Judith Huigens & Arne Niemann (2011):
'The G8½: the EU's contested and ambiguous actorness
in the G8'
In: *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 24:4,
629-657.

The G8½: the EU's contested and ambiguous actorness in the G8·

Judith Huigens and *Arne Niemann*

Abstract

This article analyses the degree of European Union (EU) actorness within the G8. Drawing on the work of Jupille and Caporaso, actorness is probed along the criteria of recognition, authority, cohesion and autonomy. We argue that the vague, flexible and informal nature of the G8 has contributed to rather nuanced and ambiguous degrees of actorness. When assessing the above criteria, overall the EU's actorness remains questionable. As for recognition, while the EU is treated as an equal by other G8 delegations, actual membership remains disputed, and third parties such as the media remain reluctant to accept EU representation as equal. Authority in terms of legal competence tends to be of lesser importance in the G8, given the informal nature of this institution. Informally, the Commission has managed to enhance its authority when it can provide substantial expertise. Cohesion has proven perhaps the most limited aspect of EU actorness. Although value cohesion is substantial, there are no formal mechanisms that tie the European participants together. Commission autonomy in the G8 is considerable in terms of its own separate institutional apparatus, as well as formal performance and compliance scores that differ from those of the European G8 members. However, ultimately the Commission's freedom of action usually remains subject to the control of its principals. Yet, EU actorness tends to differ per context as our tentative analysis of the factors conducive to autonomy indicates.

Introduction

For nearly 35 years, a group of arguably the world's most powerful state leaders have come together in an informal setting to discuss a variety of international issues. Despite its permanent character, academic attention to this case of concert diplomacy has for a long time been limited.[1] The G8's international relevance has been questioned, due to minimal legalisation and limited tangible results (e.g. Ikenberry 1993; Smyser 1993). Moreover, the informality of the summit and the related accessibility problems, have constituted a challenge for scholars concerning data access. Over the years though, the G8 has increasingly proved its significance as a decisive institution in global affairs (Payne 2008, 519; Kirton 1999),

[1] But see the works of John Kirton, Nicholas Bayne, Joseph Daniels, Robert Putnam and other scholars that are cited below.

justifying closer analysis of the summit.[2] Since 1977, only two years after the first summit in Rambouillet, the EU/EC has been officially represented at every G7/G8 summit. However, ambiguity still exists concerning the capacity in which the EU, a regional organisation, attends the group of (the) eight supposedly richest and most powerful states. As many as six European representatives can be attending the summit: France, Germany, Italy, the UK, the European Commission and the country holding the EU Presidency. While the individual EU Member States attend the summit first and foremost to represent their national interests, the Commission and the Council Presidency are there to represent the EU as a whole.

From an institutional point of view, the EU and the G8 stand in (sharp) contrast to each other. While the EU is characterised by an extensive degree of supranationalism and legalisation, the G8 constitutes the opposite: a form of 'concert diplomacy', based on informal rules that mainly serve to coordinate policy (Fischer 2001). It has been suggested that their distinct characteristics make these two institutions mutually compatible: while the G8 does well in determining guidelines and giving impulses to other bodies, the EU has the operational capacity to realise them (Lamy 1988; Kirton 2004). This study seeks to contribute to our understanding of the relationship between these two institutions, especially in terms of the role played by the EU in the G8 framework. We particularly concentrate on the extent to which the EU displays different qualities of 'actorness' within the G8. The concept of actorness sheds light on the unique entity that the European Union entails in international politics (Manners and Whitman 1998, 233-234). Actorness looks at the capacity to act, i.e. 'the ability to function actively and deliberately in relations to other actors in the international system' (Sjöstedt 1977, 15). The concept of actorness recognises the patchy and uneven nature of the international capabilities of the EU, while also considering the fact that the Community possesses some (but not all) of the characteristics of typical actors in the international system. For a conceptualisation of actorness we have drawn on the work of Jupille and Caporaso (1998), who have specified four criteria of actorness: recognition, authority, cohesion and autonomy. We argue that EU actorness within the G8 summit, apart from being somewhat contested, proves to be ambiguous and underlines the hybrid nature of the EU. This ambiguity has been institutionalised within the G8, by granting both the Commission and the Council Presidency (and four individual Member States) permission to attend the summit. Although potentially problematic, the flexibility of the G8 system has until today provided the solution to possible objections that can be raised against this construction.

---

[2] When looking at the G8, it is relevant to also take note of the recent rise of G20 activity. Since November 2008, in response the global financial crisis, the G20 has gathered every six months. It has been suggested that the G20 may replace the G8 as the dominant world leader forum. However, progress on this development has recently proven slow, for instance through the G20's inability to conjure concrete decisions in the aftermath of the financial crisis (Ubide 2010).

More succinctly, instead of solving the ambiguity of the EU as an international actor, the G8 has embraced it, by constructing a system that institutionalises this ambiguity.

What are the added values of this study: (1) overall, the role of the EU in the G8 is substantially under-researched. Previous research has merely been historical in nature and entailed a G8 perspective. This contribution hopes to fill this gap by focusing on the present and taking a predominantly EU perspective. (2) The concept of actorness has prompted quite a bit of conceptual discussion but remains empirically underexplored. While EU actorness has been found as only partially existing in the (few) studies of the 1990s, at the same time the EU's foreign policy procedures and instruments as well as the EU's own claims for constituting an actor on the world scene have further progressed since. Against this background, it seems important to probe EU actorness more thoroughly for a more recent period. (3) Approaches like those on civilian and normative power Europe (NPE) are built on the assumption that the EU possesses sufficient actorness. The mostly disappointing empirical findings concerning the EU as a normative power (cf. p. 5 below) suggest that it would be wiser to achieve greater clarity about the extent and consequences of EU actorness before engaging in the 'what sort of power' debate.

In terms of delimiting this study, preliminary research has displayed that, given the limited source material, the vast and ever-changing agenda and limited attention given to any one issue, focusing on a limited amount of issue areas would not have produced an adequate amount of data. Nonetheless, three issues have stood out in our research: climate change, nuclear energy and development policy. While not focusing on these issues exclusively, they have been used as examples throughout this article. Our analysis concentrates on data obtained concerning the five summits between 2004 and 2008: Sea Island 2004, Gleneagles 2005, St. Petersburg 2006, Heiligendamm 2007 and Hokkaido Toyako 2008. In addition, while EU representation is dual, we will primarily focus on the role of the European Commission in terms of evaluating EU actorness, given the insignificance of the Presidency in the summit process.[3]

Due to the limited amount of academic sources available on the role of the EU within the G8 framework and the fact that the G8 hardly produces any documentation, this study has

---

[3] Until the Treaty of Lisbon took effect, the European Council was represented by the state leader of the country holding the Presidency at the time of the summit. Due to the rotation of the Council Presidency, different countries tended to attend the summit each year. When the Presidency was held by a G8 member, this country represented both positions. When a non-G8 member was in charge of the EU Presidency, the Council representative was not invited to any of the preparatory meetings, and tended to join forces with the more experienced and independent delegation of the Commission. Generally, the Presidency did not receive any input from the (European) Council, nor did it brief its fellow Member States. Overall, the role of the Council Presidency at the G8 has been marginal (One of the Authors 2008). The role of the new President of the European Council, who replaces the head of government of the state holding the rotating EU Presidency at the G8, is not very clear yet and deems further investigation that is beyond the scope of this article.

suffered from data constraints. As a result, a vital data source for us has been interviews with those involved in the preparations and the summit itself. Another alternative source that has been made use of is (participant) observation. One of the authors was accredited to the Hokkaido Toyako summit in Japan as a journalist and thus interacted with media and experts at the summit. In addition, we explored the secondary literature, press statements, summit websites and media reports.

We proceed as follows: first we review the relevant literature and specify the conceptual framework. Thereafter, we probe the four categories of actorness (recognition, authority, cohesion and autonomy) in the G8 setting.

Literature review and conceptual framework

Conceptual approaches to the EU's international role

Mainstream IR theory struggles to adequately conceptualise the EU and its external relations as it tends to focus on statehood and rationality. Since the EU is neither a state nor does it have clearly defined interests enabling fully rational behaviour, the Union cannot be regarded as a fully-fledged player in international relations (Rosamond 2005, 465). The EU has been termed a 'heterodox unit of analysis', referring to its unique but ambiguous dynamic (Hill and Smith 2005, 19). Losing this state-centric focus, which tends to exclude much of what is distinctive and significant about the EU, thus helps us appreciate the Union's influence in international politics (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 12; Allen and Smith 1990, 19). The view of the EU as *sui generis* offers an alternative approach on the evaluation of the international role of the Union. It considers the EU a separate category, and contains different perspectives of looking at the unique international potential of the EU. As Marsh and Mackenstein (2005, 56) note, for example, 'the *sui generis* nature of the EU means that international organisations and fora vary in their willingness to recognise it as an actor in its own right as opposed to its constituent Member States. This leads, in turn, to substantial variations in the rights of the EC in different international organisations'.

