„Introduction: The EU as International Mediator - Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives”

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Introduction:

The EU as International Mediator - Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives

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Introduction
Since the beginning of the 2000s, we have been witnessing the European Union’s (EU) increased direct support for peace negotiations in a variety of inter- and intra-state conflicts and across different regions in its near and far abroad. The EU has established a track record of direct mediation engagement in a number of international conflicts, in particular, in its Eastern neighborhood (Bergmann and Niemann 2015: 971-72). In addition to its involvement as a direct lead or co-mediator in peace negotiations, the EU has also supported peace processes by providing information and communication channels to conflict parties, facilitating dialogue between opposing political parties in

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post-election crises or enabling and promoting mediation efforts of other international actors (Gündüz and Herbolzheimer 2010).

The introduction of the Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities in 2009 demonstrated the EU’s aspiration to increase and systematize its capacities in mediation and sharpen its profile as an international mediator (Council of the EU 2009). The Concept is the first EU document dealing exclusively with the EU’s role as a mediator in international conflicts and constitutes the main reference point for EU mediation activities. (Council of the European Union 2009: 6–9). The Concept does not place mediation within one specific policy field of EU external relations, emphasizing its cross-sectoral nature involving both ‘CFSP/ESDP and Community instruments’; it thus provides the opportunity to apply mediation to all phases of a conflict (Council of the European Union 2009: 4).

The European Union Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy adopted in June 2016 further emphasizes the importance of mediation as an instrument to prevent and settle violent conflicts (European Union 2016: 29-31). The Global Strategy acknowledges that mediation is an important component of the EU’s toolbox to address violent conflicts and situations of fragility. Institutional innovations such as the establishment of a Mediation Support Team within the European External Action Service (EEAS) in 2012 and the creation of a European Parliamentary Support Service within the European Parliament’s bureaucracy all underline the significance that is assigned to mediation in the EU’s foreign policy discourse and practice.

Despite these developments, the academic literature has not kept pace with the overall increase of the EU’s significance as an international mediator. Both the literature on EU foreign policy and that on international mediation contain few systematic and conceptually-oriented explorations and empirical assessments of the EU's efforts to mediate in conflicts. One reason for this is that both bodies of literature still rarely speak to each other (exceptions include: Bergmann and Niemann
The existing literature on EU mediation activities is nascent and can be divided into two strands. First, there are some studies that investigate the principles, concepts and policies that guide and underlie the EU’s involvement as mediator in conflicts (Davis 2014; Friis 2007; Girke 2015). Second, there are a few single-case studies that focus more explicitly on the EU’s influence and effectiveness as mediator on peace negotiations and conflict dynamics (Brandenburg 2017; Bieber 2015; Forsberg and Seppo 2010; Grono 2010).

Yet, some of these studies only provide rudimentary analytical frameworks and do not substantially contribute to systematization of knowledge and theory-building. In addition, there is a lack of comparative work that analyses EU mediation involvement across cases (exception is Bergmann 2017). Presently, we know very little about the EU’s different mediator roles. And further, the extent to which the five types of EU mediation involvement, identified in the 2009 Concept (conducting, promoting, leveraging, supporting, and funding mediation), are reflected by empirical ‘reality’. There is little research on the interplay between mediation and other types of EU conflict management activity (Whitman and Wolff 2012). Consequently, we know little about how EU mediation potentially adds up to the EU’s effectiveness as a peacemaker in international politics (cf. Blockmans 2014; Ginsberg 2001; Gross and Juncos 2010).

The goal of this special issue is to make a contribution to the nascent literature on EU mediation and shed light on an insufficiently explored and under-theorized facet of EU foreign policy. Most importantly, it seeks to improve our conceptual and empirical understanding of the European Union's role(s) as a mediator in peace negotiations, which may also lead us to identify potential avenues for further research on this topic.

The remainder of this introductory article is structured as follows: first, we further unpack the concept of mediation and offer a definition of EU mediation practice that allows for a comprehensive assessment of the EU’s roles and activities in international mediation. Second, we define the
scope of this collection and identify three research questions that guide the different contributions to this special issue. Third, we propose tentative building blocks for a framework to analyse EU mediation activities, structured along three key concepts: (a) mediator motivation, describing the different possible motives for the EU to become involved in international mediation; (b) mediation roles, referring both to the type of mediator arrangement under which the EU is involved in a mediation effort and the strategy and tactics the EU is applying as mediator; and (c) mediation effectiveness, referring to different standards of evaluation for EU mediation involvement. Finally, we provide an overview of the contributions to this special issue and specify how the different papers address the main research questions of this collection.

