We argue that *location*- and *cohort*-specific perceptions of the EU in the context of the UK’s imminent departure from the Union will be shaped by the interplay of (1) *exogenous (EU-specific)*, (2) *endogenous (third country-specific)*, and (3) *global* factors (Tsuruoka 2006; 2008; Chaban and Magdalena 2014). (1) What the EU does or says will inevitably influence how it is seen outside its borders. These EU-specific actions and words, *exogenous* to the third country under scrutiny, may relate directly to this country (e.g. the EU initiates an FTA with a certain third country), or may be internal to the EU (e.g. the EU elaborates its budget or decides its future enlargement strategy). (2) On the other hand, what a third country does or says will influence the EU’s images in this country. The third country’s actions and words may relate directly to the EU (e.g. a third country signs an FTA with the EU) or may be third country-specific (e.g. a third country elects a government that is not pro-European). Such *endogenous* factors are critical to account for: they are reflective of the current local priorities, key events, powerful actors, “reality and self-visions of the country’s political system, as well as its history and culture, norms and values, media system, and linguistic patterns” (Chaban,

Knodt and Headley 2018: 14). These factors are found to be paramount when the EU attempts a normative transmission or diffusion towards an external partner (Chaban and Pardo 2015). (3) Finally, the literature argues that *global* factors – i.e. those beyond control of both the EU and a third country – influence external perceptions of the EU (Chaban and Magdalina, 2014). Global power shifts, a changing architecture of the world and a potential demise of a rules-based global order figure among this type of factors (Chaban, Knodt and Headley 2018, 13; Keuleers 2015; PPMI/NCRE/NFG 2015).

The intersections between *location*- and *cohort*-specific perceptions triggered by an interplay of *exogenous* (EU-specific), *endogenous* (third country-specific) and *global* factors shape the images of the EU in third countries. Importantly, this intersection is also influenced by temporal factors: immediate crises and revolutionary events that may change EU images dramatically in short term *vis-à-vis* longer periods that trigger the evolution of EU images over time (Braudel 1989; Didelon-Loiseau and Grasland 2014). The unexpected and dramatic nature of the Brexit decision and persisting uncertainty around it suggests possible changes to the EU's external perceptions. The contributions to this volume deal primarily with events on a *micro-histoire* plane (Braudel 1989). They analyse if Brexit – as a *short-term* critical event – constitutes a watershed able to change the image of the EU quickly and in a profound way. They also ask if the change in EU images comes with dents and damages. And while scholars argue that images are resistant to change (see Elgström 2000; Jönsson 1990; Jervis 1976), a quick change in the images of an IR actor may happen under certain scope conditions: strong and persistent contradictions between an actor's behaviour and existing images of this actor; a situation is seen as a 'watershed'/'history making' (and the "self", i.e. the perceiving actor, is potentially affected); a feeling of uncertainty around a situation; and involvement of strong emotions. Arguably, the Brexit vote and actual Brexit are strong candidates to meet the four conditions. Significantly, each contribution also engages with longer-term insights as historical perspectives help to explain changes (or resistance to change) in the images of the EU in a specific location.

A complex interplay between the *issue*-, *location*- and *cohort*-specific perceptions with *exogenous*, *endogenous* and *global* factors existing in *short*-, *medium*- and *long-term* temporal dimensions will continue to shape EU external images. Conceptualising this interplay offers a path for a nuanced analysis of EU external perceptions in each case in our volume. Arguably, nuances are critical for maximizing the EU's dialogue with strategic regions and partners post-Brexit.

Methodology

Echoing the diversity of theoretical frameworks in the field of EU external perceptions, relevant research also employs a variety of research designs and methods. As discussed above, some projects are trans-national studies, others focus on single countries. Many of the studies are comparative – these may compare EU perceptions across locations, time periods, cohorts or discourses. Among the studies that examine EU images in multiple locations, there are studies that employ identical methods to collect and analyse the data in each location (e.g. *EU Global Perceptions* (online); *EuroBroadMap* (online); *EUmanage* (online)). Other multi-location studies choose to focus on identical research questions, but employ various case-specific methods (e.g. Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2009; Bachmann and Müller 2015). This volume belongs to the latter category. Contributors to the volume engage with a number of methods from qualitative, quantitative and mixed approaches adding to the arsenal of techniques in EU perceptions studies and proposing methodological innovations. Thereby, this methodological diversity enhances the analytical value added of the volume. Importantly, the case-studies featured in the volume focus on key cohorts (national elites on government and non-government levels and the general public) and key discourses (official documents and media content).