Increasing attention is devoted to the question of which type of 'power' the EU constitutes in its international relations. Since the early 1970s much discussion focused on the idea of 'civilian power Europe' (CPE), thus conceptualising the Community as a 'civilian' group of states with significant economic but low military power that is mainly interested in using 'civilian' means of exercising influence, in pacifying international tensions and in the juridification of international politics (Duchêne 1972). Although the concept has been widely criticised (e.g. Bull 1982), it remained influential in the academic discourse (cf. Orbie 2006), not least as a point of reference in the debate concerning the 'militarisation' of the EU (cf. Stavridis 2001). However, the majority of scholars has held that the 'civilian power Europe'

concept is (severely) contested by the advent of EU security/defence policy integration because of undue concept-stretching (e.g. Smith 2004), a weakening of the EU's distinct profile of having a civilian international identity (Zielonka 1998; Smith 2000; Moravcsik 2003), and due to adverse consequences for democratic control of security and defence policy, an essential element of the CPE idea (Wagner 2006; cf. Smith 2004).[4]

In the past few years attention has increasingly shifted to the (potential) 'normative power' of the EU, i.e. its ability to define what passes as normal in the world (Manners 2002). The normative power Europe (NPE) idea has spurred much scholarly debate and has also been subject to widespread criticism. Most importantly it has been noted that the concept lacks precision, particularly in terms of criteria and standards that can be applied for analysing the concept empirically (Sjursen 2006: 236), an aspect that has been partially addressed since then (Manners 2008; Niemann and de Wekker 2010 forthcoming). While the normative power research agenda is in the process of attaining a more systematic empirical focus (e.g. Tocci 2008a; Whitman 2011 forthcoming), and some (few) works have indeed arrived at positive findings on NPE (Manners 2002; Scheipers and Sicurelli 2007), most of the empirical studies to date have been rather sceptical in terms of the degree to which the EU constitutes a normative power. Studies have exposed the lack of (genuinely) normative intentions/commitment (Warkotsch 2006; Falkner 2007), the contested legitimacy of the Union (Harpaz 2007; Haukkala 2007), the problematic nature of normative processes in terms of reflexivity and inclusiveness (Bicchi 2006; Niemann and de Wekker 2010 forthcoming), or the lack of (normative) impact (e.g. Fernandes 2008; Tocci 2008b).

In addition, there is the concept of 'transformative power Europe' (TPE) that has gained increasing attention over recent years, either explicitly by reference to the TPE label (e.g. Leonard 2005; Grabbe 2006), or somewhat more implicitly through an expanding literature on the Europeanisation of the Union's partner countries (e.g. Lavenex and Uçarer 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). Scholarship in this area conceptualises the EU's (external) policy as primarily characterised by its transformative capacities and/or analyses the extent to which the EU succeeds in transforming the political, economic and legal structures or substantive policies of third countries. In empirical research TPE poses substantial methodological problems, not least in terms of distinguishing the impact of EU action from that of other (international or domestic) actors (e.g. Richter 2009). In addition, not surprisingly in view of the substantial overlap and similarity with the question of normative

---

[4] It should be noted that those defending the CPE concept are usually those who adhere to a narrow understanding of CPE (mainly based on civilian ends), whereas those critical of the concept in the light of the ESPD's evolution usually take CPE to go beyond (civlian) ends but also to include (civilian) means and (democratic) control.

impact, authors have questioned the transformative capacities of the Union (van Hüllen 2009; Börzel 2009).

The doubts hanging over the concept of civilian power Europe, and the empirical (and methodological) challenges facing the notions of normative and transformative power Europe raise the question of whether it does not make sense to go one step back. The NPE and TPE approaches appear to be applicable (in a sensible way) rather in cases where EU actorness is largely undisputed, which is not the case for EU participation in the G8. Both concepts build on actorness and seem to take EU actorness for granted. Yet, especially the above-mentioned studies contesting the legitimacy and impact of the EU foreign policy suggest that perhaps the second step was taken before the first, i.e. that talking about 'what sort of power/actor' initially requires more (systematic) analysis with regard to actorness itself. The need for going back to the concept is further strengthened by the fact that it remains empirically underexplored and that initial studies on actorness, as the one by Jupille and Caporaso (1998), were rather doubtful regarding the extent of EU actorness. At the same time the EU's foreign policy procedures and instruments as well as the EU's own claims for constituting an actor on the world scene have further progressed since. Against this background, it seems important to probe EU actorness more thoroughly for a more recent period.

A potential alternative for 'actorness' could be the concept of 'presence' (Allen and Smith 1990). Both concepts can account for the multidimensional nature of the EU's international role. They perceive the EU as unique in terms of its character and identity, and consider the Union as part of a new multi-actor global system (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 13; Hill 1993, 308). Both internal dynamics of the EU and the external environment, in which the EU is placed, are regarded influential. Presence is a less tangible concept, as it focuses on the (perceived) ability of the EU to operate to influence the actions and expectations of other participants (Allen and Smith 1990, 21; Rosamond 2005, 465). Actorness takes presence a step further in that it implies a larger scope for EU action and emphasises the EU's possibility to function actively and deliberately in international politics (cf. Smith 2003, 24). We have opted for the concept of actorness (rather than presence) as our point of departure here because EU presence in international politics tends to be taken for granted by authors and was already found corroborated in the 'high politics' field of security in the 1980s (cf. Allen and Smith 1990: 30-33), while EU actorness is a much more contested concept (Ginsberg 1999, 432; Hill 1993, 308; Jupille and Caporaso 1998), and thus merits empirical probing, especially against the background of increased EU foreign policy capabilities and ambitions.

The concept of actorness

6

The term 'actor capability' was first coined by Sjöstedt (1977), to account for the new presence of the European Community (EC) in the international arena and to envisage the extent to which the Community would constitute an actor in the future. His understanding of actorness recognised the patchy and uneven nature of the international capabilities of the EC, while also considering that the Community possessed some of the characteristics of the typical actors in the international system, but lacked others. Sjöstedt's criteria for actorness are delimitation from other actors, autonomy, and the possession of several state-like characteristics, such as having a community of interests, systems for controlling Community resources and for crisis-management as well a network of external agents.

The concept of actorness has social constructivist roots. It recognises the significance of social processes that shape actors' identities and provide contexts in which action is constrained or enabled (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 13). Ginsberg's interpretation of actor capability, for example, acknowledges the interplay between national actors, European actors, and Europeanised institutional norms and practices. This process interacts with the international context, after which it returns to the input side of the process: this is where perceptions of actorness can feed back to actual actorness. This means that not merely capacities and functions within the international system, but also perceptions, i.e. ideational forces, are relevant (Ginsberg 1999, 435; Hill 1993).

As identified by Sjöstedt, for instance, actorness still presumes a substantial degree of state-like properties. It has been suggested that if the EU wants to join the 'game', it will have to play, to some extent, according to the rules of this (state-dominated) game (Rosamond 2005, 466; Tiilikainen 2001, 223). At the same time increased actorness is often associated with increasing supranationalism in the policy process and less actorness with intergovernmentalism (Groenleer and Van Schaik 2007, 969). Hence, actorness, which offers a distinct category, to some extent departs from the standard tenets of traditional IR and European integration theory (cf. Ginsberg 1999, 447), but not completely, making it a hybrid concept that should be well-suited to shed light on a hybrid context, such as the role of a multi-level (and significantly supranationalised) regional organisation within a more weakly institutionalised concert diplomacy.

Throughout the decades a considerable number of slightly differing approaches to actorness have been developed, each using their own criteria. Not all these frameworks are equally suitable here. While Sjöstedt's work is conceptually inspiring, his properties focus excessively on internal characteristics and are mainly appropriate for general application to the case of the EU and hard to apply to a specific case. Ginsberg (1999) focuses on decision-making structures in his framework, an approach that is too narrow for the *ad hoc* structure of the case of the G8. Bretherton and Vogler (2006) on the other hand take a broad approach, by

focusing on opportunity, presence and capability. As these criteria are somewhat vague and (too) encompassing, the possibilities for operationalisation are limited.

Conceptual framework and indicators of actorness

For us actorness is about the EU's 'capacity to act' (Jupille and Caporaso 1998, 214), i.e. 'the ability to function actively and deliberately in relations to other actors in the international system' (Sjöstedt 1977, 15). We reject the understanding that actorness equals influence. Instead, we suggest that actorness *enables* influence, without entailing the latter. Our point of departure is the approach stipulated by Jupille and Caporaso (1998). Their critique on previous contributions to the actorness debate is that these lack clear criteria for determining the status of the EU as an actor. Jupille and Caporaso, therefore, devise four criteria for ascertaining actorness, for which they also partly stipulate indicators. The criteria are not absolute, suggesting that actorness is a matter of degree. The four criteria, which are partly interconnected, are recognition, authority, cohesion and autonomy. A number of (additional) indicators, here complemented by relevant specifying questions, have been derived from them, creating practical tools for research.

Recognition:[5] this criterion entails acceptance and interaction by and with the organisation, other members and third parties. Has the EU delegation been formally recognised by the G8 (and its members) in terms of rights and privileges of membership? Also important is *informal* recognition: is the G8 as an institution making 'use' of the EU and involving it in the summit process? Are other G8 members and third parties interacting with the EU? Is the EU representation recognised by other members and third parties, such as the media?

Authority: here it needs to be asked if the EU has legal competence to act on a given subject matter. The EU's authority can be viewed as the authority delegated by the Member States to EU institutions. In other words, legal authority or competence is conditionally granted by the Member States, the principals, to EU institutions, the agents, to act on their behalf.[6] Authority can be further sub-divided into different aspects, such as (a) the design and clarity of the mandate, (b) the representation of parties during negotiations, and (c) voting rules (cf. Meunier and Nicolaïdis 1999, 481; Meunier 2000). Apart from formal authority in terms of legal competence, the Community may also have informal authority, for example through substantial expertise on the part of the Commission.