**Defining EU mediation practice**

Mediation is an instrument of conflict management that can be applied to a wide variety of conflict types, ranging from divorce situations, to labor management negotiations to violent conflicts within and between states (Greig and Diehl 2012: 2). Here, the term “international mediation” describes mediation efforts in which either the mediator or one of the conflict parties is of different nationality in comparison to the other parties involved in the mediation process (in contrast, mediation between and through actors that all share the same nationality would not be regarded as international mediation). In international politics, mediation is not a new phenomenon and its use to settle conflicts dates back to the history of ancient Greece and Rome (Eckstein 1988, 2002).

In both violent and non-violent conflicts, mediation is considered an important instrument of international peacemaking (Wallensteen and Svensson 2014: 315). The latest version of the International Conflict Management Dataset, the most frequently used database in mediation research developed by Jacob Bercovitch and colleagues (Bercovitch et al. 1991; Bercovitch and Fretter 2007), identifies 2632 individual mediation attempts across 333 different conflicts in the period
between 1945 and 1999. The majority of these attempts have been made in intrastate conflicts (71.47%) compared to a lesser number of efforts in interstate conflicts (28.53%). As Greig and Diehl (2012: 32–33) demonstrate, the 1990s have seen more mediation attempts than in the entire Cold War period (1945-1989), and according to Wallensteen and Svensson (2014: 317), ‘this trend seems to remain’.

Given the variety of contexts in which mediation can be applied, it is unsurprising that one finds a wide range of definitions and conceptualisations of mediation employed both in mediation research and practice. In academic scholarship, definitions differ mostly with regard to (1) distinct features of mediation in comparison to other conflict management tools, (2) the role and behavior of the mediator, and (3) the overall goal of mediation. For instance, Oran R. Young adopts a broad definition of mediation as referring to

‘any action taken by an actor that is not a direct party to the crisis, that is designed to reduce or remove one or more of the problems of the bargaining relationship, and therefore to facilitate the termination of the crisis itself’ (Young 1967: 34).

Young’s conceptualisation of mediation appears to encompass all third-party intervention making it less useful to specify the EU’s new mediation role in peace processes. Others perceive the neutrality or impartiality of the third party intermediary as the key characteristic of mediation (Folberg and Taylor 1984: 7) thus focusing on the particular mediation style. Overall, most definitions of mediation share the following: the characteristic of third-party involvement in the management of a conflict; an emphasis on the voluntary and non-violent nature of mediation and the non-binding character of mediation outcomes. These features are well summarized in the most prominent scholarly definition of mediation by Bercovitch and colleagues (Bercovitch et al. 1991: 8) who understand mediation as a

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2 See also Themner and Wallensteen (2013: 7–8) and Bergmann (2014: 237–41).
‘process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law’.

The EU’s definition formulated in the 2009 Concept is slightly broader in the way that it frames mediation as a tool of conflict transformation, but also more precise in defining the role of the mediator who ‘is both involved in the process and substance of the negotiations by making suggestions and proposals’ (Council of the European Union 2009: 2–3). Apart from taking up the role of a mediator in peace negotiations, the Concept specifies four more indirect types of mediation involvement, differentiating between promoting, leveraging, supporting, and funding mediation (Council of the European Union 2009: 6). As Haastrup et al. (2014: 3) note, the EU’s conceptualization of mediation is deliberately broad precisely because it allows for the deployment of mediation at all stages in the conflict cycle.

How to best conceptualize EU mediation practice for this special issue’s purpose of mapping the field of the EU’s involvement in international mediation? To be able to fully understand the EU’s role in international mediation, we argue for taking into account both the EU’s role as lead or co-mediator in peace negotiations and more indirect forms of mediation involvement as specified in the 2009 Concept. Thus, we propose to differentiate between two types of EU mediation practice: *EU mediation* and *EU mediation support*.

