How to cite?


DOI: 10.1695/2012012

**Portugal and the EU’s Eastern Enlargement:**

A logic of identity endorsement*

**Martijn Schukkink**
Editor/Project Manager, Parliamentary Documentation Centre, The Hague

**Arne Niemann**
Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Mainz

**Abstract:** This paper addresses the puzzle of why Portugal has consistently supported the EU’s fifth enlargement. We argue that standard explanations, based on welfare maximisation, geopolitics, or rhetorical action, cannot persuasively account for this policy choice. Instead, we advance an alternative explanation – subsequently referred to as ‘identity endorsement’ – that is based on a logic of appropriateness where behaviour is shaped by aspects of similarity and congruence, and where the development of Portuguese identity has constituted what has been perceived as appropriate in the context of Eastern enlargement. We argue that EC/EU membership has provided Portuguese political elites with a renewed collective identity, in which a choice for membership has been equated with a choice for democracy, stability and openness. Portuguese support for Eastern enlargement has consistently been based on these concepts that originated from Portugal’s own period of accession negotiations. By fully supporting Eastern enlargement, Portugal could act together with the ‘European core’, and Portugal itself would become more ‘core’, i.e. more European. For Portuguese political elites, supporting Eastern enlargement thus constituted an act of ‘identity endorsement’, i.e. the confirmation, (re-)production and reinforcement of existing identity constructions. We tentatively suggest that the notion of identity endorsement may also shed light on other empirical puzzles related to European integration.

* We are grateful to Marieke de Goede and two anonymous referees for their useful comments on earlier drafts as well as Annika Herbel and Jan Bucher for their valuable research assistance.

http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2012-012a.htm
Keywords: Central and Eastern Europe, democracy, discourse, enlargement, European identity, Europeanisation, identity, Portugal, post-Communism, sociological institutionalism, political science.

Table of Contents

Introduction ..........................................................................................................................2
1. Approaches to member state enlargement politics ...................................................4
   1.1 Rational choice approaches .............................................................................5
   1.2. Rhetorical action (RA)...................................................................................9
2. Theoretical point of departure: identity endorsement .............................................13
   2.1. Operationalisation .........................................................................................17
3. Probing identity endorsement ...............................................................................19
   3.1. Rise of the (increasingly dominant) pro-European discourse .......................19
   3.2. Common references to Portugal’s own experiences (with membership) ..........22
   3.3. The defence of Eastern enlargement on the basis of ‘solidarity’ ......................25
   3.4. Accusing opponents of Eastern enlargement of xenophobia, provincialism, isolationism .28
   3.5. Pro-European discourse gains dominance ......................................................29
Conclusions .....................................................................................................................31
References ........................................................................................................................35

Introduction

Since the late 1980s Portugal has consistently supported the goal of EU Eastern enlargement – from discursive support during/right after the collapse of the Communist regimes in the CEEC, via advocacy of rapid enlargement during the 1990s, to the unanimous ratification of the accession agreement in the Assembly of the Republic (Portugal’s unicameral Parliament) in 2003 (Diário da Assembleia da República 1998, 1990, 2003a, 2003b; Azevedo & Campos da Costa 1999). This is rather puzzling because it cannot convincingly be explained through mainstream theoretical frameworks. Welfare-related rationalist accounts do not make sense because most economists expected a moderate decrease of the Portuguese GDP as a result of the EU’s fifth enlargement.1 In addition, explanations based on geopolitics cannot persuasively account for Portugal’s preferences either because geopolitically the shift of the

---

1 The terms ‘fifth enlargement’ and ‘Eastern enlargement’ are used synonymously here. The role of Cyprus and Malta are disregarded given their negligible impact on this context.
EU’s centre of gravity eastwards can be viewed as rather detrimental for the country. Furthermore, an explanation based on rhetorical action — which would suggest that Portugal was rhetorically entrapped — does not add much to our understanding: Portuguese preferences for Eastern enlargement were formed already by the late 1980s, and these were consistently maintained. Instead, it seems that Portugal did not need to be rhetorically entrapped in order to become a staunch supporter of Eastern enlargement.

We argue that the puzzle of explaining Portuguese preferences regarding this process lies in modern Portuguese national identity, where properties of ‘Europe’ and ‘Europeanness’ play a constituting role. Portugal's Europeanness, within this context, has been consistently treated as the alternative to the totalitarian, unstable and closed political system the country had known for so many years (until 1974). Having secured EC membership in 1986, Portugal’s choice for Europe was essentially political, notwithstanding the impact EC/EU membership has had on economic growth and development. Membership has had a significant positive influence on the consolidation of democracy in Portugal, not least since the identification of the Union with liberal democracy and political freedom has had great symbolic influence in Portugal (Royo 2007). Membership allowed Portuguese society to identify with democracy and the positive economic effects of structural funds helped to legitimise the new political system (Royo 2003: 288). Studies show that satisfaction with democracy seems to be ‘the most important variable in explaining support for the EU’ (Costa Lobo 2003: 105). Political elites in Portugal, with the exception of the Communists and the Left Bloc, have consistently linked these two variables (Costa Lobo 2007: 20). Portuguese associations with European integration have generally been very positive. For the first time in its history, Portugal experienced democracy, political stability and economic growth simultaneously.

From the late 1980s/early 1990s, Eastern enlargement presented an opportunity for Portugal to become one of the core members of the organization, as it gave Portuguese politicians the chance to act along with the traditional European core that wished to continue the European project towards the East. For Portugal, following this explanation, supporting Eastern enlargement can be treated as an act of endorsing, modern Portuguese national identity. The latter has been endorsed in the sense that existing identity constructions were confirmed, reproduced and reinforced vis-a-vis a historical other (its fascist past and the threat of instability in the aftermath of the Carnation Revolution), through the understanding of the

---

2 For example, Portuguese per capita income grew from 56 percent to about 74 percent of the EU average during the 1980s and 1990s. In addition has fully participated in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) from its inception in 1999 (cf. Royo 2004).
3 In addition, the CDS-PP did not make a direct link between democracy and EU membership, but only for a short and unsuccessful period in the early nineties.
4 This refers to the Estado Novo regime (1933-1974), led by António de Oliveira Salazar (until 1968) and Marcello Caetano (until 1974).
5 Between 1974 and 1976, during the Ongoing Revolutionary Process, no less than 6 consecutive interim governments followed each other before a constitution was established. In March of 1975 a failed coup d’ état of right wing military forces linked to General Spinola led to yet another, more leftist interim government. In November of the same year another attempt to overthrow the government, this time induced
candidacy/accession path as strongly promoting democratisation (thus depicting EU enlargement as open, inclusive and positively reformist), and because Eastern enlargement resonated well with Portugal’s own experience, thus generating solidarity and identification with the CEECs’ development. Apart from shedding light on the above mentioned puzzle and introducing an explanation that is informed by an alternative (and less used) conceptual underpinning, this paper also adds value in the sense that it focuses on an underexplored dimension of the enlargement literature. While much of the scholarship focuses on questions of EU enlargement politics, applicants’ enlargement politics, and the impact of enlargement, the dimension of member states’ enlargement politics has featured to a lesser extent (cf. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002). In addition, studies analysing EU members’ enlargement politics mainly concentrate on the larger and more influential member countries, while smaller and less influential ones – and those without any major political and economic benefits in prospect⁶ – have featured significantly less as units of analysis.

Our general methodological approach can be described as careful ‘process tracing’ (George and Bennett 2005), put into practice through triangulation across different data sources such as official documentation (esp. parliamentary debates), media reports, specialist publications, interviews, as well as opinion poll and survey data. Our conceptual point of departure (identity endorsement) and the suggestions/hypotheses flowing from it will mainly be substantiated by way of discourse analysis as a means to finding patterns in public statements, which regulate political debate, allowing for certain interpretations while excluding others (Wæver 2009: 165). We have developed specific indicators for ‘identity endorsement’ that will be specified at the end of the second section.