---

[5] Jupille and Caporaso distinguish *de jure* and *de facto* recognition, but due to the informal nature and the limited level of legalisation of the G8, there are no *de jure* elements to the G8. Instead, we focus on formal and informal recognition.
[6] Jupille and Caporaso (1998, 216). For other accounts describing the EU's role and authority to act externally in terms of a principal-agent framework, see Meunier (2000), Dür and Elsig (2011 forthcoming).

Cohesion: Jupille and Caporaso distinguish between four dimensions of cohesion: (1) value cohesion: does the EU express common basic goals within the G8? (2) Tactical cohesion: are possible diverging goals made to fit with one another by issue linkage and side payments? (3) Procedural cohesion: does consensus exist within the EU representation as to how to process issues of conflict and on the rules and procedures regarding this? (4) Output cohesion: does the EU as a whole succeed in formulating policies within the G8, regardless of substantive and procedural agreement? And finally, it should be asked if the different forms of cohesion allow for ambitious EU positions, lowest common denominator EU positions, or just unilateral action (Jupille and Caporaso 1998, 218-220).

Autonomy: in this respect we have distinguished between distinctiveness and independence. First, it needs to be inquired, if the EU has a distinctive institutional apparatus within the G8, in relation to the other EU Member States and other third actors. Second, in terms of independence, it should be asked if there is discretionary goal formation, decision-making and implementation on the part of the EU. For independence to be present the distinct institutions 'should make a difference, compared to the baseline expectation of a decentralised state system working on the basis of power and interest' (Jupille and Caporaso 1998, 217).

Before proceeding to our findings, the informality of the G8 setting is worth emphasising. The criteria as phrased by Jupille and Caporaso might be rather formalistic for this case. Therefore, it is possible that more nuanced versions of these indicators – such as informal forms of recognition and authority – apply in the case of the G8, as will be illustrated in the empirical sections.

Recognition

Formal recognition

Formal recognition refers to the formalistic aspects of summit participation, including the question of membership. The EU has always been welcome at every summit since the foundation of the G8 in 1975. The delay in actual participation was not so much due to objections by the non-EC G8 members, but was caused by internal disagreement amongst the EC Member States (Hainsworth 1990; Niemann and Huigens 2011 forthcoming). When this bickering over EC representation was finally resolved, the Community was invited to the 1977 summit in London. The actual participation of the EC differed per subject. During the first few years, the Community was excluded from some of the discussions, for instance where competence was unclear. Moreover, some G8 members, such as France, kept their

reservations against Community participation. It was not until 1981 that the EC was officially called in at all discussions, including more political topics (Hainsworth 1990).

The question is whether the EU has become an actual member. However, it is hard to speak of 'members', since the G8 has no official treaty base. An EU official even wonders, 'how can we become a member of an institution that does not exist?'[7] It is undefined what 'Group of Eight' refers to exactly; some consider this to be a reference to eight nation states, and others to eight world leaders (cf. G8 Research Group 2005; Government of Japan 2008). According to the European Commission (2008), the EU does not fit the profile of a 'nation state', which is why participates without actually being mentioned in the name of the summit. Among the G8 members, opinions differ on whether or not the EU can be considered a real 'member', a matter that is exemplified by the difference between the Canadian and German official website on G8 affairs. While the Canadians refer to the EU as a member, the Germans explicitly do not (Government of Canada 2008; Federal Government of Germany 2007). Even within the European Commission itself, disagreement exists on the issue of membership.[8]

Despite these disagreements, there seems to be little open debate on the issue. Since there are no rules to exclude the EU, and all members have recognised its relevance in the context of global governance, the Commission is officially granted complete participation. In no way does the access of the Commission to the summit differ from that of the (other) G8 members. They are always invited to all discussions, including the G8 leaders' meetings. During the discussions, the Commission holds exactly the same rights as its G8 counterparts. It has the right to be heard on any agenda item.[9] The Commission is involved in all preparatory meetings, and is granted the same infrastructural means (such as delegation size and workspace) by the host as the other G8 members. The President of the Commission holds the position of diplomatic head of state during the summit, putting him at an equal level with his G8 companions. Actually, the G8 is one of the few events where he is treated as such.[10]

The only element, where summit participation formally differs from that of the other G8 members, is the fact that the EU cannot host a summit. Although formal recognition is seemingly complete, this element of membership is essential, as even the Commission G8 Policy Coordinator, Alejandro Ulzurrun, is willing to admit. He argues that hosting a summit would strengthen the perception of the EU as a full player within the G8. The summit host

---

[7] Interview with J. Korte, Head of S.G.F.2, European Commission, Brussels, 8 September 2008.
[8] Former Commission G8 Policy Coordinator, Morgan Mc Swiney and former Commission Sherpa Stefano Sannino are convinced that the Community functions as a member. Joost Korte, head of the Commission department dealing with G8 affairs, on the other hand does not wish to refer to the Commission as such (Interview with Korte, Brussels, 8 September 2008; Interview with M. Mc Swiney, former EU Policy Coordinator, Brussels, 4 September 2008; Interview with S. Sannino, former EU Sherpa, Brussels, 14 Oktober 2008) .
[9] Interview with Mc Swiney.
[10] Ibid

plays a significant role in general mediation, but also holds the important privilege of defining the agenda and inviting third parties. Nevertheless, the Commission does not formally try to enforce the matter, as it considers this to be 'politically impossible'.[11]

Informal recognition

Informal recognition captures the extent to which other summit participants, but also observers, interact and engage with the EU. In terms of the interaction and collaboration with other G8 participants, it seems that while the EU may not be a sovereign G8 'member state', it is generally treated and regarded in the same respect. It has thus been stated that 'we believe that the EU plays a significant role and is equal to other partners in all G8 activities'.[12] And a member of a European G8 delegation notes: 'I look at the Commission as a separate country almost; [...] it operates in that respect'.[13] It has been recognised that the G8 discussions cannot take place in an effective manner, without EU participation. Exactly because inviting the EU to the table is more about effectiveness than legitimacy, informal recognition is considerable. The EU is not present as a courtesy, or for ceremonial purposes: it is there because the G8 is devoted to tackling important global issues, on which the EU has considerable influence. Other G8 members therefore say: 'the EU is there because of what it can contribute'.[14] The issue of development aid, one of the key issues at recent summits, can be used to illustrate this matter. Since the Commission has a substantial budget for aid (Holland 2008, 352), it would be highly ineffective to exclude it. Another example is climate change, where the EU has set important norms and standards, not only within the Union but also globally (Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007). As a result, it has much to contribute to G8 discussions.

Informal recognition is also substantiated in the sense that the Commission does not only hold the same rights, but also the same responsibilities. The EU is expected to comply with the commitments agreed at the summits, and the Commission has never used the 'we are not a real member, and therefore we do not need to comply'-card.[15] On issues of exclusive competence, such as trade, the EU is recognised not only as a full participant, but also as the main spokesperson on behalf of the European G8 countries. And on those issues the Commission is not only recognised through its legal competence but also due to its expert knowledge and technical expertise.[16]

Apart from formal recognition and interaction, there are other aspects of EU participation that reveal something about recognition. These are symbolical elements,

---

[11] Interview with A. Ulzurrun de Asanza y Munoz, G8 Policy Coordinator European Commission, Brussels, 23 July 2008; Interview with Mc Swiney.
[12] Interview with Member G8 of the delegation of the Russian Federation, by email, 3 October 2008.
[13] Interview with a member of an EU state's G8 delegation, telephone, 12 September 2008.
[14] Interview with members of the G8 delegation of Germany, Berlin, 13 March 2009.
[15] Interview with Mc Swiney.
[16] Interview with S. Sannino, Brussels, 14 October 2008.

seemingly trivial, but significant in the G8 context. The G8 summit gets substantial media attention and is perceived an excellent opportunity for international exposure by G8 members (Payne 2008: 519-520).[17] To be present at the summit means that one belongs to the group of most influential powers in the world. To be portrayed as such can shape perceptions – both towards third countries and one's own citizens – and these perceptions affect actorness. Regarding some symbolic aspects the EU does rather well. Not only is the Commission always invited to all summit events, including informal occasions, at official events the EU flag is always present, like that of the other G8 countries. At the summit websites of the past six years, the EU is presented as an equal among the other G8 members, avoiding the question of actual membership. However, the G8 remains the G8, instead of a possible G9, thus excluding the EU from the 'number'. To all the other members besides the Commission, the issue of the summit name currently does not seem to be negotiable.[18] While this has no real consequences for EU participation at the summit, it does have symbolical value.