In this issue we utilize the definition of Bergmann and Niemann (2015: 959) who refer to EU mediation as ‘as any efforts by single or collective actors representing the Union to assist negotiations between conflict parties and to help them bringing about a settlement to their conflict’. This definition is suitable for the purpose of the special issue for two reasons. First, it further specifies the actor dimension of EU mediation efforts. As Girke (2015: 513) rightly points out, no formal
mandating procedure for mediation has been established in the EU’s foreign policy system which implies that mediation can be applied by a range of different actors at various levels of EU foreign policy, including the High Representative, EU Special Representatives, Heads of EU delegations and CSDP personnel, the Council Presidency, and Members of the European Parliament (cf. Davis 2014: 97). The important point is that these actors act in their capacity of representatives of the Union. Second, it limits the focus to the EU’s involvement in negotiations, which, in turn, implies that efforts of shuttle diplomacy and good offices – conflict management instruments that do not necessitate that conflict parties de facto negotiate with each other – would rather be considered as mediation support activities.

EU mediation support, in contrast, refers to all EU activities that aim to support mediation efforts by other third parties, be it states, international and regional organisations or non-state actors. More specifically, the Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities identifies three measures that correspond with our conceptualisation of mediation support: (1) funding mediation processes led by other third parties; (2) leveraging mediation efforts by providing diplomatic support and/or economic incentives for compromise solutions and supporting the implementation of agreements through a variety of CFSP/CSDP and Community instruments; and (3) supporting mediation, referring to the contribution to capacity building and training as well as the provision of expertise to mediators and conflict parties (Council of the European Union 2009: 6).³

In sum, we propose to adopt a broad understanding of EU mediation practice that captures the wide variety of activities the EU is conducting in the field of mediation. This approach allows us to systematically map the field of EU mediation practice and cover a range of aspects and facets of EU mediation practice that have not yet been sufficiently explored. In the next sections, we discuss

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³ In addition, the Concept identifies promoting mediation as fourth type of mediation involvement, which refers to the more general commitment to promote the use of mediation as a non-violent conflict management instrument.
the EU’s institutional architecture for mediation and mediation support, before outlining the research questions that guide this special issue.

The EU’s institutional architecture for mediation activities

The institutional architecture in support of EU mediation activities primarily builds on CFSP/CSDP actors, but also assigns a role to the European Commission (Council of the European Union 2009: 4-5). Within the CFSP structures, the PSC is the most important organ when it comes to defining the mandates of EU mediators and controlling the strategic direction of mediation efforts (Treaty on European Union, Art. 38, 43). It is in the PSC where member states are regularly updated about EU mediation efforts carried out by the High Representative, EU Special Representatives or other EU actors and discuss and decide on the mandates of EU mediators (Council of the European Union 2009: 4). While the PSC is subordinate to COREPER II in terms of preparing FAC’s meetings, decisions and positions taken by the PSC are usually not changed by COREPER II (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014: 69).

Concerning the conduct of EU mediation, the High Representative (HR) /Vice-President of the Commission, the European Special Representatives as well as the EEAS and EU delegations have been at the “front line” of mediation activities. The three High Representatives of the EU’s foreign policy to date – Javier Solana, Catherine Ashton and Federica Mogherini – have been personally involved and led a number of prominent EU mediation efforts. During his term of office, HR Solana played a key role in brokering the Ohrid Framework Agreement between the Macedonian government and the Albanian opposition; mediated the Belgrade Agreement between Serbia and Montenegro on the formation of a state union, and was involved in the multilateral effort to broker an
agreement between the Ukrainian government and opposition to re-run the run-off elections between Viktor Yanukovych and Viktor Yushchenko (Ilievski and Taleski 2010; Bergmann 2017; Pifer 2007). Solana’s successor, Baroness Catherine Ashton, invested a lot of personal effort in leading the high-level talks between the Prime Ministers of Serbia and Kosovo in the framework of the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue (Bergman and Niemann 2015: 965). In addition, HR Ashton lead the EU’s diplomatic efforts to find a solution to the political crisis in Egypt in the aftermath of the Arab Spring (see Pinfari in this issue). HR Federica Mogherini, who succeeded Ashton in 2014, continued the efforts to mediate in the high-level dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia and was on the frontline of the EU’s efforts to broker the Joint Comprehensive Plan for Action on Iran’s nuclear programme (Sauer 2015: 107–16).