We proceed as follows: section one briefly reviews the most important conceptual approaches to EU enlargement and probes the extent to which they can explain Portugal’s support for the fifth enlargement round. In the second section, we specify our own theoretical point of departure and also indicate how ‘identity endorsement’ has been operationalised. Section three probes ‘identity endorsement’ with regard to the research question. Finally, we draw some conclusions from our findings and indicate how the notion of identity endorsement may enhance our understanding with regard to other empirical questions related to European integration, and particularly EU enlargement.

1. Approaches to member state enlargement politics

Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2002: 504-505) have distinguished between the following dependent variables concerning the study of enlargement: (1) applicants’ enlargement politics; (2) member state enlargement politics/policy; (3) EU enlargement politics; (4) the impact of enlargement. They schematised the available academic literature on enlargement, by left wing extremists, failed, and marked the decline of communist influence in Portuguese post-dictatorial politics (Medina 1994: 236-238).

But on Spain, see Piedrafita (2007).

http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2012-012a.htm
based on the above-mentioned dimensions and the type of study (single case, cross-sectional comparison or longitudinal comparison). Within this scheme, this article is best described as a single case study within the member state politics dimension. Not only has this category generally been under-researched (but see Tewes 1998 and Hyde-Price 2000), analyses of decision-making processes in countries without any major political or economic benefits in prospect are strikingly absent (but see e.g. Piedrafita 2007 on Spain). The next sub-sections discuss the main approaches for conceptualising enlargement on the dimension of member state enlargement politics/policy, while demonstrating that these accounts cannot convincingly explain the policy pursued by the Portuguese government on Eastern enlargement.

1.1. Rational choice approaches

Rational choice theory stipulates an explanation of actor preferences and collective outcomes as a result of individual actions. Actors calculate the utility of different courses of action and choose the one that maximises their utility (e.g. Becker 1976; Monroe 1991). In rational choice theories expected individual costs and benefits determine a particular state’s enlargement preferences. One can broadly distinguish two types of rational-choice approaches to explain member state stances to the enlargement policy: (1) welfare-related approaches; (2) geopolitical approaches. However, both accounts cannot convincingly explain the position taken by Portugal on Eastern enlargement.

The welfare-related approaches

Welfare-oriented accounts for explaining enlargement politics and policy focus, in particular, on ‘policy costs and benefits’ (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2002: 510). These are related to the institution’s ‘club goods’. In the case of the European Union these entail contributions to the EU budget and the receipt of EU funds. In addition, (political) economists, especially, have drawn attention to the potential impact of further enlargement on aspects, such as the development of GDP, trade effects (in terms trade creation/deflation), and competitiveness of a certain state (e.g. Baldwin et al. 1997; Kohler 2004; Breuss 2002). While some authors have made use of similar welfare-related aspects to explain particular member state preferences and positions with regard to their enlargement policy (on Germany, see Hyde-Price (2000: 183-184), in the case of Portugal such account does not make sense.

---

7 The study is not really relevant in terms of “EU enlargement politics” because the weight of Portugal’s preferences in the overall enlargement process have been of lesser importance for the eventual overall outcome (cf. Schimmelfennig 2001; Gaspar 2000; Seixas da Costa 2000, 2002). Strictly speaking, of course, a single member state could have blocked the entire enlargement process.

8 For literature (reviews) on the three other dimensions of studies on enlargement, see e.g. Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier (2002); Moravcsik & Vachudova (2003); Dardanelli (1999).
Overall, welfare-related perspectives have suggested that Portugal would not benefit from, or even be adversely affected through, Eastern enlargement. The negative overall effects on Portugal’s GDP, as presented in the various macro-economic available predictions, ranged from 0.3 percent (Baldwin et al. 1997) up to 1.3 percent (Kohler 2004). Mateus et al. (2004: 604) consider a number of different scenarios, all of them suggesting something between a GDP loss of 1.5 percent and a slight gain of 0.3 percent. The probable negative impact of Eastern enlargement has been explained in a number of ways.

Crespo et al. (2004: 782-783) suggest two main effects of EU enlargement on the Portuguese economy. First there is the possibility of trade creation, meaning an increase of bilateral flows with the CEECs. Second, one could expect a trade shift as Portugal’s traditional trade partners switch their imports to the CEECs. As far as trade creation is concerned, trade between Portugal and the CEECs by the year 2000 did not exceed 2 percent of total Portuguese trade, and substantial effects on trade flows as a direct consequence of enlargement were not expected in any of the EU members, as trade barriers had already been gradually removed in the years before May 2004. In addition, whilst in terms of the number of countries the fifth enlargement may have been unprecedented, in terms of GDP it was quite comparable to previous enlargements (Caetano et al. 2002: 8, 65). Portugal, due to its geographical position and the nature of its exports, was considered unable to increase its exports to the CEECs on a substantial scale, while it was at risk of experiencing losses as a consequence of significant trade diversion (Breuss 2002; Emerson & Gros 1998).

The possible outcomes presented above deal only with trade effects. However, enlargement was also to widen the European Single Market. This would increase competitive pressures, and later lead to increased competitiveness. It was forecast, however, that Portugal was to be the only EU-15 country to expect a decrease of competitiveness, predominantly caused by falling productivity, over the years of 2008-2010, after an initial positive effect during the first years after enlargement (Breuss 2002: 252).  

Portugal opposed any plans for recalibrating the EU budget, which would leave the country with lesser finances from the structural funds. Together with Spain, Greece and Ireland the Portuguese fought for a ‘preservation of solidarity’ within the European Union.  

The outcome of the Agenda 2000 negotiations, in which a new financial framework for the years 2000-2006 was established, conformed to Portugal’s wishes. Portugal would annually receive approximately €656 million under the new framework, against €637 million under the previous one (Azevedo & Campos da Costa 1999: 14). Portugal’s contentment with the

---

9 Simulations based on the OEF World Macroeconomic Model were first published in Breuss (2001).

10 Given the pressure that the fifth enlargement would put on financing Community policies, observers agreed that a reform of the Common Agricultural Policy and structural policies was an indispensable precondition for enlargement. Any reform would lead to a certain reduction of transfers for EU farmers and to fewer regions eligible for financial support, and would thus disproportionately affect the main beneficiaries of the budget at the time: Spain, Greece, Portugal, and Ireland. As a result, all of them challenged the Commission’s opinion that enlargement could be funded on the basis of the current budget limit (Schimmelfennig 2001: 52).
eventual results nonetheless does not disprove that the cohesion countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) still had to bear, in relative terms, a greater share of enlargement costs than the net payers within the EU-15 (Breuss 2001: 12). For Portugal, enlargement costs amounted to an estimated average of 1.5 percent of GDP per year, while the EU average was only 0.17 percent (Breuss 2002: 257). A more recent Commission report on the consequences of enlargement shows, in Portugal’s case, relatively large trade shifts away from the old member states (around -1.2 percent), compensated only slightly by trade with the new member states (around +0.15 percent) (Commission 2009: 64). These figures suggest that the abovementioned predictions were not far from the truth.

Following on from the analysis carried out in this section, in nominal terms, Portugal was predominantly expected to lose from enlargement because of its poor point of departure in terms of trade competition with the CEECs. Welfare-related explanations are thus unlikely to provide a convincing argument. And whatever Portugal may have achieved during underlying (Agenda 2000) negotiations, this does not compensate for the fact that the overall balance remains negative. In addition, section 3 will demonstrate that Portugal was a reliable supporter of Eastern enlargement long before the post-enlargement budget was negotiated, thus further undermining explanations based on welfare-maximisation.