Furthermore, the media that are important in terms of public perception often fail to portray the Commission as an equal member. Within the Commission's press team frustration exists, for instance, about the fact that while the Commission President is always invited to photo-sessions, some media still manage to edit him out of the pictures. And as the Commission G8 Policy Coordinator observes: 'when you see these anti-globalisation cartoons, we're not there either! They mock the G8 leaders, but forget the EU. That is really an indication of our role'.[19] The way the media portray the EU says something about its recognition. However, it must be kept in mind that the EU is likely to receive less media attention due to the set up of the summit.[20] Of course, the 'eight most powerful leaders of the world' make for a more attractive picture than the eight most powerful leaders, plus 'some other important people'. These eight world leaders are the familiar faces, the most direct link to their country. EU citizens still identify first and foremost with their national leaders, not with President Barroso and the same applies to the media.[21]

In sum, the formal recognition of the EU seems almost complete, and the other G8 members mostly interact with the EU delegation as they would with any other G8 member. This is largely due to the informal nature of the G8, which has enabled the Commission to participate fully, without any membership formalities getting in the way. At the same time however, informal recognition remains ambiguous and somewhat contested. In the media frenzy that the G8 has become over the years, perceptions are highly significant as they might

---

[17] Interview with Korte.
[18] Interview with Ulzurrun, Brussels, 23 July 2008.
[19] Interview with Ulzurrun.
[20] Interview with Mc Swiney.
[21] See also Bijsmans and Altides (2007) on the lack of media attention for the EU and the democratic consequences of this 'gap'.

have a bearing on the general legitimacy of the EU as an actor and through that, its actorness. Hence, while the nature of the G8 has enabled the Commission to participate, it simultaneously draws attention to a number of state-like capabilities that the EU lacks. As such, the Commission remains the odd man out, despite 30 years of presence at the summit.

Authority

When looking at the authority of the EU within the G8, the focus is on internal dynamics. At first glance, authority mainly refers to legal competences – the extent to which the EU has the right to speak on behalf of the Member States on a given subject matter (Vogler and Stephan 2007, 395). Authority also addresses the design and clarity of the mandate, the representation of parties during negotiations, and applicability of decision-making procedures (cf. Meunier and Nicolaïdis 1999, 481; Meunier 2000). As is shown in this section, however, a strong focus on legal matters might neither fit the informal nature of the G8, nor the current system of competences within the EU, which allows for considerable flexibility and may enable the EU to develop its role as an international actor, irrespective of whether or not they hold exclusive authority (Groenleer and van Schaik 2007; cf. Rhinard and Kaeding 2006).

EU representation within the G8

It took a couple of years to agree on the legal principles of EU representation within the G8, an issue on which there was considerable disagreement. The question was whether distinct EU representation was needed, or whether Community powers could be delegated to the four EU G8 countries. According to a compromise reached in 1977, both the Commission and the Council Presidency would be present to take part in those sessions at which issues of EC competences were to be discussed. This represented a pragmatic and parallel approach: the Community was accepted as relevant, but in a complementary matter, never replacing the present Member States. A so called 'pooling of sovereignties' would occur on those issues of Community competence, without a fixed or binding mandate (Hainsworth 1990; Rome European Council 1977). That compromise still applies, although the list of competences has expanded parallel to internal institutional and exogenous developments (Hainsworth 1990; Niemann 1998).

Up until today, the EU representation, both in terms of the Commission and the Council Presidency, remains without a legal mandate. According to the Commission, a mandate is not necessary, since no formal decision-making takes place at the summit and G8 agreements are mainly political and very general.[22] Since there is no legal mandate, there are also no voting procedures at the EU level. The Commission sherpa reports to COREPER II

---

[22] Interview with Korte; cf. Pentilla 2003.

twice a year: prior and after a summit. These meetings merely aim at informing the Council and the 23 EU members that are not involved in the summit process. While the representatives can ask questions, there is usually very little debate. The meetings are purely informative and take place merely as a courtesy.[23]

That the Commission and the Council Presidency do not hold a fixed mandate within the G8 does not mean that they have no right to speak. It implies that any commitments made at the summit by the Commission or Council President are not binding.[24] The G8 reality is mainly political, as opposed to legal. There are no rules excluding the EU from specific debates. The Commission and Council Presidents have the right to speak on all issues, regardless of competences. Nonetheless, the authority of the Commission will be most substantial in cases of exclusive competence. For example, on trade issues, the Member States 'tend to defer to the Commission'.[25] Credible commitments on external trade can only made by the Commission, and it is widely acknowledged that the Commission has superior expertise on such dossiers, as a result of which its (informal) authority is further enhanced.

Politically, the division of competences does have an impact on EU authority within the G8. It would simply not be deemed appropriate for the EU to speak on matters on which they hold no competence. While the Commission is technically allowed to contribute to the debate on issues of 'high politics' such as Iran, in reality it tends to keep quiet.[26] It has also been noted that in case of disagreement amongst European G8 members, the participation of the Commission becomes very delicate and formal, as choosing sides can be problematic for the Commission.[27] On issues of limited competence the Commission 'has to test the mood a bit'.[28]

Competences and actorness

It has been suggested that EU actorness can still be significant also on issues that do not fall under the Community's exclusive competence (Groenleer and van Schaik 2007, 991). EU actorness and mixed competence[29] seem to go together rather well: while actorness recognises the hybrid and ambiguous nature of the EU, mixed competence is an excellent illustration of this nature (Leal-Arcas 2001, 487). The system of competences within the European Union has been set up in a way that leaves room for considerable flexibility. When competence is

---

[23] Interview with Ulzurrun; cf. Bayne and Putnam 1987, 153.
[24] Interview with Ulzurrun.
[25] Interview with a member of an EU state's G8 delegation, by telephone, 12 September 2008.
[26] Interview with Mc Swiney.
[27] Interview with A. Dvorkovich, G8 Sherpa Russian Federation, by email, 29 July 2008.
[28] Interview with Mc Swiney.
[29] Under mixed competence the Community and the Member States share competence (Leal-Arcas 2001). Examples of such mixed competences are the internal market, environment, consumer protection and energy (TFEU 2008, Art. 4).

shared or complementary, the legal and formal boundaries no longer exclusively determine how far the EU can go. A competence can formally be conferred to both the EU institutions and Member States, while in practice the EU takes the lead. As such, looking at EU authority in the context of the G8 entails more than a look at the Treaties: the context determines to a great extent how much authority the EU actually has. This suggests that authority (especially in cases of mixed competence) depends to a considerable extent on the unique dynamic that develops per subject.

On climate change, for example, the Community constitutes an important actor. Although *de jure* the Commission has not been granted the authority to conduct international negotiations, a role that is technically foreseen for the Presidency (Groenleer and van Schaik 2007, 985), the Commission has become the main promotional broker on the issue within the G8 context. Not only has the Community established far-reaching goals and targets on the subject in the past, but the Commission also holds the institutional continuity within the G8 summit, and has also substantially increased its expertise on the issue over the years, enabling it to play a vital role in (G8) climate change negotiations.[30] Legal competence on such matters will remain limited, but the *political authority* of the Commission is substantial. Due to the flexibility of mixed competence, the EU can further develop its actorness/autonomy (cf. Rhinard and Kaeding 2006).

The situation with regard to authority may seem confusing, but little frustration exists on this matter among other G8 members.[31] Lack of clarity concerning competences and authority has hardly ever caused conflict among G8 members, since the summit is not a decision-making body and focuses on giving broad direction.

Cohesion

Cohesion constitutes perhaps the greatest challenge for the EU, as its international potential depends on it to a considerable extent (Marsh and Mackenstein 2005, 253-254). Cohesion is less bound by formalities and rules that, as elaborated above, hardly apply within the G8 context. Therefore, cohesion, more than e.g. formal authority reflects the unique dynamics of the G8 case, focusing on political (as opposed to legal) aspects. Four separate dimensions of cohesion have been identified: value cohesion, tactical cohesion, procedural cohesion and output cohesion (Jupille and Caporaso 1998, 219). Together they illuminate the degree of unity among EU representatives and the instruments that are used to achieve such unity.

Value cohesion

---

[30] Interview with members of the G8 delegation of Germany, Berlin, 13 March 2009.
[31] Interview with member of the G8 delegation of the Russian Federation, by email, 3 October 2008; interview with members of the G8 delegation of Germany.

Value cohesion entails the extent to which basic goals of the Commission and the Member States are similar or compatible (Jupille and Caporaso 1998, 219). While formally no coordination takes place to ensure cohesion at the summit, in practice EU participants are often in agreement. That is no surprise, since there are few international issues left on which the EU has not established a common position already (e.g. Smith 2006). An official of a European G8 country states: 'I think we are often on the same page as our Commission colleagues. On most issues, there is already agreement on the European level. So it's obvious that we have the same kind of agenda as the Commission.'[32]

Apart from internal EU agreement culminating in value cohesion, the context of the G8 has a considerable influence on value cohesion, due to a number of reasons. First of all, the G8 is not considered the most ambitious instrument of global governance, which amplifies the phenomenon that most issues have already been discussed at the EU level.[33] The G8 is aimed at participants agreeing on common measures toward global challenges, not so much at drawing up and signing international agreements (May 2005: 69). It therefore tends to stay away from radical proposals and mainly rehashes what has already been decided upon elsewhere. The example of climate change is illustrative here. For some time now, the European Union has pursued a leadership role in this issue area, by setting the example for other developed and emerging economies. The EU has adopted a number of progressive climate changes policies, such as the 2007 plan to cut CO_2 emissions by 20 percent by 2020, with renewables accounting for 20 percent of the EU's overall total energy consumption (Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007, 19). It is clear that the EU Member States and the Commission already dealt with this issue prior to G8 deliberations. As a result, value cohesion is considerable, culminating in a strong united European position on climate change, as can be seen at the summits in Germany and Japan.[34]

Second, relating to the previous argument, the agreements reached at the summit are often of a general nature. In such a context, the Commission can participate, without taking a formal position on the more controversial themes. G8 members will for instance endorse the increase of development spending, without touching upon the more controversial issue of the direction of these expenditures.[35] In such a situation, EU Member States may be in disagreement on the latter, but still maintain value cohesion on the more general commitment to increasing development expenditures (Labonte and Schrecker 2007, 186).