While the High Representatives have been the leading figures in high-level mediation efforts, EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) are the main EU institutional actors involved in mediation activities at all different levels. EUSRs are important players in the day-to-day conduct of EU foreign policy with a broad range of responsibilities in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management. As Adebahr (2012: 165) puts it,

‘in terms of crisis management, there is hardly anything EUSRs do not do, stretching from classic diplomatic activities (like regional and multilateral collaboration, the supervision of human rights and the rule of law, as well as public diplomacy) to active engagement in conflict resolution (including through participation in peace negotiations, supervision of the implementation of international agreements, institution-building and security sector reform)’ (Adebahr 2012: 165).
The 2009 Concept thus strongly emphasizes the EUSRs’ significance as providers of a number of mediation- and dialogue-related tasks (Council of the European Union 2009: 5). As several contributions to this special issue demonstrate, EUSRs for specific crisis regions and conflicts are the main EU instrument for mediation activities (see Davis, Pinfari, Elgström et al. in this volume).

In the EEAS’s headquarters in Brussels, the Division on Prevention of Conflicts, Rule of Law/SSR, Integrated Approach, Stabilisation and Mediation (PRISM) – formerly known as the K2 Division on Conflict Prevention, Peace-building and Mediation Instruments – is the most important body related to EU mediation policy. The division is responsible for policy development on issues ‘such as the monitoring of potential crisis situations, mediation, and deployment of mediators or observers on the ground in potential conflict zones’ (Middleton et al. 2011: 16). In particular, the Mediation Support Team (MST) created in 2011 within the K2 division developed into a key supporting and coordinating body in the field of mediation (cf. Brandenburg 2017: 7). While the MST itself is not engaged as third-party mediator in violent conflicts, it has offered a series of coaching and training activities for EEAS (and EU delegations staff and thus serves as an important “in-house” provider of mediation expertise and knowledge. In addition, it has provided operational support to EU actors engaged in mediation efforts and has started to develop a cooperation network with other international public and private actors, in particular with the United Nations Mediation Support Unit (European External Action Service 2013; Sherriff and Hauck 2012).

In addition to CFSP bodies, the European Commission has been a key driver of the development and institutionalization of EU conflict prevention policy, which constitutes the overarching framework of the EU’s approach to mediation (Stewart 2008). EU mediation may also involve Community instruments and actors in cases where EU mediation efforts are linked with other areas of EU foreign policy such as development or enlargement policy (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014: 61–63). One example is the close involvement of European Commission officials in the EU’s mediation
team in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue (Bergmann 2017: 199-200). Moreover, the key mechanism to fund EU mediation support activities is the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), formerly Instrument for Stability (IfS), a community instrument funded under Heading IV of the EU’s budget. IcSP funds are managed and overseen by the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, a Commission body under the authority of the High Representative for the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy/ Vice-President of the Commission. For the period between 2014 and 2017, for example, € 25.5 million have been designated to finance measures in the field of confidence-building, mediation, dialogue and reconciliation (European Commission 2014). The most prominent IcSP activity in relation to EU mediation activities is the European Resources for Mediation Support (ERMES) project that has established a rapid-response network to deploy mediators and conflict prevention experts to acute crisis situations and provided third parties with training and coaching in mediation skills (European Commission 2016).

The EU’s institutional architecture for mediation activities thus involves a number of institutions and actors at various levels within the EU’s foreign policy system. The EU’s institutional architecture for mediation comprising both CFSP actors and Community instruments mirrors the cross-cutting character of mediation as an instrument at the intersection of CFSP and other EU external policies (Council of the European Union 2009: 4). As will be shown by several contributions to this special issue, EU mediation activities often involve ad hoc arrangements that span across policies and institutions, which makes coordination in mediation efforts a particular challenge (see Davis, Pinfari, in this special issue).

Focus of the special issue and research questions
This special issue seeks to improve our understanding of EU mediation, both empirically and conceptually. In empirical terms, it maps the field of EU mediation practice and provides a nuanced and empirically rich knowledge about EU mediation and mediation support in various conflict regions. In conceptual terms, it seeks to identify and discuss suitable theoretical approaches and conceptual tools to analyse EU mediation practice and thereby to bridge the divide between Conflict and EU Foreign Policy Studies. The special issue, thus, addresses a significant research gap in the academic literature on international mediation and aims to contribute to a more systematic research into this field of EU foreign policy.