Robert Jervis (1976, 28) noted that “it is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decision-makers’ beliefs about the world and their images of others”. These are the frames through which policy-makers make sense of and judge the world. Unsurprisingly, numerous studies in the EU perception area focus on views held by policy-, decision- and opinion-making elites. Such perceptions are typically mapped via the analyses of interviews, official documents and speeches (Lucarelli 2014, 2–6). Framing theory by Entman (2003; 2004) argues that

the meanings and frames of foreign policy actors, events and identities “activate and spread from the top level [...] to the network of non-administration elites, and on to news organizations, their texts, and the public” (Entman 2003, 415). Contributions to this volume engage with different levels of national elites as well as with official discourses in the analysis of EU perceptions at times of uncertainty following the Brexit referendum. Most studies rely on elite interviews, though with different elites, and complement these with other data sources. For example, Chaban and Knodt (2020) and Lisbonne-de Vergeron (2020) have conducted interviews with a broader range of Ukrainian and Indian political, business, civil society, cultural and media elites. Endo (2020) as well as Jin and Kirchner (2020) engage with official documents and think tank reports to gauge Japanese and Chinese perceptions of the EU in times of Brexit. The studies on Canada (Hurrelmann 2020), the US (Speyer, Hähn and Niemann 2020) and Mexico (Dominguez 2020) take discursive interventions from politicians as the starting point for their investigations and complement them with analyses of select think-tanks (US and Mexico) and journalists (Canada and Mexico).

The role of influential media in political learning, communication and opinion-formation has been long advocated by communication studies. News media constitute the decisive transmission belt for communicating identity conceptions in both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ directions (Entman 2003, 420). While some observers argue that in the case of the EU, news media coverage tends to be rather limited, we argue that the EU’s multiple crises have raised the EU’s media visibility (Guinaudeau and Palau 2016). This is through reports that portray the EU’s crises taking place in Europe as well as reports that analyse how the EU’s challenges may or do influence external partners (EU news stories with the so-called ‘local hook’). In comparison to the studies of EU perceptions through elite discourses, media studies remain in a relative deficit (Elgström and Chaban 2015, 25–28). A burgeoning direction in the studies of EU images in media is analyses of the Internet, and social media in particular (Bain and Chaban 2017; PPMI/NCRE/NFG 2015; Chung 2013). In our volume, images of the EU in new internet media were in the focus of analyses by Park and Chung (2020), who explore EU images in South Korea through YouTube Videos and Isani, Schlipphak and Silverman (2020) who analyse tweets on the EU in the MENA region. Other authors focused on traditional media: Alpan and

Şenyuva (2020), Lazarou, Cuotto and Luciano (2020) and Kotsopoulos (2020) complemented their study of elite opinion in Turkey, Brazil and South Africa respectively with insights into influential print media.

EU perceptions among the general public are increasingly attracting scholars' attention. While EU perceptions among elites are "the most informed, nuanced, multifaceted and dynamic" (Elgström and Chaban 2015, 28), public opinion studies are gaining traction, not least due to the development of EU public diplomacy within the EEAS structure (see Chaban and Beltyukova 2014). Importantly, public images have been found to be rather generic and stable, mostly due to the low level of knowledge on the EU among the publics outside the Union. Large-N studies of public opinion demonstrate that there are meaningful differences in EU images triggered by individual-specific factors (such as age, gender, region, education, income, personal contacts with the EU and interpersonal communication about the EU) (see e.g. Keuleers 2015; PPMI/NCRE/NFG 2015; Isani and Schlipphak 2017). Awareness of these differences is instrumental in crafting an informed and effective EU public diplomacy. In this volume, several authors relied on public opinion to complement their analyses of elite perceptions. This cohort features particularly prominently in Kelly's and Mochan's (2020) study of EU perceptions in Australia and New Zealand. Ananieva (2020) reconstructs EU perceptions in Russia by adding public opinion data to insights derived from interviews with Russian think tank experts, media and official discourse.

Structure and Contributions

Following this Introduction, the first contribution in this volume takes on an 'inside-out' perspective setting the scene for external partners' perceptions. Geoffrey Edwards (2020) discusses the UK's view on Brexit and foreign policy, as well as images of the EU in the UK post-Brexit referendum. Thereafter, the volume encompasses five sections, each focused on a strategic region as defined by the EU Global Strategy.