While the G8 context in most cases seems to facilitate EU value cohesion, it is also important to emphasise that this same context also makes value cohesion less of a necessity.

---

[32] Interview with a member of an EU state's G8 delegation
[33] Interview with Korte.
[34] Interview with Ulzurrun.
[35] Interview with a member of an EU state's G8 delegation

The informality of the setting enables the Member States to deviate from the established EU line. Individual EU members will try to push their own interests in the G8 context as far as they can, while the Commission will function as a gentle reminder of the established EU line.[36] Despite the official EU development policy, of which achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDG's) by 2015 is the cornerstone (Holland 2008: 344-345), individual Member States may still lag behind, due to their own individual difficulties with living up to MDG-standards. Meanwhile, the Commission will pursue the official EU position, without confronting the 'rebellious' Member States.[37] Notwithstanding such occurrences, overall the extent of value cohesion can be regarded as considerably high.

Tactical and procedural cohesion

Now the question arises to what extent diverging goals are actively made to fit with one another, for example through issue linkage and side payments, prior to the summit. This tactical cohesion relates closely to procedural cohesion, which focuses specifically on whether there are rules and procedures on dealing with conflict situations. While discord is inevitable, the issue here is whether the entire EU representation has agreed on rules and procedures concerning disagreements.

There is neither a coordinated European position within the G8, nor a formal policy among European delegations on how to deal with diverging goals in the G8. The G8 agenda is not explicitly discussed at European Council meetings, and European delegations do not meet and coordinate prior to the summit to establish a common EU stance.[38] In case (value) cohesion is extensive, this usually results from previous or even parallel coordination efforts. However, these efforts do not take place specifically for G8 purposes.[39]

At the summit, is it common for each European Member State to have its own favourite topic. Sarkozy and his 'crusade' for G8 expansion are illustrative here. While the EU representation remains neutral on the topic, France is free to pursue this goal individually. Since the EU participants do not specifically aim to present themselves as one cohesive unit at the summit, diverging goals are not necessarily an issue. Every member state knows what the EU line is, but is still free to express views that are not in accordance with this line. As one insider noted, 'all the EU members, of course, respect EU agreements. At the same time, EU agreement has never been an obstacle to expressing views that differ from that agreement'.[40] The summit is informal and every participant can speak freely, without the constraints of legal

---

[36] Interview with Mc Swiney; Interview with Korte.
[37] Interview with Ulzurrun.
[38] Interview with Ulzurrun.
[39] Interview with members of the G8 delegation of Germany
[40] Interview with a member of the G8 delegation of the Russian Federation.

matters or formal rules. That is why there are no formal coordination efforts to ensure cohesion.

On the other hand, a former policy coordinator of the Commission, considers discord among the Member States the worst that can happen, and feels that the Commission will therefore do everything in its power to prevent this. In his view, lacking cohesion damages the perceptions of EU actorness. 'There is disagreement between the EU Member States, informally, and behind the scenes. But you don't want that during the summit.'[41] Behind the scenes, the Commission thus attempts to avoid conflict and disagreement not only at the main summit, but also during preparatory meetings. European sherpas meet each other on many (non-G8) occasions, and they know exactly where the bottlenecks are. While the Commission does not consider itself so much a leader in this informal coordination process, it does regard its role as highly significant: 'we can play a substantial role as an honest broker'. Yet, all communication and coordination is very informal and rather *ad hoc*: 'it is discrete, behind the scenes, not out in the open'.[42]

While individual EU Member States will not always neatly align according to EU objectives, on issues where the EU has established a firm line in the past, they will cautiously and informally try to achieve this. After all, cooperation could establish a majority position for the Europeans, helping to build momentum. When this happens, the coordination role usually falls in the hands of the Commission.[43] There are no formal rules on this, but European delegations expect the Commission to coordinate and mediate the EU line on certain issues. As this process is completely informal, it can be used at the discretion of the Member States. In practice, this means that they will ask for coordination whenever it suits them and if it does not, there is very little the Commission can do to ensure cohesion. For instance, when the American sherpa contacts the different EU members to meet concerning the contents of climate change for an upcoming summit, the European sherpas will contact the Commission and ask it to coordinate. The Commission will then arrange an informal gathering, establish an EU line and report back to the American sherpa. However, this differs per issue area: if the same happens on the MDGs, there is little chance for Commission coordination since Member States have resented this in the past as they face their own difficulties living up to MDG-standards. At that point, 'the last thing they want is for the Commission to come breathing down their necks'.[44]

European G8 members have noted that diversity may even be desired within the G8, since the summit functions as a creative think-tank, giving impetus to new policy (Pentilla

---

[41] Interview with Mc Swiney.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Interview with Korte.
[44] Interview with Ulzurrun.

2003). '[D]isagreement is allowed and not problematic'[45], as it is mostly a question of diverging ideas as opposed to real conflict. Non-EU G8 members do not expect the EU members to always express the same goals and ideas. In fact, such coordination is regarded as counterproductive, considering the goals of the summit.

In sum, the nature of the summit creates certain dynamics. While both tactical and procedural cohesion are limited in terms of formal mechanisms to prevent or deal with disagreements, it is clear that ambiguity is once more the case, as diversity and disagreements are allowed and even applauded in some cases, but simultaneously feared by the Commission. While lack of (procedural and tactical) cohesion is not necessarily problematic for the G8, it does add to the confusion that exists on the role of the EU within the summit.

Outcome cohesion

Outcome cohesion captures the effective unity achieved by European delegations in formulating common policies at the G8 summit, regardless of (prior) value, tactical and procedural cohesion. Practically, output cohesion depends on whether or not the EU has already reached internal agreement on a given subject area, albeit not for G8 purposes. The subject of climate change at the 2008 summit of Hokkaido Toyako serves as an illustration. In this case, the Commission functioned as the main broker, with four countries backing it up. Such cohesion made the EU a powerful and influential actor on climate change at the summit (Kwok *et al* 2008, 129). This occurred despite mixed competences and lacking formal rules on reaching such cohesion. However, where such prior EU agreement is absent, as on nuclear energy, output cohesion is very likely to be low. Output cohesion has also proven to be more difficult on politically more sensitive topics such as the MDGs.

EU G8 Member States realise that when they manage to ensure high output cohesion, their impact on outcomes is considerable. Yet, the alliances are *ad hoc* and will depend on the interests concerning a given issue. Member States do not wish for the institutionalisation of coordination to ensure maximum flexibility and the freedom to act individually. The G8 remains first and foremost an informal gathering of eight state leaders, a setting in which the Commission is (normally) not in the position to enforce cohesion among the five or six European participants.

Finally, one more issue is relevant when reflecting on the output side of cohesion. If extensive output cohesion was the case, the risk of European block-forming would seem a likely possibility in the context of the G8. With sometimes as many as six European members at the table, one could imagine frustration among the non-EU participants. In fact, block-forming happens, but not on all issues and not always according to EU lines. Most G8

---

[45] Interview with a member of an EU state's G8 delegation

members agree that too much European unity could lead to internal division within the G8: the Europeans versus the rest, which would prove to be extremely unproductive.[46] As one G8 official states: 'It would be unfortunate for the G8 if there was a united EU voice all the time, because then the Americans or the Japanese might say: "we'll just speak to the Commission from now on"'.[47] Fact of the matter is, that such complaining only rarely happens, as was the case in 2008 when the united European position enforced momentum on the issue of climate change and the Japanese delegation openly complained about 'the number of Europeans at the table'.[48] Nonetheless, since the alliances overall vary, European block-forming has never been a real issue. This suggests that the current ambiguous set-up of EU representation within the G8 is the way it is, because it lacks cohesion. If cohesion were to be more substantial, non-EU G8 members would never accept the current number of European participants, as it would throw the G8 off-balance.

Autonomy

Autonomy encompasses the Commission's distinctiveness and independence, in relation to its members, institutions and third actors. While distinctiveness focuses on institutional distinction, independence assesses the extent to which these distinctive institutions make a difference. This presupposes agency slack, with discretionary goal formation, decision-making and implementation. Autonomy seems a particularly interesting aspect to look at in the context of the G8, since as many as six EU participants can take a seat at the summit table.

Distinctiveness

The Commission has its own distinctive institutional apparatus, with an independent infrastructure. The Commission sends its own President, his Head of Cabinet as sherpa and three sous-sherpas (for financial, political and foreign affairs). During the summit, the Commission delegation remains separate from the other (EU) G8 members. It has its own administration, expertise teams and media officers, conducts individual press conferences and distributes its own press statements. Hence, in none of the summit activities or preparations is the Commission delegation connected to, or dependent on, other (EU) G8 delegations.[49] In view of the truly distinct institutional resources, the Commission can really be regarded as the ninth member at the table, as also other G8 members agree.[50] Certainly the way the EU representation is structured is conducive to substantial decision-making autonomy, as it

---

[46] Interview with members of the G8 delegation of Germany.
[47] Interview with a member of an EU state's G8 delegation.
[48] Interview with Ulzurrun.
[49] Interview with Ulzurrun.
[50] Interview with a member of an EU state's G8 delegation.

clearly demarcates the Commission from influence of non-G8 EU members. The Commission merely informs COREPER II on G8 aims and results, without any voting or significant input by the non-G8 EU Member States, a procedure that indicates rather substantial autonomy (cf. Meunier and Nicolaïdis 1999, 481).