The contributions to this special issue address three research questions:

1) What are the motivations and institutional drivers of EU engagement in international mediation?

2) How do the different roles and strategies the EU adopts shape its mediation practice?

3) To what extent is the EU effective in mediation and mediation support activities?

These three questions reflect the special issue’s comprehensive approach to put an equal focus on the input, process and output dimension of EU mediation. The questions mirror the three major themes in international mediation: mediation onset, mediation process, and mediation outcomes (Hellman 2012; Wallensteen and Svensson 2014). Focusing on all three dimensions of mediation thus reflects this Special Issue’s ambition to provide a comprehensive account of the EU’s engagement as an international mediator. Implicit to these three questions is the issue of institutional capacities of the EU. The Special Issue deals with this theme as a cross-cutting dimension with implications for the motivations/drivers, roles/strategies and effectiveness of EU mediation practices. In answering these questions, we aim to elaborate on both the theoretical and empirical implications for EU mediation.
While these questions do not exhaust the possible aspects of EU mediation activities worth studying, it nevertheless points to important avenues and themes that allow us to ‘dig deeper’ into the field of EU mediation practice. The next section further elaborates on these themes in EU mediation studies.

**Avenues for studying EU mediation practice – themes and concepts**

The papers in this special issue are tied together through their common concern with the EU’s involvement in international mediation, seeking to add to our conceptual and empirical understanding of EU mediation practice. Each paper reflects on at least one/some of the research questions identified above, putting individual emphasis on particular aspects of the topic. As we believe it will be more fruitful to allow contributing authors to make their own explorations of these issues, we do not recommend or prescribe a specific conceptual framework. Nevertheless, we discuss some potential avenues for addressing the questions and themes identified above, which could finally lead towards some building blocks of a conceptual framework for studying EU mediation practice at a later stage.

**(1) Drivers of EU mediation**

Both mediation research and EU foreign policy studies provide some useful points of departure to address the issue of the EU’s motivation to become engaged in mediation activities. In the mediation literature, the question of mediator motivation in general is relatively under-explored, but there are some works which at least partially touch upon it (Beardsley 2011: 22–25; Bercovitch 2009: 345–46; Greig and Diehl 2012: 78–90; Touval 2003; Touval and Zartman 1985: 8–10). As Touval and Zartman (1985) point out, mediators are usually driven both by a desire to contribute to the
peaceful settlement of a conflict at an abstract level and to influence the concrete substance of a mediated agreement in a way that it serves their own interests.

The desire to make a positive contribution to the preservation or restoration of peace is certainly one potential motive for mediators and can also be linked to specific humanitarian concerns (Greig and Diehl 2012: 79). International and regional organizations could also be particularly intrinsically motivated to mediate due to their specific organizational mandate to maintain peace and security between their member states (Greig and Diehl 2012: 90). Concerning the EU’s intrinsic motivation for mediation engagement, one could also make connections to the literatures on Normative Power Europe (Manners 2002; Whitman 2011) and/or Civilian Power Europe (Bull 1982; Smith 2004) as well as to research on the EU’s stance towards the Responsibility to Protect (Franco et al. 2015).

Concerning the advancement of self-interest, there are many different possible motives, ranging from security interests to economic and trade interests as well as to the quest for international reputation. In addition, mediators are also very rarely indifferent concerning the concrete terms of agreement:

‘Mediators are likely to seek terms that will increase the prospects of stability and deny their rivals opportunities for intervention. They may also wish to ensure that the terms of a settlement will enable them to continue “to have a say” in relations between the adversaries’ (Touval and Zartman 1985: 9).

Depending on the constellation of actors involved, there may be a mix of motives for the EU to become engaged in mediation practice. Investigating the EU’s motives is an important exercise insofar as it allows us also to understand more profoundly the roles and strategies the EU employs.