The first section deals with the EU's neighbours to the East and South and includes chapters on Turkey (Alpan and Şenyuva 2020), Russia (Ananieva 2020) and Ukraine (Chaban and Knodt 2020). The Wide Atlantic region covered in section two is represented by case-studies on the US (Speyer, Hähn and Niemann 2020), Canada (Hurrelmann 2020), Mexico (Dominguez 2020) and Brazil (Lazarou, Cuotto and Luciano 2020). The Middle East and Africa (section 3) are covered by studies on South African perceptions of the EU after Brexit (Kotsopoulos 2020) as well as an analysis on the MENA region (Isani, Schlipphak and Silverman 2020). India (Lisbonne-de-Vergeron 2020), Korea (Park and Chung 2020), China (Jin and Kirchner 2020) and Japan (Endo 2020) are studied as cases from Asia (section 4), complemented by a study on Australia and New Zealand by Kelly and Mochan (2020). In their conclusion, Chaban, Niemann and Speyer (2020) summarize the main results and reflect on the effect of changing external perceptions of the EU on its foreign policy and external action.

The volume first turns towards the EU's neighbours to the South and East. Based on semi-structured interviews with politicians, public opinion data and a media analysis, Alpan and Şenyuva (2020) explore whether Brexit and particularly the new relationship between the EU and the UK might be a model for EU-Turkey relations. They find that the prospect of Brexit has generally not dented the attractiveness of EU membership for Turkish EU experts even though they reserve final judgement until the actual realization of the British exit. Ananieva (2020) looks at decision-makers, opinion-making elites and the general public for EU perceptions post Brexit vote in Russia. She argues that Brexit is generally perceived as an intra EU-UK issue that will weaken the UK. For the EU, Russian perceptions envision two scenarios: (1) a weakening of the EU, as Brexit might heighten Euroscepticism, thus diminishing the EU's power to 'lead by example' or (2) an increased intra-European differentiation into core and periphery. Chaban and Knodt (2020) study EU perceptions in the crisis-ridden Ukraine. Informed by IR's image theory, the chapter surveys elite opinion among Ukrainian political, business, civil society, cultural and media elites. It shows that the EU is not seen to suffer a critical loss of capability or opportunity as a result of Brexit. Yet, importantly, reflections on Brexit and the Russia-Ukraine conflict occur in parallel, suggesting that images of the EU after the

UK leaves will continue to be influenced by the ongoing conflict and Ukrainian internal developments.

As for the Wide Atlantic, the chapters on the US and Canada both analyse EU perceptions through political discourse. Speyer, Hähn and Niemann (2020) examine Presidential remarks from the Obama and Trump administrations and analyses commissioned by two leading think-tanks (the Brookings Institution and the Heritage Foundation) which align themselves to the opposite sides of the political continuum in the US while nurturing close relations with the respective governments. Hurrelmann (2020) analyses public statements on Brexit by representatives of Canada's two main parties - the currently ruling Liberal Party and the oppositional Conservative Party. Both chapters observe an increasing politicization of transatlantic relations. In the US, a liberal internationalist perspective which rejects Brexit as detrimental for the UK, the EU and the US is pitched against a trumpian-conservative praise of national sovereignty and a zero-sum conception of cooperation. In Canada, the traditionally UK- and Commonwealth-oriented Conservatives are pitched against the pro-EU multilateralist liberals. The result for Canada may be dramatic – namely, the emergence of two competing visions of the transatlantic relationship, each based on its own specific perception of the EU, whose relative influence on public policy depends on short-term political factors. To gauge EU perceptions in Mexico, Dominguez (2020) studies statements by public officials, scholars and influential journalists between 2016 and 2018. He argues that in Mexico Brexit is perceived overwhelmingly negatively. This is due to its potential disruptive effects on the European integration process. For Mexico, the EU continues to represent a desirable, admired and exemplary partner. The most recent modernization of the EU-Mexico association agreement (in April 2018) and the derogatory rhetoric of US President Trump towards Mexico are the two key factors that influence this persistent positive EU perception in Mexico. Lazarou, Cuotto and Luciano (2020) analyse EU perceptions post Brexit referendum among Brazilian political, intellectual and entrepreneurial elites, as well as in the mainstream online and print media. They find that Brazilian narratives of the EU are linked to the benefits of regionalism and the perception of the EU as global (trade) power. Thus far, they have not been significantly affected by the Brexit decision.

The chapters on South Africa and the MENA region also focus on elite perceptions and discourses. Kotsopoulos (2020) opts for a comprehensive review of the analysis of Brexit in the South African press, think-tank and research environment. He detects a negative but functional reception of Brexit, which is focused on its economic costs. Brexit is almost exclusively discussed with reference to the UK, while perceptions of the EU remain entrenched with little, if anything, said about the consequences for the EU or the Union's decline as a global actor. Isani, Schlipphak and Silverman (2020) base their analysis of EU perceptions in the MENA region on elite statements in leading newspapers and on Twitter. Their results indicate that Brexit did not substantially alter the EU's perceived legitimacy in the Gulf, the Levant and Iran. However, opinions diverge across the region about how Brexit will change the relationship of individual states with the EU and on whether the EU is seen as a model of regional integration to be emulated by the MENA states.