**Geopolitical approaches**

These approaches seek to describe and explain the impact of geography on politics and the behaviour of actors in international politics based on geographical variables, especially in terms of a country’s geographical position (Mackinder 1904; Sprout and Sprout 1965). An important geopolitically-induced question regarding Eastern EU enlargement is related to internal geopolitical changes due to a shift of core and periphery (Delanty 2007).

In terms of geopolitics, new member states could be seen as both potential new allies and as (economic) competitors (Moravcsik & Vachudova 2003). As for the former, Portugal might gain some new allies in the Eastern European applicants, given the fact that most CEECs were about the same size and were, to an increasing extent, about as economically developed as Portugal. Therefore, they are likely to side with Portugal on important issues concerning questions related to ‘big vs. smaller member states’, or the need for economic solidarity. However, the fact that Portugal shows quite a lot of political and economic similarities with a number of CEECs is also a cause for many of the potential negative material consequences pointed out in the previous sub-section. The share of agriculture in the Portuguese economy is similar to Hungarian, Slovenian, Czech, and Latvian figures. The same is true of unemployment figures and the weight of the tertiary sector. The percentage of the Portuguese population between the ages of 25 and 64 that attended higher education was even lower than any of the new member states (Mateus et al. 2004: 78).
More importantly in geopolitical terms, the fifth enlargement could imply a shift of the EU’s centre of gravity from South to East (or at least eastwards), a scenario that was regarded as detrimental, especially by Social Democrats and Christian Democrats. As the leader of the Christian Democratic/Conservative CDS-PP, Paulo Portas, suggested in a parliamentary debate in 2001, ‘enlargement, to us, is an extremely difficult issue, because it turns us more peripheral, since Europe is running towards the East, as is its centre of gravity [shifts]’ (Diário da Assembleia da República 2001: 3900). Vitor Martins (1999: 44) of the centre-right PDS suggested that ‘the heart of Europe will be more Berlin than Brussels. The Atlantic will become more peripheral with the reinforcement of the EU’s continentality. We should not underestimate the geopolitical consequences of such a step’. PS deputy Vera Jardim affirmed that the new members “were technically and industrially prepared in a way that will cause problems [for Portugal]” (LUSA 2004b). This suggests that Portuguese politicians throughout the political spectrum did in fact fear negative geopolitical consequences on the EU level, and this anxiety has been substantiated in the literature, especially in terms of economic implications (Gaspar 2000: 370; Mateus et al. 2004: 353, 420). These concerns, however, never jeopardized the PSD’s and the CDS-PP’s support for the overall enlargement process, and should perhaps be treated within the light of a debate between government and opposition on a subject (Nice Treaty) both parties essentially agreed upon.

As for migration, another factor with geopolitical implication, some have suggested that its consequences for member states’ GDPS are unlikely to be substantial (Breuss 2002), while others have pointed out that the negative public opinion on migration might endanger future horizontal and vertical European integration (Grant 2006: 1). In addition, more generally enlargement tends to increase the political, economic, social and cultural diversity within the Union and thus provides a challenge towards EU coherence and cohesion. Hence, (rapid) Eastern enlargement could eventually cause the overall process of European integration to slow down or even result in gridlock. The difficult last round of Treaty revision(s) leading to the Treaty of Lisbon could be seen as proving some support for this line of argumentation.

11 Moreover, the geographical position vis-à-vis the CEECs can be understood as a proxy for the scope for economic exchange with these countries (Moravcsik 1998). As a result, the Southern member states, and especially Greece and Italy, supported the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, the Southeastern candidates (cf. Schimmelfennig 2001: 51).

12 All citations from Portuguese sources are translations by Martijn Schukkink.

13 Though PS politicians seemed more reluctant when it came to naming the possible negative side effects of enlargement – PS was governing at the time – one cannot say they were not aware of this. Carlos Gaspar, one of President Sampaio’s main political advisors, wrote extensively on the risks for Portugal on the road towards Eastern enlargement.

14 In the same debate, Portas assured that “a Czech from Prague and a Portuguese from Braga are equally European”, defending himself against PS politicians who questioned his support for European integration (Diário da Assembleia da República (2001), p. 3901).

15 However, it has been argued rather convincingly that such fears have been overstated and that the functioning of the EU and its decision-making process has been affected to a lesser extent than foreseen. This has been attributed, for example, to (a) the EU’s intense membership conditionality employed especially in the run-up to the 2004 and 2007 enlargements (Epstein and Sedelmeier 2008: 795), and (b) processes of socialization that have effectively accustomed and aligned CEEC civil servants and policy-makers’ with the Community’s norms and working practices (cf. Edwards 2006; Sedelmeier 2008: 807; Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010).
Portugal, as one of the drivers behind vertical European integration, might thus have expected Eastern enlargement to become a threat to its preferences regarding the deepening of European integration. Seeing that the project of Eastern enlargement somewhat overlapped with the process leading to a European Single Currency, the latter being clearly in Portugal’s interest, Eastern enlargement could be considered a disturbing factor (Departamento de Prospectiva e Planeamento 1995: 29).16

In geopolitical terms, for Portugal there seem to be at least as many arguments to oppose enlargement as there are to defend the process. One might thus have expected Portuguese attitudes to be moderate, reserved or even sceptical. Hence, neither welfare-oriented nor geopolitical approaches can convincingly explain Portuguese preferences regarding European enlargement. Therefore, we need to look further.

1.2. Rhetorical action (RA)

Frank Schimmelfennig (2001), in his seminal article on Eastern enlargement, uses the mechanism of ‘rhetorical action’ (hereafter referred to as RA) to explain how certain member states were ‘shamed’ into enlargement: in a highly institutionalised environment, such as the EU, policy-makers are concerned about their reputation as members and about the legitimacy of their behaviour. ‘Actors whose self-interested preferences are in line with the community norms have the opportunity to add cheap legitimacy to their position. They will argumentatively back up their selfish goals and delegitimize the position of their opponents. This strategic use of norm-based arguments in pursuit of one’s self-interest has been termed ‘rhetorical action’ (Schimmelfennig 2001: 63).

Schimmelfennig does not observe true opposition towards enlargement. Expected costs and benefits are reflected solely in the ‘degree of enthusiasm’ EU-15 member states expressed. The degree of enthusiasm is reflected in his categories of ‘drivers’ and ‘brakemen’.17 In general, EU member states bordering CEEC applicants were the drivers of EU enlargement. To explain brakemanship, the variable of ‘potential losses from enlargement’ is included. First, those EU-15 economies which, like most of the CEECs, specialise in the production of textiles, agriculture, and heavy industries are likely to experience competition from new member states. Second, ‘less developed’ member states, being net recipients, will see their share in EU structural funds drop, as new members will also become net recipients.

The differences between member states in terms of expected costs and benefits, according to Schimmelfennig, cannot be overcome, since ‘neither the Central and East European countries

---


17 Drivers were those member states “advocat[ing] an early and firm commitment to Eastern enlargement”, whereas brakemen “were reticent and tried to put off the decision” Schimmelfennig (2001: 49).
nor the ‘drivers’ among EU members [possess] sufficient bargaining power to change the balance of costs and benefits for the “brakemen” in favour of Eastern enlargement’ (Schimmelfennig 2001: 54). The question then rises, how were the brakemen convinced, if not by material ‘side payments’? This is where rhetorical action – the strategic use of norm-based arguments in pursuit of one’s self-interests – comes in. According to Schimmelfennig, RA worked because it gave the drivers the power to prevent brakemen from openly opposing the goal of enlargement. For example, disputing that the CEECs truly belonged to Europe was not a real option. This was anticipated by the drivers through the association agreements, which were invoked as intermediate steps to help the CEECs ‘Europeanise’. Thus, although the CEECs were perhaps not yet fully European, it was suggested that through the efforts of all member states they could be Europeanised in the foreseeable future (Schimmelfennig 2001: 73-74). As an example of ‘shaming’, French President Mitterand’s commitment for Eastern enlargement has been referred to. Although he was ambiguous about the fifth enlargement, Mitterand felt obliged to declare his official support from the CEECs’ membership aspirations. This, in turn, was often cited by the CEECs to make sure that the French President would stick to his words (Schimmelfennig 2001: 74).