(2) EU mediation roles and strategies

In the mediation literature, the concept of mediation role refers to at least two different aspects of mediation. In a narrow sense, the EU’s mediation role could be understood as referring to the type
of mediator arrangement under which the EU is involved in a mediation activity. Based on the definition of mediation practice presented above, the individual contributions to this special issue look into different types of mediator arrangements, including the EU as sole mediator, the EU’s participation in multi-party mediation and the EU as a financial or political supporter of third party activities. Further inquiry into the different EU mediation arrangements across cases allows us to better understand the variety and scope of EU mediation practice.

In a broader sense, mediation role refers to the strategy and tactics a mediator adopts in his/her efforts to broker an agreement between conflict parties. While the range of possible tactical moves by the mediator may be enormous - Capelos and Smilovitz (2008), for example, identify more than sixty possible mediator tactics - mediation scholars have made some attempts to systematize the various forms of mediation behavior through the development of ideal types.

A classical distinction in the mediation literature is between power mediation and pure mediation:

'The typical pure mediator tries to get the confidence of the parties, avoid the participants' loss of image, enhance the communication, and build social ties among the parties (...) On the other hand, the power mediator uses its economic, military, and political resources to pull or push the parties in their preferred direction, takes measures to secure its own interests in the country of the conflict, and exercises its leverage over the parties in order to make them comply' (Svensson 2007b: 229–30).

While there is a long-standing debate in mediation literature on the issue of what approach is most effective, Svensson (2007b) shows that power mediation and pure mediation are complementary rather than mutually exclusive.

Another prominent taxonomy of mediation strategy by Touval and Zartman (1985) distinguishes three mediator roles: (1) mediator as facilitator, serving primarily as a communication channel and information provider between the disputants; (2) mediator as formulator, playing a more active role
in structuring the negotiation process and making proposals for possible compromise solutions; and (3) mediator as manipulator, going beyond formulation by also making use of coercive measures and/or positive incentives to move the parties towards agreement (“carrot-and-stick approach”) (cf. Bergmann and Niemann 2015: 962). Similar to the classic distinction between pure mediation and power mediation, the conceptualization by Touval and Zartman (1985) is based on the degree of control the mediator exerts on the negotiation process, but conceptualizes mediation strategy more as a continuum of degree rather than a dichotomous variable.

While the debate on the effectiveness of different mediator roles remains unresolved (cf. Wallensteen and Svensson 2014), recent studies suggest that heavy power mediation may be best suited to produce agreements between conflict parties, but may have a negative effect on the long-term durability of agreements as manipulators risk to broker “artificial agreements” that break down as soon as the third party’s commitment to the implementation of the brokered deal ceases (Beardsley et al. 2006; Beardsley 2011).

Finally, an investigation of the EU’s mediation roles may also draw on the insights from role theory. Within European integration studies, the conception of role is well-established in the literature on the EU’s external policy roles and how the EU’s role conceptions and the expectations of external actors shape EU external action (cf. Elgström and Smith 2006). Role theory may, thus, extend our understanding of how external perceptions of the EU may affect its approach and strategies as a mediator (see Elgström et al, this volume).

(3) EU mediation effectiveness

Conceptualizing and assessing effectiveness of policies and actions is a hotly debated issue, both in the literatures on EU foreign policy and international mediation. In EU foreign policy studies,

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4 Similar classifications have been proposed by Bercovitch and Houston (1993, 1996, 2000), Beardsley (2011) and Beardsley et al. (2006)
EU effectiveness in international politics is a key theme of many recent publications (da Conceição-Heldt and Meunier 2014; Jørgensen et al. 2011; Niemann and Bretherton 2013; van Schaik 2013). Although this is not undisputed, goal-attainment in terms of the EU’s ability to achieve its goals concerning a particular policy or measure seems to have become the main reference point for evaluating EU effectiveness.

In mediation research, many quantitative studies have applied the standard of conflict settlement to evaluate mediation effectiveness. Conflict settlement is hereby understood as the observable immediate outcome of a mediation effort, often assessed in terms of five possible outcomes: full settlement, partial settlement, cease-fire agreement, process agreement, and no agreement (Bercovitch 2005: 293–94). Others have suggested to go beyond this conceptualisation and to consider also long-term stability as an indicator of mediation success (Beardsley et al. 2006; Beardsley 2011; Svensson 2009).