The final section of the volume addresses the Asia-Pacific region. For India, Lisbonne de Vergeron (2020) detects "a shift of strategic interests in the wake of Brexit". Her analysis of interviews with representatives of the Indian political, academic, business and media elite reveals how India maintains a focus on bilateral relations, rather than on the supranational EU. However, Brexit, which is largely perceived as detrimental to the UK, accelerates the ongoing replacement of the UK as a traditional partner - by France in the realm of security cooperation and by Germany in economic issues. Park and Chung (2020), by contrast, focus on EU perceptions of the South Korean public as expressed in internet media, specifically YouTube videos on Cameron's referendum pledge and the Brexit referendum. With the help of semantic network analysis, they find that Koreans harbour a deep anxiety about the effects of Brexit on the EU and the UK as well as their respective partnerships with South Korea. Yet, the sustained economic importance of EU-South Korea trade ensures a concern for and overall positive evaluation of the EU. Chinese elite's perceptions of the EU after Brexit are gauged by Jin and Kirchner (2020) via the analysis of official documents, media reports and interviews with government officials and think tanks. The authors show that Brexit is considered a tremendous upheaval in EU integration which will have repercussions on the international order generally and EU-

China relations particularly. The assessment has, however, grown more favourable given the EU's cohesion demonstrated in the EU-UK negotiations and due to China's conflict with US President Trump. The influence of the US' unilateral policy also nurtures a growing sense of common interest and mutual dependence of Japanese elites towards both the EU and the UK, as they are considered key allies in maintaining the liberal international order (Endo 2020). While Britain's decision to leave the EU has already triggered Japanese economic interests to shift from the UK to the EU27, the US policy shift has overshadowed Brexit, thereby attenuating considerable negative effects on Japanese perceptions of the EU.

The chapter by Kelly and Mochan (2020) studies EU perceptions post-Brexit in Australia and New Zealand. Both countries are part of the Commonwealth and the Five Eyes Intelligence Cooperation with the US and the UK and are therefore particularly interesting with regard to the effects of Brexit on EU perceptions. Based on quantitative and qualitative analysis of media data, interviews and opinion polls, the authors show that Brexit as an issue has high salience in both countries, even eclipsing the New Zealand-EU and Australia-EU FTAs currently being negotiated. As a result, perceptions and relations are dominated by confusion, rather than progressive policy impulses, suggesting a further concentration of the foreign policy of the two countries on the Asia-Pacific, rather than the UK and EU.

Concluding remarks

Our volume presents a comprehensive collection of conceptually-driven and empirically-rich case-studies into EU perceptions around the world at times of major uncertainty triggered by the Brexit referendum of 2016. Over three years of confusion and ambiguity cannot go unnoticed either for internal or external observers. Taken together, the following chapters paint a nuanced and detailed picture of the changing world that the EU is confronted with while, at the same time, managing the unprecedented challenge of a member state's exit. Given Britain's economic importance, military strength and diplomatic ties, this exit will leave traces, both internally and on the EU's relations with and perceptions in the wider world. However, overall the chapters suggest a relatively limited change

to the global perceptions of the EU following the UK membership referendum. Beyond the economic realm, Brexit has had little independent impact on the images of the EU as a global actor. Having said that, Brexit is viewed to add to the pre-existing crises of the EU that keep undermining the EU's global appeal. The interplay of *exogenous*, *endogenous* and *global* factors has shaped some common trends and also notable differences between countries and regions that are discussed in greater detail in the concluding chapter (Chaban, Niemann and Speyer 2020). The chapters of this volume take the analysis of the EU's external reception as a starting point for providing policy advice to foreign policy makers around the world and particularly in the EU. This way, we hope to further both the analysis of foreign policy in the academic realm and foreign policy making at a more practical level.

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ⁱ While a deal between the UK and the EU according to which the UK remains in the Single Market remains a theoretic possibility, it is now highly unlikely.

ⁱⁱ See for example: EU perceptions in China e.g. Lisbonne de Vergeron (2007); Shambaugh, Sandschneider and Hong (2008); Zhang (2011), see also project "Disaggregating Chinese perceptions of the EU" (European Commission n.d.); EU perceptions in Japan e.g. Tsuruoka (2006; 2008); Oshiba (2012); EU perceptions in India e.g. Jain and Pandey (2010; 2013); Lisbonne de Vergeron (2006; 2011); EU perceptions in South Africa e.g. Fioramonti and Poletti (2008); EU perceptions in Canada e.g. Croci and Tossutti (2007); EU perceptions in Arab countries: Isani and Schlipphak (2017).