RA argues that countries like Portugal that did not expect to benefit from enlargement in material terms (thus constituting brakemen), were ‘rhetorically trapped’ into the process, since they were unable to use legitimate strategies to halt it. We argue that ‘rhetorical entrapment’ does not apply to Portugal’s position and role in the overall process. Subsequently, we advance three points in order to substantiate this claim: (1) Portugal did not constitute much of a brakeman. It did not seek to slow down the enlargement process as such (although its pursuit of other goals might have given such impression). (2) Portuguese preferences have been consistent from the very beginning and followed logically from speech acts from before the collapse of Eastern European communist regimes, meaning that Portugal did not need to be rhetorically ‘trapped’ into Eastern enlargement. (3) Portuguese preferences with regard to future EU enlargement continue to indicate general support for horizontal integration, even when fellow member states assume a much more critical attitude.

First, in Schimmelfennig’s account Portugal appears as one of the brakemen of Eastern enlargement that needed to be shamed and rhetorically trapped into it through processes of RA. He suggests that Portuguese preferences with regard to the distribution of enlargement costs or further liberalisation of trade in textiles were anti-enlargement strategies in disguise (Schimmelfennig 2001: 55, 57). Schimmelfennig here used preferences regarding the constraints of enlargement to demonstrate that certain member states were not eager for enlargement itself. In our view, he puts the threshold for corroborating his claim concerning Portuguese ‘brakemanship’ too low. Arguments regarding possible negative side-effects of enlargement cannot simply be equated with strategies to delay or avoid enlargement itself. This does not do justice to the way Eastern enlargement has been discussed in Portugal. None of our data suggests that Portuguese governments can be suspected of deploying anti-enlargement strategies. In addition, the subsequent analysis indicates that Portugal’s pro-enlargement behaviour has been remarkably consistent.
Overall, the evidence for Portugal slowing down the enlargement process is very sparse (Gaspar 2000: 365), while suggestions to the contrary are more convincing. For example, it has been argued that Portugal advocated rapid enlargement, according to some sources even without asking for compensation regarding the extra costs this may involve for Portugal (Torres 1999: 86). In a 1992 report on enlargement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Portugal considered that a first round of Eastern enlargement would be possible perhaps as early as 1998 (Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros 1992: 182). According to Azevedo & Campos da Costa (1999: 16), “the Portuguese point of departure was essentially neutral”, a stance that has been formalized during the Luxembourg summit in December 1997, when Portugal and France presented a joint proposal of neutrality, “which would set them free from an ‘air of suspect behaviour’, as in preferring some new member states over others.” The statement that “Portugal did not limit enlargement to a certain number of countries” (Institut für Europäische Politik 1998: 30) differs from Schimmelfennig’s claim that the Portuguese government favoured an inclusive approach.

Portugal’s 2000 Presidency performance also suggests that it was speeding up rather than obstructing the enlargement process. Under the Portuguese presidency nearly all chapters were opened and a significant number of chapters were closed with Cyprus, Slovenia, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic. At the same time negotiations were started with Bulgaria, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Romania. Generally, the role of the Portuguese Presidency on the enlargement dossier has been described as ‘ambitious’, making ‘good progress’, or even ‘being unrivalled’ by prior Presidencies (Edwards & Wiesalla 2001: 43; Sajdik & Schwarzinger 2007: 112; Seixas da Costa 2000: 229). In addition, during the IGC negotiations, Portugal did not want to focus unduly on voting weights in the European Council, as this could be interpreted as an attempt to slow down the enlargement process, something the Portuguese government reportedly did not intend to do (Vasconcelos 2000: 12).

The second and perhaps most important indication that Portugal was not ‘rhetorically trapped’ into enlargement is the fact that the possibility and also the definite desirability of an eventual enlargement towards the East was already expressed in parliamentary debates around the time of the various events that led to the collapse of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, roughly between the years of 1989 and 1991. In an important debate on the then ongoing collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe in December 1989, support for opposition forces was overwhelming and references to Portugal’s own memories of the seventies were numerous. PS deputy António Barreto, for example, wanted “a bigger Europe […] that is more open to enlargement towards the new European nations of Central and Eastern Europe” (Diário da Assembleia da República 1989: 795-796). PSD’s minister of Foreign Affairs João de Deus Pinheiro, during the same debate, already described a three point plan consisting of keeping a reunified Germany in the European Community, normalizing relationships with the CEECs and finally “the absorption of the reformed
countries of the East” (Diário da Assembleia da República 1989: 745).\footnote{See for more examples the entire contributions of António Barreto (PS) and João de Deus Pinheiro (Minister of Foreign Affairs – PSD) in the parliamentary debate of December 5th, 1989 (Diário da Assembleia da República 1989: 745-746; 795-796) and Jaime Gama (PS) in the parliamentary debate of January 16th, 1990 (Diário da Assembleia da República 1990: 1120). N.b.: Jaime Gama later became minister of Foreign Affairs (1995-2002), a job he had already held before from 1983 to 1985. See also section 3 for more evidence.} Important in that respect is also the consistency of the political discourse, which will be illustrated in section 3. This strongly suggests that Portuguese politicians were not ‘silenced’ by CEECs’ and drivers’ legitimacy-based arguments in favour of enlargement, assuming that without these arguments they would have felt free to oppose CEEC membership. This observation indicates that RA was not the reason why Portugal supported enlargement.

Demonstrating the consistency of the dominant discourse would be easier if Schimmelfennig had defined specific moments in which RA occurred, reached its climax or fell back. However, this is not the case. Nonetheless, Schimmelfennig (2001: 69) does mention that RA started as early as 1990, when CEECs started to emphasise their Europeanness (e.g. Hroch 2000; Neumann 2000 and Kuus 2007). These strategies were immediately echoed by drivers’ statements (Schimmelfennig 2001: 71). Further examples of RA in the article are mainly dated from the early nineties, which suggests that by the mid-nineties RA had already largely ‘fulfilled its task’. This analysis of the dominant discourse in Portugal should thus mainly be focussed on possible inconsistencies registered between the late eighties and the mid-nineties. However, in order to be as complete as possible, our analysis will cover the entire debate between the late eighties and the year 2004, including the period around 1999 that constitutes a critical juncture, as explained later. As section 3 will (further) indicate, the Portuguese discourse was remarkably consistent across this entire time span.

A third indication for rejecting RA is grounded in more recent discussions on horizontal integration. Portugal’s minister of Foreign Affairs already reaffirmed Portuguese support for future enlargement towards Serbia (early on, see LUSA 2009a). When both Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy suggested offering Turkey no more than a special partnership status, Portuguese President Cavaco Silva expressed Portugal’s full support for Turkey’s full membership, while pointing at the various similarities between his country and Turkey in terms of the respective key positions they hold in the EU’s relations with other continents (LUSA 2009b). Even in a climate where it would be accepted to be reluctant towards Turkey’s membership, Portugal is not.\footnote{Another important aspect explaining Portuguese preferences regarding the Turkish EU membership bid is explicit US lobbying (JornalismoPortoNet 2004). The weight assigned to the opinion of the US with respect to Turkey’s place in Europe is quite understandable, bearing in mind Portugal’s Atlantic vocation and the Portuguese perception of national defence as described below (cf. pp. 12-13 and 17).} This might be seen as an indication of Portugal’s general commitment to EU enlargement, whilst direct material aspects are not likely to play a significant role, or may even impact adversely on Portuguese interests, as in terms of cohesion funds with Turkey’s accession to the Union. Apparently, as far as EU enlargement is concerned, Portugal does not await the positions of the majority before offering full support for a project that is not particularly in the country’s national interest.

http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2012-012a.htm
Given that welfare-oriented and rhetorical action accounts cannot (persuasively) explain Portugal’s support for Eastern enlargement, a less common theoretical approach will be advanced.