In a first attempt to bridge the two literatures, Bergmann and Niemann (2015) proposed a two-dimensional conceptualization of EU mediator effectiveness, differentiating between an EU-specific perspective and a conflict-specific perspective. The EU-specific perspective evaluates whether the EU has been able to attain its goals concerning a particular mediation effort. The conflict-specific perspective asks whether the EU-led mediation effort contributed to conflict settlement. The conflict-specific perspective may also investigate the wider effects of EU mediation on (local) conflict dynamics, i.e. how EU mediation engagement and outcomes are perceived and interpreted by the conflict parties (Autesserre 2017). Overall, we have outlined some of the key issues concerning EU mediation practice that could serve as potential research avenues for further investigation into this topic. In the following, we give an overview of the contributions to this special and how the individual papers addresses these issues identified above.
Overview of contributions to this special issue

The scholarly literature has thus far failed to capture our intent. Here, each contribution is intended to provide a holistic picture of the EU’s mediation roles, its internal capabilities and the consequences of its external practices. To mirror the EU’s broad conceptualization of mediation, the contributions both cover EU interventions in violent conflict (e.g. Egypt, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ukraine) as well as in post-conflict stabilization phases (e.g. Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina). Moreover, they reflect the different international configurations in which the EU mediates, covering cases of EU sole mediation (e.g. Kosovo, Egypt), EU involvement in multi-party efforts (e.g. DRC, Ukraine, Bosnia-Herzegovina) and cases where the EU is rather perceived as an observer than a (lead) mediator (Israel-Palestine).

Serving as a bridge between the cannon of mediation studies and the EU’s mediation practices as situated within its foreign and security policies, Davis uses the case of EU mediation efforts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In this context, the DRC serves as an important context for understanding some of the logics governing the EU’s initial venture into the field of mediation, even before the practice is formalised.

Moving to another African country, Pinfari locates the EU’s mediation practice within its broader conflict management and foreign policies. EU mediation in Egypt presents an exposition of a rather flawed actor that is often conflicted, sacrificing its potential as a mediator for its role as a global security actor. It is thus evident that the chaotic nature of the EU internally, invariably impacts on its external practices then.

It is the consideration of how the internal institutional configuration impacts on the external capabilities that motivates Haastrup’s contribution. A unique perspective, this article is concerned with how mediation capabilities sit within the EU’s broader CSDP architecture and the opportunities and constraints of the arrangement. Specifically, it questions the extent to which the EU in its
role as International mediator has institutionalised it broader commitments to gender inclusive practices.

Bergmann takes up the theme of where EU’s mediation roles sit within other contexts through the investigation of EU and UN mediation efforts in Kosovo. This article explores the different strategies employed by the two organisations and their implications for effectiveness within a particularly challenging environment. Through another case example, this time of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Richter similarly explores the extent of the EU’s effectiveness as an international mediator. Unlike in Bergmann’s case example, however, the EU’s strategy of manipulation that achieved limited success in Kosovo was counter-productive to the Bosnia and Herzegovina case.

The mixed results of EU engagements are a consistent theme in several of the articles of this Special Issue, and Natorski’s elucidation of EU mediation in Ukraine especially underscores this. Through longitudinal lenses, Natorski engages EU mediation practices in Ukraine across three events: the Orange Revolution, the Euromaidan crisis and the war in Eastern Ukraine. By analysing EU mediation efforts in three events but within the same country Natorski convincingly shows how perceptions of other external actors impact on the EU’s choices in its role as international mediator.

The theme of external perceptions is picked up in the contribution of Elgström et al. In a comparative analysis of EU roles in Ukraine and the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, their article investigates how others perceive the roles, strategies and effectiveness of the EU as International mediator. Using role theory, the EU, they argue is perceived to be a biased observer. Due to its existing foreign policies with parties within the conflict, the extent of the EU’s effectiveness to positively impact conflict is questioned.

The conclusion to this special issue further elaborates the linkages between the different papers and also analyses the findings of the special issues with regard to the three research questions specified above and the EU’s distinctiveness as an international mediator. In addition, potential avenues
for future research are outlined and some policy recommendation given. These provide some food for thought to policy-makers on how the EU’s mediation capacities could be further strengthened and what role mediation could/should play in the EU’s future toolbox for conflict prevention and crisis response.

References


Hellmann 2012