Independence

Independence assesses to what extent the EU acts with discretion from other actors in terms of objectives, decision-making and implementation (Jupille and Caporaso 1998, 218). We argue that while some formal indicators suggest substantial independence, taking a closer look at the context casts doubts over a true independence of the EU in the G8 framework.

First of all, studies conducted by the G8 Research Group on performance and compliance[51] should be taken into consideration. Performance has been defined by the Research Group as the ability to successfully pursue one's priority objectives at a given summit and to steer the statements that emerge from the G8 to reflect one's goals (Kwok *et al.* 2008: 3). The data in table 1 suggest that Commission performance at recent summits has been comparable to that of the 'real' G8 members. This means that the Commission has been quite successful as an autonomous delegate. Not only has the Commission proven itself an effective summit participant, the figures also indicate that its performance does not correlate with that of the other EU Member States.

Table 1: Performance scores per summit since 2004.

Year / Country	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008[52]
European Commission	0,77	NA	0,87	0,77	0,63
France	0,82	NA	0,75	0,82	0,48
United States	0,75	NA	0,77	0,72	0,75
United Kingdom	0,72	NA	0,77	0,82	0,87
Germany	0,82	NA	0,75	0,82	0,33
Japan	0,77	NA	0,77	0,82	0,80
Italy	0,75	NA	0,72	0,77	0,46
Canada	0,77	NA	0,87	0,82	0,70
Russia	0,62	NA	0,72	0,75	0,62

Source: G8 Research Group (cf. http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/)

[51] It should be emphasised that the use of this data is disputed, since some critics feel that previous reportings were done poorly and rather arbitrarily (interview with C. Vanderlinden, by email, 5 October 2008).

[52] 2008 scores are not properly comparable to those of previous years, since a slightly altered assessment method has been used (Kwok *et al.* 2008; interview with Vanderlinden).

Another measurement that is used by the G8 Research Group is that of compliance rates. These refer to the extent to which a G8 member state has complied with the targets set at previous summit (Kokotsis 2008). In figure 1, the average compliance scores, the combined compliance scores of the four EU members, and the scores of the Commission have been compared over the 2004-2007 summits. The graph not only shows that compliance scores of the Commission have been excellent over the years, but also that its compliance differs from that of the EU member state average, which indicates at least a certain degree of Commission 'independence' in terms of policy implementation.

Figure 1: Compliance Scores EU and G8 average

Source: G8 Research Group (cf. http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations)

The analysis on recognition and the abovementioned scores suggest that the Commission is usually regarded as a separate and independent summit participant. Nonetheless, the unique setting of the G8 has created a situation in which several European participants are active, which justifies a closer look at the question of who the Commission actually represents. This refers to the issue of how strict the demarcation in autonomy should be. Although a formal mandate has never been granted, the EU Member States informally delegated power to the Commission in 1977, when it was decided that the Commission President was to negotiate alongside the four European G8 members, without replacing him (Hainsworth 1990). However, this 'parallel approach' left the question of who represented whom up in the air: neither a supranational approach with a legal mandate was adopted, nor a purely intergovernmental approach with the Member States as exclusive representatives of the Union. The 1977 compromise has created a unique relationship between collective principals (the Member States) and an agent (the Commission), which is marked by the interesting

feature of having some principals present at the summit and others not (Niemann and Huigens 2011 forthcoming).

The question also arises as to whether this construction is a case of double representation (Pentilla 2003). The five EU participants function separately, while at the same time their interconnectedness cannot be denied, since the Commission often represents a position that has been established at intra-EU negotiations. The general view seems to be that the EU delegation represents the EU as a whole. However, some officials hold a different opinion: when Barroso joins the table, he is first and foremost considered a representative of the Commission, without considering who the Commission in fact represents.[53] A delegate of a European G8 member notes: 'I don't think the Commission can stand up there and say: we represent the entire EU. To do that would mean that their view is also automatically the view of the UK, France, Germany and Italy, which is not always the case. I think the EU as such is not represented, only the Commission is'.[54] The same seems to apply to the position of the non-G8 EU Member States. Their limited ability to influence Commission participation at the summit, suggests that the Commission does not aim to explicitly represent those EU Members that do not take part in the summit process. Nevertheless, a Commission representative stated that the Commission is there 'to guarantee integrity, objectivity and impartiality'. Being in that position, it is well aware that the interests of the smaller Member States need to be looked after.[55] Hence, some (perceived) ambiguity remains on the question of who the Commission represents.

As opposed to individual EU G8 members, the Commission must always take into account the positions of the other EU summit participants, and will therefore hardly be pressing for the more radical approaches (Putnam and Bayne 1987, 153).[56] In addition, in practice the opinion of the Commission will never be completely contradictory to that of the other EU members and the Commission will not back a new proposal of, for example, the UK, before other EU members have done so. Division can take place among the ranks of the EU members, and the Commission will choose sides, but only after at least one other EU member has expressed its support for that side.[57] This means that the EU will not act unilaterally, but in most cases with the support of at least two European G8 members, while the individual Member States on the other hand, will not hesitate to act independently. For example, at previous summits France individually and openly advocated expansion of G8 membership (Kwok *et al.* 2008, 26). The Commission could never advocate such a position

---

[53] Interview with a member of the G8 delegation of the Russian Federation.
[54] Interview with a member of an EU state's G8 delegation.
[55] Interview with Korte.
[56] Interview with Dvorkovich, by email, 29 July 2008.
[57] Interview with a member of an EU state's G8 delegation.

completely individually.[58] This connection with EU Member States, present at the summit or not, makes the Commission a bit of a conservative player on some issues. It can be concluded that real independence is difficult for the hybrid entity that the EU still is. The Commission, as an agent, is inevitably bound by its principals, and is therefore likely to remain the odd man out at this summit of autonomous state leaders. However, it is important to note that Commission autonomy depends on a number of conditioning factors.

Factors conditioning EU autonomy

An important question concerns the factors conditioning EU actorness. Since an analysis of this question along all four criteria of actorness would go beyond the scope of (what can be done in) this paper, we focus here on autonomy, which arguably (together with cohesion) constitutes the most important criterion within the concept. Of the four actorness criteria autonomy most closely relates to the EU making a difference (and providing leadership) in international politics, something that is also reflected in the definition of actorness, as 'the ability to function actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system' (Sjösted 1977, 15).

In order to investigate this question we briefly compare two sub-cases: (1) that of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and overseas development assistance (ODA); (2) the issue of nuclear energy and the role it should play in EU G8 countries' strategies in terms of both the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and energy security. These sub-cases are similar in some crucial aspects but diverge in others. Both cases are characterised by diverging principal preferences and by mixed competence. On the other hand, they differ in two respects that are tentatively suggested here to have been responsible for different degrees of autonomy: firstly, 'the power and firmness of status-quo oriented (or opposing) principals', and secondly 'Commission experience, expertise and standing'.

The first case is characterised by a rather complex actor constellation. The UK, the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Luxemburg and the Commission seem to have been (strongly) in favour of progressive targets in terms of the MDGs and ODA, with these countries also having the highest commitments. On the other hand, the new Member States that joined since 2004, together with Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece, have seemed less enthusiastic on that and more moderate in their goals. Germany, France and a few other countries appear to take an intermediate position. While their goals and (real) commitments tend to be somewhat more modest than the progressive group, their policy rhetoric is quite far-reaching (e.g. Chow *et al.* 2007: 6; Erdman *et al.* 2008: 146). Against this backdrop, the Commission seems to have come out and played a strong and proactive/independent role, also

---

[58] Interview with members of the G8 delegation of Germany.

in the G8 framework. For example, at the Gleneagles summit in 2005, Commission President Barroso was the only leader to mention the MDGs in his press conference (Corlazzoli *et al.* 2006: 28). Before the Heiligendamm summit in 2007, Barroso criticised Member States, such as Germany, for counting debt relief to meet aid targets (Chow *et al.* 2007: 132). In addition, at the 2008 G8 summit in Japan, it was the Commission that encouraged non-European G8 countries to match EU targets (Kwok *et al.* 2008: 130).