2. Theoretical point of departure: identity endorsement

We argue that a constructivist/sociological institutionalist approach can shed considerable light on this case. From such a perspective, institutions can take on a life of their own and – contrary to the rationalist understanding – cease to be strictly instrumental to states’ interests. As a result, interests and identities are no longer ‘exogenously given’, but are derived – at least partially – from the institutional context itself (Wendt 1992; Adler 1997). At the basis of the constructivist / sociological institutionalist approach is the ‘logic of appropriateness’. Here, ‘[a]ctors seek to fulfill the obligations encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a political community or group, and the ethos, practices and expectations of its institutions. Embedded in a social collectivity, they do what they see as appropriate for themselves in a specific type of situation’ (March & Olsen 2004: 1). In this logic ‘processes of reasoning are not primarily connected to the anticipation of future consequences as they are in most contemporary conceptions of rationality. Actors use criteria of similarity and congruence, rather than likelihood and value’ (ibid.: 4). The dichotomy between criteria of similarity and congruence on the one hand and likelihood and value on the other is based, respectively, on the distinction between what one is used to doing in a likely situation and what one would do to get maximum results, i.e.: doing what is appropriate and doing what is likely to produce the most favourable consequences. Whereas the latter will most likely invoke future perspectives, the former will make use of metaphors and analogies, by stating that situation X is similar to situation Y, where rule R was followed. Therefore we should likewise apply rule R to situation X.20

This paper focuses on the role of identity. We suggest that Portuguese national identity has constituted what has been perceived as appropriate in the context of Eastern enlargement. Identity is understood here as ‘that part of the individuals' self-concept, which derives from their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance of that membership’ (Tajfel 1982: 24). Groups of individuals feel that they have something in common which provides the basis for forming an ‘imagined community’ (cf. Anderson 1991). Identity not only expresses what it means to be a member of a community, it also indicates the boundaries of the group, distinguishing an ‘inside’ from an ‘outside’, or a ‘self’ from an ‘other’ (Neumann 1996; Bruter 2003: 1150). Difference and otherness thus play a significant role in (re-)producing identity. While some authors emphasise the role of danger in the process of identity construction (e.g. Campbell 1998), the constitution of identity in relation to difference does not necessarily require a behavioural

20 Tewes (1998: 124) has built on this to describe Germany’s role conflict between deepening and widening with regard to Eastern enlargement.
relationship characterised by mutual exclusion or the perception of the other as a threat to one’s identity (Rumelili 2004: 29).

In a globalising world, the perception of a community may be widened as certain common elements of national identities are transferred to a higher level (Salazar 1998: 123). An international or supranational institution may thus hold certain identity aspects on its own that national actors can, to varying degrees, make part of their self-concept. The EU, as an institution, links identities and ‘provide[s] vocabularies that frame thought and understandings and define[s] what are legitimate arguments and standards of justification and criticism in different situations’ (March & Olsen 2004: 5). Legitimacy, in this context, is often understood in terms of democratic principles which are learned, not given. Democratic governance, then, is not to be understood as a means to achieve one’s predetermined preferences. The institution serves to develop, transmit and protect democratic values. Consequently, ‘[a] democratic identity also includes accepting responsibility for providing an institutional context within which continuous political discourse and change can take place and the roles, identities, accounts, rules, practices, and capabilities that construct political life can be crafted’ (March & Olsen 2004: 6-7).21

European identity, in Portugal’s case, is equated with the consolidation of democracy. As Portuguese politicians had defended EU membership as the (only) way to secure democracy, a logically deducible ‘rule’, in the sense of March and Olsen pointed out above, would be to grant membership to potential member states who likewise seek to secure their fragile democracies. Compliance with ‘criteria of similarity and congruence’ would thus imply defending Eastern enlargement. Nonetheless, the recognition of this ‘rule’ by Portuguese politicians is, at this stage, still no more than a hypothesis, which will be further analysed and substantiated in section 3.

As pointed out in the literature, the consistency of identities should be treated as a variable. ‘Fulfilling an identity through following appropriate rules often involves matching a changing and ambiguous set of contingent rules to a changing and ambiguous set of situations’ (ibid.: 8). Therefore, one should first describe the existing set of collective identities within its political context. After determining that identities play any part in a given decision-making process, the next step would be to find out in what situations they matter and in what other situations a logic of consequences may be involved. This is based on the assumption that it does not make sense to frame the debate along the lines of ‘identity versus interests’. Instead, they may be viewed as complementary, and it then depends on the context which logic prevails (or is invoked) (cf. Risse et al. 1999; Niemann and Mak 2010; Verhoeff and Niemann 2011). March and Olsen suggest four different ways to distinguish between

21 One might argue that this last quote should be applied both to the EU member states and to countries aspiring EU membership. However, Fierke and Wiener (1999) argue that this ‘rule’ has not been decisive in the EU’s decision to enlarge.
situations where one logic takes precedence over the other. Two of them are relevant for the argument(s) advanced in this paper.

Firstly, a clear logic prevails over an unclear logic. This insight has been used by Risse et al. in their research on the role of collective identities in the decision to adopt or reject the Euro. Risse et al.’s argument is similar to the argument we seek to make in this study. When the logic of consequences is unclear — as in the cases of Germany and the UK, where there were as many good materially infused reasons to be in favour or against the single European currency – while the logic of appropriateness is clear, with stable collective nation-state identities in both the UK and Germany22 — we can expect the latter logic to prevail. ‘In other words, collective nation-state identities then delineate the realm of appropriate and legitimate political choices. Moreover, political actors are likely to frame their preferred courses of action in those identity terms. Those who successfully manage to link their preferences to the collective nation-state identity, will carry the day in a political discourse characterized by identity politics’ (Risse et al. 1999: 158; see also March & Olsen 2004: 20-21). Similarly, the empirical sections of this paper argue that in the case of Portuguese support for Eastern enlargement material gains and concerns were rather ambiguous – pointing into different directions, and/or balancing each other out, or perhaps even tipped towards the concerns – while nation-state identities, carried by the dominant domestic discourse, where clear and stable.

Secondly, March and Olsen suggest that the two logics can be distinguished in the way that ‘one logic is used to establish fundamental constraints for a decision, and the other logic is used to make refinements within the constraints’ (March & Olsen 1998: 953). Applied to our case this would mean making a distinction between the general enlargement debate, and secondary debates on the conditions under which enlargement could take place. For our case, we hypothesise that the overall decision to enlarge was based on arguments related to collective identities, while refinements and issues related to the implications of Eastern enlargement, such as the Nice Treaty and the Agenda 2000 negotiations, were dominated by the logic of consequences. This distinction introduces a separation between ‘the enlargement debate’ and underlying debates, something which has been ignored by most studies that seek to explain Eastern enlargement (but cf. Jileva 2004: 17). The distinction does not contradict the first one (about a clear logic prevailing over an unclear one). Instead, they go hand in hand: we hypothesise the general debate to be dominated by clear identities, while interests were rather ambiguous. Regarding secondary debates, we hypothesise that identities are less important while interests were much more clearly defined.

However, the question of how supporting Eastern enlargement was ‘appropriate’ for Portugal still has to be further elucidated. For this purpose, we introduce the notion of identity

22 In the case of the UK, opposition to the Euro was facilitated by a dominant discourse in which ‘Europe’ was still construed as ‘the other’ (Risse et al. 1999: 159-163). For the case of Germany, see the elaboration next page.
endorsement. Identity endorsement is a process that confirms, (re-)produces, and reinforces existing identity constructions. The notion corresponds to the image of publically and discursively supporting and strengthening (i.e. endorsing) certain policy goals. We suggest that support for Eastern enlargement was identity ‘endorsing’ in the Portuguese context because it was a publicly voiced choice – feeding into the increasingly dominant discourse – for a set of ideas encompassing democracy, stability and openness, which would result in a closer approximation of the ‘European identity’ associated with these aspects. Several interrelated underlying dynamics drive this process of identity endorsement.23

Firstly, an identity can be defined (and thereby endorsed) vis-à-vis a historical other (e.g. Diez 2004: 321). Here the ‘other’ is usually located within the ‘self’. In the case of EMU, Germany’s ‘other’ has been its own nationalist and militarist past, from which it distinguished itself by embracing another important phase of European integration (Risse et al. 1999). To fully understand the case at hand, another dimension is relevant: the core-periphery dimension, which affects the Portuguese context. This concerns the distinction between the EU-9 (the core) as member states with longstanding experience regarding democracy, stability and open economy and the young democracies of Southern Europe, Portugal, Spain and Greece (the periphery).24 We hypothesise that the (Europeanist) Portuguese identity was reinforced through distancing from Portugal’s fascist era (1933-1974) and turbulent period towards democratization (1974-1976). By supporting Eastern enlargement, Portugal could move further away from its nationalist past and instable transition period and at the same time move closer to the European core. This Europeanist identity, in Portugal’s case, does not undermine the Atlanticist tradition25 within Portugal’s system of alliances. The strong pro-NATO position of Portugal’s main political parties in the early eighties, was ‘not in itself anti-European’, as politicians thought of Atlanticism as complementary to Portugal’s newly gained position in Europe.26 Supporters of this combination of Europeanism and Atlanticism were to be found on both sides of the political spectrum, as were the ones who thought Portugal’s EC-membership could jeopardize relations with the Lusophone world. However, the former (who thought of Europeanism and Atlanticism as complementary) have gained dominance (Vasconcelos 1996: 270-271).

Secondly, existing identity patterns can be reconfirmed vis-à-vis a geographical other. This can happen, for instance, on the basis of acquired characteristics, such as democracy. We suggest that in this case, the CEEC became temporary others. Through the path of candidacy (and eventually accession) the belief was reinforced that the CEEC can develop strong and

23 Other aspects can play a role in identity endorsement, such as more antagonistic geographical othering. We have confined ourselves here to the aspects of identity endorsement that are more relevant for our subsequent empirical analysis.
24 For the core-periphery distinction in the context of identity politics, see e.g. Neumann (2000).
25 Atlanticism, in Portugal’s case, does not only include relationships with NATO allies, but also with Lusophone states around the Atlantic, such as Brazil and the former African colonies.
26 The relevant literature (on identity) also suggests that identities tend to be multiple (cf. Haas 1958; Oakes et al. 1994; Niemann 2006).
stable democratic institutions, which reproduced the understanding of Europeaness/European identity as inclusive, open and universalist, and was thus regarded as attractive by the largely EUphile Portuguese political elites (attempting to distance themselves from their undemocratic past). Hence, here temporal and geographic otherness are closely interrelated (cf. Rumelili 2004: 46).

Thirdly, in addition to, and to further plausify, the two preceding aspects, attention needs to be drawn to the notion of ‘resonance’. The latter explains which identity constructions and endorsements are available in a given political discourse. Ideas that come to the fore through political processes/discourses are more likely to be influential the more they resonate with given collective identities (e.g. Marcussen et al. 1999). The notion of resonance is directly related to above-elaborated aspects of similarity and congruence at the heart of the logic of appropriateness (cf. March & Olsen 2004: 9-11). We argue that Eastern enlargement resonated (well) with Portugal’s own experience of transition and accession (and the understanding developed from this experience), and thus triggered a certain solidarity with the CEEC and substantial identification with their situation.

To sum up, we suggest that Portugal’s position in the EU debate on Eastern enlargement is best understood through the logic of appropriateness. We hypothesise that Portuguese national identity has constituted what has been perceived as appropriate in the context of the fifth EU enlargement, as identities indicate a clear policy choice for supporting Eastern enlargement, whereas material arguments are at the very least unclear. Identities have been endorsed in the sense that existing identity constructions were confirmed, reproduced and reinforced vis-a-vis a historical other (its fascist past), through the understanding of the candidacy/accession path as strongly promoting democratisation (thus depicting EU enlargement as open, inclusive and positively reformist), and because Eastern enlargement resonated well with Portugal’s own experience, thus generating solidarity and identification with the CEECs’ development. Collective identities are assumed to have been reinforced by the idea that Portugal could lose its peripheral status in the EU through the promotion of Eastern enlargement. In other words, Portuguese political elites endorsed their true European identity by actively supporting Eastern enlargement.

2.1. Operationalisation

From a discourse-analytical perspective ‘identities are not simply given, but discursively constructed’ (Diez 2004: 321). The existence (and persistence) of a dominant discourse building a nation-state identity, determining which norms and values are valid and which are not within EU-related debates, will be indicative of what was considered appropriate and what was not. This point of view stems from a conception of discourse, in which the individual actor is not seen as an autonomous subject, but rather placed in his/her discursive context (Diez 1999: 603). Discourses structure our thoughts, but they are not ‘tangible’, in the sense they could be treated as causes or motives. The ‘structuring’ quality should rather be seen as ‘enabling’. After all, discourses structure individual acts, but they are also dependent on
individual acts. However, in the course of their continuing existence, they set limits to what can possibly be articulated (Jachtenfuchs 1997: 47; Diez 1999: 605). ‘The language of the political discourse is the language the political actors can use’ (Larsen 1997: 20). Thus, discourses, apart from defining and enabling, also ‘silence and exclude, for example, by limiting and restricting authorities and experts to some groups, but not others, endorsing a certain common sense, but making other modes of categorizing and judging meaningless, impracticable, inadequate or otherwise disqualified’ (Milliken 1999: 229).

Our analysis of the Portuguese political discourse will concentrate on the period from 1989 to May 2004 (when the first round of the fifth enlargement was realised). Written or recorded sources from May 2004 onwards could provoke bias, as the actual consequences of enlargement, whether negative or positive, could affect the data obtained. The following indicators will serve as referents for determining when we can speak of ‘identity endorsement’:

(A) References to Portugal’s own experiences with membership would be common: (a) the pre-1990 political systems in the CEECs, the geographical other, would be compared to Portugal’s during the years of fascist dictatorship (the historical other); (b) the situation in which the CEECs found themselves during the 1990s would be compared to Portugal between 1974 and 1986; (c) references to future expectations with regard to CEECs’ development after gaining membership would be made on the basis of Portugal’s own experiences with membership. This indicator goes back to the essence of the logic of appropriateness, namely that it is based on criteria of similarity and congruence. CEEC development would resonate with Portugal’s own experience.

(B) EU-membership for the CEECs would be likely to be defended on the basis of ‘solidarity’, as this was one of the basic values under which Portugal’s own accession had been realised and understood. ‘Solidarity’ can be understood as a moral concept supporting the same comparisons that is described under (1).