As for the second issue, the principal constellation is such that virtually all 27 EU Member States but Germany favour the inclusion of nuclear energy as (part of) a strategy to enhance EU energy security and reduce CO_2 emissions. Germany's position – while not really reflecting the preferences of Chancellor Merkel and her Christian Democratic Party – has been a firm one because it has been bound by the Nuclear Exit Law to close all nuclear power plants by 2020. This was confirmed by the coalition treaty between the Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Social Democrats (SPD). The latter held a very strong preference in that respect. Overall, the German stance was credibly backed-up by strong domestic constraints (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 13/7/2008). The UK, France and Italy as the other European G8 participants, however, (strongly) support the inclusion of nuclear energy in EU/G8 energy strategies, along with the EU-23. The Commission's preferences have been in line with the EU mainstream position (*Deutsche Welle*, 16/03/2006; Financial Times 16/09/2008). In the G8 context, however, the Commission has avoided to express itself strongly and proactively/independently on the issue. Instead it played a low key role and took an (almost) agnostic position at the summits.[59]

We propose that *the power and firmness of status-quo oriented (or opposing) principals*, and *Commission experience, expertise and standing* can account for the different outcomes. (A) The power and firmness of status-quo oriented principals: concerning the MDG/ODA issue, even the more reluctant EU Member States (including Italy), and the ones with intermediate preferences (including Germany and France) have engaged in rhetorical statements, suggesting that this is an important issue and that they want to do more (e.g. Rampal 2005; Erdman *et al.* 2008: 146; cf. Concord Europe 2008). Under such circumstances, it is more easily justifiable for the Commission to speak out and take advantage of Member States' rhetorical commitments (cf. Barroso 2008: 2; Chow *et al.* 2007: 132).[60] As one official put it, 'with so much "cheap talk" about exaggerated targets by even the laggards, it was clear that the Commission could freely exploit this and take the lead in the G8, even if the real preferences of Member States are considerably more conservative'.[61] In this context it can also be argued that the Commission used the G8 to leverage its own

---

[59] Interview with Mc Swiney.
[60] Interview with a member of an EU state's G8 delegation.
[61] Interview with members of the G8 delegation of Germany.

internal EU agenda, by trying to pull the EU laggards along through pushing ahead at the international level.[62] By contrast, Germany's stance on nuclear energy has been firm and unambiguous, with credible domestic constrains (e.g. *Süddeutsche Zeitung* 5/8/2008; Financial Times 9/6/2008). In addition, Germany being a very reluctant principal, has at the same time been an *attending* principal (i.e. been involved in the G8 context), thus better equipped for monitoring and 'sanctioning' the agent. These are all aspects that (also) suggest that a powerful principal, which Germany also constitutes given its size and economic weight, can influence matters under the given circumstance (cf. Lyne *et al.* 2006: 58). As one Commission official noted, 'with such a Member State heavy weight so unequivocally and convincingly setting tight boundaries of EU action, we had to sit back and shut up in the G8'.[63]

(2) The Commission has more experience, expertise and standing in development/aid policy, thus allowing for a greater role in the G8 context. In addition, the Commission has increasingly portrayed itself as assuming a leadership role on this issue (Orbie and Versluys 2008; Commission 2008). Interviewees have held, for instance, that the Commission 'has acted in a more self-confident and independent manner in the G8 because of its sheer status as a major international actor in this sector, with several decades of practice and a substantial budget for it'.[64] By contrast, the Commission has traditionally had less of a role and standing in energy policy. It was not until 2007 that the European Council confirmed that energy policy would get a legal basis in the Treaty of Lisbon (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 240-242). It has thus been noted that 'given our limited prior involvement, and the more limited expertise and knowledge in the Commission services, we have felt less at home on the issue and therefore also felt that it would have been inappropriate for the Commission to take a distinguished stance on nuclear energy at the G8'.[65]

Conclusion

The G8, in all its vagueness and informality, has proven to be a setting in which the hybrid European Union can participate significantly. The EU participates on all issues and it contributes to most debates, but its actorness remains questionable even after 30 years of presence, as our analysis along the criteria of recognition, authority, cohesion and autonomy has indicated. As such, the EU cannot be considered a full 'actor' (as understood in terms of 'actorness') within the Group yet; hence the term G8½.

---

[62] Cf. Orbie and Versluys (2008). Relevant agenda-setting rationales and mechanisms underlying such processes have been described with reference to EU policy-making by Princen (2007: 31-33ff).
[63] Interview, by telephone, 2009.
[64] Interview with a member of an EU state's G8 delegation.
[65] Interview, by telephone, 2009.

Concerning recognition, the Commission is fully accepted within the summit process and other G8 delegations interact with the Commission in the same way as with any other G8 member. However, obscurity persists concerning the exact position of the EU within the summit. While treated as an equal by other G8 delegations, actual membership remains a disputed issue. That third parties, such as the media, remain reluctant to accept the EU representation as equal, is less relevant than formal recognition by the G8 members. At the same time perceptions constructed and fortified by the media should not be underestimated, as they tend to have a bearing on the EU's legitimacy and thus translate back into actorness.

Theoretically, the authority of the EU, more specifically the Commission, is minimal, since there is no mandate. But given the informal and non-binding nature of the summit, legal matters are of lesser importance in this context. Nonetheless, the reality is shaped by legal boundaries as set out in the Treaties. In practice, this means that the EU generally has most authority in areas of full competence. In cases of limited or non-existing competence, the Commission President will stay in the background, as too much input will not be considered appropriate. Cases of mixed competence have provided considerable flexibility, as a unique dynamic may develop per case.

Cohesion has proven to be probably the most ambiguous criterion and also one that remains rather limited. Although value cohesion is considerable, there are no formal mechanisms that tie the six separate EU participants together. Cohesion is desired and pursued only when it suits the European G8 Member States. EU actorness remains limited as long as this characteristic persists. The absence of a legal mandate and the lack of recognition concerning certain (symbolic) aspects as well as the absence of actual EU membership in the G8 at least partly result from the EU's limited cohesion. If the various European representatives would speak with one voice, EU representation at the summit would have to change, in which case its recognition, authority and autonomy would alter, too. But, since cohesion remains limited, the EU delegation remains parallel and therefore ambiguous.

Finally, the Commission can be regarded completely autonomous in terms of its own separate institutional apparatus at the G8. Formal indicators related to Commission performance and compliance would also suggest substantial Commission independence. However, in practice Commission autonomy in terms of independence is more limited because ultimately its freedom of action is subject to control of its principals. However, if the conditions are 'right' – with respect to 'the power and firmness of *status-quo* oriented (or opposing) principals' and 'Commission experience, expertise and standing' – as in the case of the MLGs, the Commission can act rather autonomously.

The informality of the G8 process has set the broad parameters for EU actorness. To a large extent, the nature of the G8 summit offers an explanation for the more nuanced and ambiguous degrees of actorness that we have found. Within these parameters, recognition,

authority, cohesion and autonomy differ considerably per context. Overall, the informality of the G8 has proven to be beneficial for the EU as it plays to its strengths. The EU has not clearly defined its international status yet, but the G8 might just be the perfect setting for it. The EU can participate fully, without being hampered by the fact that it is not a nation-state. The informality of the G8 has left the issue of what exactly the EU as such is doing at the summit, for a large part untouched. The two institutions generally suit each other well: the EU can improve the effectiveness of the G8, while the G8 can enforce the international legitimacy of the EU (Hainsworth 1990) and can also be seen as a forum in which the EU can work on its international actorness.

Future research should most of all take a closer look at the factors conditioning EU actorness (in the G8), beyond the autonomy criterion and beyond those tentatively suggested. Other factors impacting on EU actorness may include the degree of politicisation, the extent to which topics have been discussed at EU level, and whether or not an EU Member State is acting as host. In addition, with the Treaty of Lisbon new contours of the international representation of the EU have been established. These include a single legal personality for the Union and the permanent president of the European Council (replacing the head of government of the state holding the EU Presidency in the G8). Only time will tell how the EU's new external policy setting will influence EU actorness within the G8. Finally, the increasing international relevance of the G20 and the fact that the EU constitutes a full-fledged member in this forum, would deem an analysis of EU actorness within this latest global forum, highly interesting and relevant.

References

Allen, D. and Smith, M. (1990) 'Western Europe's presence in the contemporary international arena', *Review of International Studies*, 16, 19-37.

Barroso, J.M. (2008), 'President Barroso's statement at the G8 outreach session with leaders from Africa', Speech/08/377, G8 summit in Toyako, Hokkaido, Japan, 7 July 2008, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/08/377&format=PDF&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en

Bicchi, F. (2006), '"Our size fits all": normative power Europe and the Mediterranean', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13: 2, 286-303.

Bijsmans, P. and Altides, C. (2007) '"Bridging the Gap" between EU Politics and Citizens?', *Journal of European Integration*, 29:3, 323–340.

Börzel, T. (2009), 'Transformative Power Europe? The EU Promotion of Good Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood', paper prepared for the ERD workshop, Florence, April 16-17.

Bretherton, C. and Vogler, J. (2006), *The European Union as a Global Actor*, London: Routledge.

Bull, H. (1982), 'Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 21, pp. 149-164.

Chow *et al.* (2007), *G8 Country Analysis Part II: Assessment Reports,* Toronto: G8 Research Group, http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2007heiligendamm/2007countries-perf.pdf

Concord Europe (2008) *AidWatch Analysis ODA numbers 2008*, available at http://www.concordeurope.org/Files/media/extranetdocumentsENG/NavigationSecondaire/WorkingGroups/Aidwatch/new_website/Key-analysis-ODA-numbers-2008.doc

Corlazzoli, V. *et al.* (2006), *Issue Assessment Report 2006 St. Petersburg Summit*, Toronto: G8 Research Group, http//www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2006stpetersburg/2006-issue-assessment.pdf

Duchêne, F. (1972) 'Europe in World Peace', in: Mayane, R. (ed.): *Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead*, London: Fontana, 32-47.

Dür, A. and Elsig, M. (2011 forthcoming), 'Introduction: Principals, Agents, and the EU's Foreign Economic Policies', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 18, 3.

Erdman, E., Vanderlinden, C., Gorbunova, K., and Guebert, J. (2008), *2007 Heiligendamm G8 Summit Final Compliance Report*, Toronto: G8 Research group. http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2007compliance_final/07-final.pdf

European Commission (2008), *FAQs: the G8 Summit in Japan from 7-9 July 2008,* Press Releases, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/478&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en, 07-04-2008.

European Commission (2008), 'Communication from the Commission […]: The EU – A global partner for development; speeding up the Millennium Development Goals', COM(2008), 177 final, Brussels, available at http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/michel/Policy/key_documents/index_en.html

Falkner, R. (2007), 'The political economy of 'normative power' Europe: EU environmental leadership in international biotechnology regulation'*, Journal of European Public Policy*, 14, 4, 507–526.