(C) Opponents of EU-membership would be likely to be accused of xenophobia, provincialism, isolationism, i.e. the values associated with the fascist dictatorship. These concepts argue the illegitimacy of certain stances following the dominant discourse. They indicate that it suffices for actors to point to these concepts as they are inherently opposed to modern Portuguese identity as constructed within the dominant discourse.

(D) The pro-European discourse would gain dominance. This would point to the clarity of identities, as a result of which Eurosceptics within the Portuguese political spectrum feel compelled to operate within this discourse to express their views in such a way that they are at least seen as ‘legitimate’.

All four indicators fit within the framework of identity endorsement: references to Portugal’s own experiences with membership, defending CEEC membership on the basis of solidarity, accusing opponents of the fifth enlargement of xenophobia and provincialism, and the dominance of the pro-European discourse are all related to endorsing modern Portuguese
identity by overcoming the historical other, reproducing a positive understanding of
Europeanness and, more generally, positive resonance with given collective identities. The
fourth indicator in particular would (also) suggest that identities were in fact more clear than
interests in the debate on Eastern enlargement. While we speak of an existing ‘dominant
discourse’, the very existence of it needs to be demonstrated in section 3. In addition, if the
dominant discourse changed at critical junctures\footnote{On ‘critical junctures’, see e.g. Marcussen \textit{et al.} (1999: 615). We call these critical junctures because the events that took place during these years had, or could be expected to have, a serious impact on Portuguese national interests with regard to EU enlargement. 1989-1991 is believed to fit this definition because of the unanticipated (speed of the) collapse of communist regimes and the fact that CEECs immediately started leaning towards association with, and/or membership in, the EU and NATO. The period around 1999 is a critical juncture in the same sense because it was the year in which the Agenda 2000 and Nice Treaty negotiations took place, EMU participation was secured by Portugal and enlargement negotiations were opened with all CEEC applicants.}, e.g. the period of 1989-1991 and ± 1999, this would suggest that identities were not as clear as presumed, and that material interests might have played greater role than expected. One might see the consistency of the dominant discourse as the fifth general and essential indicator of the alternative conceptualisation. Without consistency, the basic idea behind the dominance of identities over interests would have to be dismissed.

3. 

Probing identity endorsement

This section explores the alternative conceptualisation of explaining the Portuguese attitude and stance concerning Eastern enlargement. ‘Identity endorsement’ will be probed along the lines of the four indicators specified above. As a basis for investigating these indicators, we need to assess if and how an (increasingly dominant) Europeanist discourse could emerge in Portuguese political life in the first place. This way, we can analyse what ‘Europe’ and ‘Europeanness’ mean in Portuguese political life and better assess/understand how horizontal integration would be reacted to within the constraints of the dominant discourse. This overall argument of this section is that, for Portuguese political elites, supporting Eastern enlargement did in fact constitute an act of ‘identity endorsement’, i.e. the confirmation, (re-)production and reinforcement of existing identity constructions.\footnote{A factor that has been conducive to this development has been the context of a growing economy, especially between the late 1980s and late 1990s (Royo 2004, 2008), which is likely to have impacted positively on Portugal’s strong support for Eastern enlargement.}

3.1. Rise of the (increasingly dominant) pro-European discourse

Overall, a friendly climate for a strong Europeanist discourse has prevailed in Portugal. The birth of the pro-European discourse took place in the final years of the Estado Novo (±1968-1974), coinciding with an unprecedented political turnover, which after 25 April 1974 demanded the construction of a new national identity. It is therefore reasonable to assume that there must be some kind of relationship between the emergence of this discourse, described
below, and the quest for a new national identity. In order to rightfully assess how Portugueseness has been defined in terms of Europeanness, we have to define what Portugueseness was following Salazarist logic and how this changed around the period of the Carnation Revolution up to the moment when Portugal finally achieved EU membership.

After the collapse of the fascist regime, the Europeanists dominated the Portuguese political spectrum. As also acknowledged in the literature, Portugal’s choice for Europe was essentially political, i.e. a choice to secure democracy (cf. Fishman 2003; Costa Lobo 2003; Royo 2007). This choice was supported by around 75 percent of the deputies in the Assembly of the Republic. Only the far left was against membership. Within this context, the pro-European discourse was set to become influential. In order to define how this discourse is constructed, we especially analysed the parliamentary debate regarding Portugal’s official EEC-membership application that was submitted in March of 1977, combined with newspaper articles and essays by acknowledged Portuguese opinion makers. This debate shows some strong indications as to the European discourse that emerged in the years following the Carnation Revolution. The most eye-catching features of this discourse are the following:

**Choice against membership = choice for Salazar**

Criticism of the government’s plans to apply for full EEC-membership came from the two communist parties, the PCP and the much smaller UDP (later included in the Left Bloc), which foremost argued that that accession would increase the ‘inequality between Portugal and its richer European counterparts’, and the supranational character of the Community institutions was undesirable (Diário da Assembleia da República 1977: 3020-3021). The mainstream of the political spectrum responded by suggesting that abstaining from membership was directly linked to the fascist past. It was pointed out, for example by Mário Soares (then Prime minister for the Socialist Party) that ‘staying isolated was precisely Salazar’s choice at the time of the Marshall Plan, something for which he was heavily criticised by the democratic opposition’ (ibid.: 3022). He later asserts that ‘we cannot, for ideological prejudices equal to those expressed by Salazar in 1945 and after, abandon Europe, however this time those prejudices point in the opposite direction’ (ibid.). Europe as a ‘sphere of democracy’, contrasted with the domestic past, thus seems to have become a recurring notion.

The minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Medeiros Ferreira, referring to the Communists’ position, adds the following slightly insinuating question: ‘to what extent could one say that

---

29 This refers to former dictator António de Oliveira Salazar, who was Portugal’s prime minister from 1932 to 1968. His regime (‘Estado Novo’) was essentially authoritarian, corporatist and politically fascist, though Salazar was seen as more moderate than his Spanish (Franco) and Italian (Mussolini) contemporaries. The Estado Novo was continued by his successor Marcello Caetano until 1974, the year of the peaceful Carnation Revolution.

30 All translations from Portuguese sources have been carried out by Martijn Schukkink.
the anti-European options would not go side by side with the humble and insignificant Portugal that Salazar wanted to build and to what extent would Europe’s cultural influence not be a strong factor in fighting the cadaverous kingdom of provincialism and mediocrity?’ (Diário da Assembleia da República 1977: 3031). The expression ‘cadaverous kingdom’ (‘Reino Cadaveroso’) refers to an essay by the famous Portuguese author and political activist António Sérgio, in which he fulminates against the seventeenth-century spirit that destroyed the promise of Portuguese sixteenth-century secular humanism.

*Choice for membership = choice for democracy:*

This analogy is reinforced by historical perceptions of reality in which objection to EEC-membership is treated as equivalent to a choice for the past, i.e. a choice for authoritarianism. Diário de Notícias, one of the main quality newspapers in Portugal, wrote that ‘to admit the contrary [i.e.: rejecting EEC-membership] would be the same as accusing many, and many different politicians, of severe irresponsibility. It would be a vote of no confidence towards democracy’ (Diário de Noticias 1986a). Mário Soares, the first Prime Minister of the Third Republic, put it like this: ‘the application for membership that now follows […] represents the realisation of an ambition deeply felt by the Portuguese people. An ambition we have to realise with determination and by working hard, with reference to the essential democratic principles and values […]. European integration is a great national project, beaconing and giving meaning to our revolutionary experience’ (Diário da Assembleia da República 1977: 3015; also cf. Expresso 1977: 15). The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Medeiros Ferreira, subscribed to this view (Diário da Assembleia da República 1977: 3016).