Federal Government of Germany (2007), G8 Summit 2007 Heiligendamm, *The G8-members at a glance*, http://www.g-8.de/Webs/G8/EN/G8Summit/Participants/G8/g8.html, 08-13-2008.

Fernandes, S. (2008), 'EU Policies towards Russia', in Tocci, N. (ed.), *Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European Union and its Global Partners*, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels.

Fischer, K. (2001), 'The G7/8 and the European Union', in: Kirton, J.., Daniels, J. and Freytag, A. (eds.) *Guiding Global order*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 123-142.

G8 Research Group (2005), *What does the G stand for?*, http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/g.html, 08-12-2008.

Ginsberg, R.H. (1999) 'Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 37:3, 429-454.

Government of Canada (2008), *G8 Members*, http://www.g8.gc.ca/members-en.asp, 07-30-2008.

Grabbe, H. (2006), *The EU's Transformative Power: Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Groenleer, M.L.P. and Schaik, L.G. van (2007), 'United We Stand? The European Union's International Actorness in the Cases of the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 45:5, 969–998.

Hainsworth, S. (1990), *Coming of Age: The European Community and the Economic Summit*, Country Study, No. 7, Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto.

Hill, C. (1993) 'The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 31:3, 305-325.

Hill, C. and Smith, M. (eds) (2005), *International Relations and the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Holland, M. (2008) 'The EU and the Global Development Agenda', *European Integration,* 30:3, 343–362.

Ikenberry, J. (1993), 'Salvaging the G-7', *Foreign Affairs*, 72, 132-139.

Jupille, J. and Caporaso, J. (1998) 'States, Agency and Rules: the European Union in Global Environment Politics', in: Rhodes, C. (ed.), *The European Union in the World Community*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 213-229.

Keukeleire, S. and MacNaughten, J. (2008) *The Foreign Policy of the European Union,* Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Kirton, J. (1999), 'Explaining G8 Effectiveness' in Hodges, M, Kirton, J. and Daniels, J. (eds), *The G8's Role in the New Millennium*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 45-68.

Kirton, J. (2004), 'Cooperation between the EU and the G8 in Conflict Prevention', in: Kronenberger, V. and Wouters, J. (eds), *The European Union and Conflict Prevention*, The Hague: T.M.C Asser Press, 451-466.

Kirton, J.J. (2010), 'Assessing G8 and G20 Performance, 1975–2009', Paper prepared for the annual convention of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, February 17-20, 2010.

Kokotsis, E. (2008), *G8 Commitment/Compliance Coding and Reference Manual*, G8 Research Group, University of Toronto, 17 March.

Kwok, A., Seleanu, D., Vanderlinden, C. and Guebert, J. (2008), *2008 Hokkaido Toyako G8 Summit Country Assessment Report*, University of Toronto G8 Research Group, 9 July 2008.

Labonte, R and Schrecker, T. (2007) Foreign policy matters: a normative view of the G8 and population health, *Bulletin of the World Health Organization*, 85, 3, 185-191.

Lamy, P. (1988), *The Economic Summit and the European Community*, Bissel Paper, No. 5, University of Toronto, Centre for International Studies.

Lavenex S. and Uçarer E. (2004), 'The External Dimension of Europeanization: The Case of Immigration Policies', *Cooperation and Conflict* 39, 4, 417-443.

Leal-Arcas, R. (2001) 'The European Community and Mixed Agreements', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 6:4, 483-513.

Leonard, M. (2005), *Why Europe will run the 21st century*, New York: Public Affairs.

Lyne, M., Nielson, D. and Tierney, M. (2006), 'Who delegates? Alternative models of principals in development aid', in Hawkins, D *et al.* (eds), *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Manners, I. (2002), 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40:2, 235-258.

Manners, I. (2008), 'The Normative Ethics of the European Union', *International Affairs*, 84, 1, 45-60.

Manners, I. and Whitman R. (1998) 'Towards Identifying the International Identity of the European Union', *Journal of European Integration*, 21, 3, 231–249.

Marsh, S. and Mackenstein, H. (2005), *The International Relations of the European Union*, Harlow: Pearson Longman.

May, B (2005), 'The G8 in a Globalising World: Does the United States Need the G8?', in: Fratianni, M. *et al.* (eds.) *New Perspectives on Global Governance: Why America Needs the G8*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 67-79

Meunier, S. and Nicolaïdis, K. (1999), 'Who speaks for Europe? The delegation of trade authority in the EU', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 37: 477-501.

Meunier, S. (2000), 'What Single Voice? European Institutions and EU-US Trade Negotiations', *International Organization*, 54, 1, 103-135.

Moravcsik, A. (2003) 'How Europe Can Win Without an Army', *Financial Times*, 3 April.

Niemann, A. (1998) "The PHARE programme and the concept of spillover: neofunctionalism in the making", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 5, 3, 428-446.

Niemann, A. and de Wekker, T. (2010 forthcoming), Normative power Europe? EU relations with Moldova', *European Integration online Papers*, Vol. 14.

Niemann, A. and Huigens, J. (2011 forthcoming), 'The European Union's role in the G8: a

principal-agent perspective', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 18, 3.

Orbie, J. (2006), 'Civilian Power Europe: Review of the Original and Current Debates', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 41:1, 123-128.

Orbie, J. and Versluys, H. (2008) 'The European Union's International Development Policy: Leading and Benevolent?', in J. Orbie (ed.) *Europe's Global Role, External Policies of the European Union*, Hampshire: Ashgate, 67-90.

Payne, A. (2008), 'The G8 in a changing global order', *International Affairs*, 84:3, 519-533.

Pentilla, R. (2003), 'The Role of the G8 in International Peace and Security', *Adelphi Paper* 355, New York: Oxford University Press.

Princen, S. (2007), 'Agenda-setting in the European Union', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 14, 1, 21-38.

Putnam, R. and Bayne, N. (1987), *Hanging Together: Cooperation and Conflict in the Seven-Power Summits*, London: Sage.

Rampal, J. (2005) 'Belgium urges rich to meet aid pledges', *Inter Press Service,* 17 February.

Rhinard, M. and Kaeding, M. (2006), 'The International Bargaining Power of the European Union in "Mixed" Competence Negotiations', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 44:5, 1023-1050.

Rome European Council (1977), Record of conversation over dinner (argument about Community representation at G7) from 25-03-1977, PREM 16/1254, Margaret Thatcher Foundation.

Rosamond, B. (2005), 'Conceptualizing the EU Model of Governance in World Politics', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 10:4, 463-478.

Scheipers, S. and Sicurelli, D. (2007) 'Normative Power Europe: a Credible Utopia?', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 45, 2, 435-457.

Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (eds) (2005), *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*, Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press.

Schreurs, M. and Tiberghien, Y. (2007), 'Multi-Level Reinforcement: Explaining European Union Leadership in Climate Change Mitigation', *Global Environmental Politics,* 7:4, 19-46.

Sjöstedt, G. (1977), *The External Role of the European Community*, Saxon House, Swedish Institute of International Affairs.

Sjursen, H. (2006), 'The EU as a "normative" power: how can this be?', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13:2, 235-251.

Smith, K. (2004), 'Still "civilian power EU?"', CIDEL Workshop, Oslo, 22-23 October 2004.

Smith, K. (2000), 'The end of civilian rower EU', *The International Spectator*, 35, 2, 11-28.

Smith, M. (2006), 'The EU as an international actor', in Richardson, J. (ed.), *The European Union: power and policy-making*, London: Routledge, 289-310.

Smith, M. E. (2000), 'Conforming to Europe The Domestic Impact of EU Foreign Policy Cooperation', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 7, 4, 613-31.

Smyser, W. (1993), 'Goodbye G-7', *The Washington Quarterly*, 16, 15-28.

Stavridis, S. (2001), 'Why the "Militarising" of the European Union is strengthening the concept of a "Civilian power Europe"', *EUI Working Papers*, RSC No. 2001/17.

Tiilikainen, T. (2001), 'To Be or Not to Be: An Analysis of the Legal and Political Elements of Statehood in the EU's External Identity', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 6, 223-241.

Tocci, N. (ed.) (2008a), *Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European Union and its Global Partners*, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels.

Tocci, N. (2008b), 'Policies towards Israel-Palestine 2000-07', in Tocci, N. (ed.), *Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European Union and its Global Partners*, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels.

Ubide, A. (2010) *The G20 – A group in search of a mission*, Bruegel G20 Monitor, 17 June.

Van Hüllen, V. (2009), 'Talking is Silver but what if Silence is Golden? Engaging Authoritarian Regimes in External Democracy Promotion', *Berlin Working Papers on European Integration*, Freie Universität Berlin, No. 12.

Vogler, J. and Stephan, H.R. (2007), 'The European Union in global environmental governance', *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics*, 7:4, 389-413.

Wagner, W. (2006), 'The Democratic Control of Military Power Europe', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13, 2, 200-216.

Warkotsch, A. (2006), 'The European Union and democracy promotion in bad neighbourhoods: The case of Central Asia', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 11, 4, 509-525.

Whitman, R. (ed.) (2011 forthcoming), *Normative Power Europe: empirical and theoretical perspectives*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Zielonka, J. (1998), *Explaining Euro-Paralysis. Why Europe is Unable to Act in International Politics*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.