Freitas do Amaral, deputy for the Christian democrat CDS-party, one of the devoted supporters of Portugal’s EU-membership together with the Socialist Party and the centre-right Social Democrats, read the choice for integration with Europe as follows: ‘from the Portuguese point of view, we think it is Europe — democratic Europe — in which our country can and should find the institutional, geographical and cultural framework, in which our new historical destiny has to strike root and develop’ (ibid.: 3019). He goes on to suggest that ‘from the European point of view, we consider it indispensable to enlarge it to every democratic country that is located in it and to strengthen its importance, its projection and its influence, so that the voice of its age-old democratic and humanist civilization can be heard and carry weight’ (ibid.). This is an interesting vision within the context of this paper, as will become (even) clearer later on in this section, since it indicates the roots of the Portuguese political discourse on Eastern enlargement.

Hence, increasingly dominant discursive patterns explicitly linked a new Portuguese national identity to the European project, which, in its turn, is equated with openness and democratic values (cf. Diário de Noticias 1986a,b,c). While Portugal remained somewhat circumspect regarding political integration during the first few years of EC membership, this soon changed. This process was fostered by the first Portuguese Presidency in the first semester of 1992, which reinforced Portugal’s political assertiveness, as the country engaged more fully with EC matters, such as the EC’s answer to the war in former Yugoslavia. Portuguese
politicians, from the beginning of the 1990’s, were eager to lose this peripheral status and act along with the traditional core of democratic and integrationist member states (Vasconcelos 2000: 6; Lourenço 1994).

Linking Portuguese national identity to the European project, according to most politicians at the time, did not imply that Portugal’s Atlanticist perception of national defence had to be abandoned. For example, in 1994, then state secretary of European Affairs, within the context of a debate on the Maastricht Treaty, affirmed that “this willingness to take part in the European project does not in any way inhibit us from cultivating our ties with other parts of the world”… “Atlanticism, one of the primary aspects of our foreign policy, does not in any way collide with our European options. This is an Atlanticist orientation, fully compatible with the project of European integration, it is a Euro-Atlantic orientation” (Diário da Assembleia da República 1994a). In fact, Portugal’s diplomatic and military (IFOR, SFOR, KFOR) involvement in former Yugoslavia during and after its first EU presidency demonstrated that Atlanticism and the Europeanization of Portuguese defence politics did not have to be contradictory.31 In fact, Portugal’s Strategic Concept of National Defense (2003)32 shows that Portugal was very much aware of the fact that however intensified European cooperation had become, security and defence policies were still based on Atlantic alliances. In Portugal’s case, this meant that issues such as increasing illegal immigration from new neighbouring countries like the Ukraine and Moldova, still had to be addressed in the context of NATO (Carrapiço 2003-2004)

Subsequently, we examine the four indicators of identity endorsement: (A) common references to Portugal’s own experiences (with EU membership); (B) the defence of Eastern enlargement on the basis of ‘solidarity’; (C) the accusation of opponents (of Eastern enlargement) of xenophobia, provincialism, isolationism; and (D) the pro-European discourse gaining dominance.

3.2. Common references to Portugal’s own experiences (with membership)

References to Portugal’s own road towards EU membership – by comparing the pre-1990 Communist systems in the CEEC with Portugal’s during the fascist dictatorship, by comparing CEEC transition post-1989 with the Portuguese transition between 1974 and 1986, and by referring to expectations concerning the CEEC’s development after EC membership with Portugal’s own membership experience – can be seen as examples of the ‘criteria of similarity and congruence’ (March & Olsen 2004: 4; cf. pp. 10-13 above). Moreover, for Portuguese political elites to emphasise the idea that they were now passing the flame to

31 One should distinguish Portugal’s strategic perception of national defence, which was clearly Europeanized due to for example the Yugoslav war and the decreasing importance of Portugal’s Lajes airbase on the Azores to the US military, and the role of Atlanticism in political discourse. To the Azorean population, Portugal’s ties with the US remained of great (electoral) importance (cf. Magone 2004, Cooley 2008).

another group of new democracies that want to become European (i.e. the new periphery), would implicitly underline the idea that Portugal was now definitively becoming part of the core.

On 5 December 1989, The Assembly of the Republic extensively discussed recent developments in Central and Eastern Europe. In the debate, parliamentarians made frequent reference to Portugal’s own Carnation Revolution. For example, João de Deus Pinheiro (of the centre right PSD), Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that ‘in Hungary [...] we saw improvements, which I think, in a certain way, resemble some of those we had after the 25th of April [1974 in Portugal], in the sense of a euphoric reaction to liberty, to dazzling improvements in every field, especially in terms of human rights and plural democracy, in an immediate rapprochement towards the Council of Europe, and even towards the European Community itself’ (Diário da Assembleia da República 1989: 744). When the Minister laid down his vision on the future of Europe, following the political changes of 1989, he recalled the 1948 conclusions of the Congress of Europe that called for a European construction open to countries of the East that reassume the Western political legacy. Drawing a parallel between potential future accessions and earlier ones, he suggested as early as December 1989 that ‘throughout the history of the European Communities, every new membership application has been met with conservative reactions. But the spirit required by the circumstances seemed to prevail when the Communities opened to the admission of Portugal, Ireland and Greece’ (ibid.: 772).

PSD-parliamentarian Pacheco Pereira, along with others, also referred to Portugal’s experience in a similar way during the debate on the political changes in Central and Eastern Europe. He pointed out that ‘we are in extremely delicate processes of democratic liberation in Eastern Europe. Let’s remind ourselves of the social and political revolt in Portugal, after April 25th, with its excesses, in order to understand the potential conflicts that could arise in Eastern European societies. [...] Therefore, the peoples of the East need our full solidarity to carry out their democratic revolution, in order to obtain total [political and economic] freedoms’ (ibid.: 791). These ‘potential conflicts’ arguably reminded him of the turbulent period directly after April ’74, when the first revolution was close to being followed by a second (Communist) revolution. Portugal, at the time, had no experience with stable democracy, as the short-lived First Republic (1910-1926) yielded no less than 45 governments. Europe, therefore, was undoubtedly perceived as an indispensable factor in the delicate first steps towards establishing a sustainable form of democracy.

These statements, together with the observation that the PS, PSD, CDS and PRD33 agreed broadly on the welcoming attitude to be assumed by the Portuguese government, leads one to conclude that the events of the late eighties in Eastern Europe were met with familiarity and

---

33 The centrist PRD (Partido Renovador Democrático) existed from 1985 to 1991 and has known a short period of political importance when it was responsible for both the preservation and the fall of Cavaco Silva’s minority government.
encouragement in the dominant political discourse in Portugal. Immediately references to, and linkages with, Portugal’s own experiences were made. This seems to have provided a strong source of support for the transition process and — already as early as 1989 — found its expression in solid support for the idea of Eastern enlargement of the Community.

During a follow-up debate on 16 January 1990, PS deputy and future Minister of Foreign Affairs Jaime Gama (PS) complained about a supposed lack of ambition and adequacy on the government’s part regarding its response to the recent developments in the East. He asserts that ‘the time has arrived to appreciate the role of Portugal in the Council of Europe and to promote – by means of the Portuguese example of a transition to democracy – the role of this organisation. Joining the Council of Europe has been, and will continue to be, a stepping-stone towards EC membership, which is why it is so important at this moment with regard to the Central European countries, who are initiating processes of regime transformation that are […] similar to those we went through ourselves’ (Diário da Assembleia da República 1990: 1120). This quote – characteristic of the dominant political discourse – suggests that the Portuguese political elites felt they had a moral duty to support Eastern European countries in their attempt to install democratic regimes, something which is directly related to Portugal’s own recent and successful transition to democracy.

During the parliamentary debate, Gama stated that the stance he defended would have a positive impact on Portugal’s positioning within the European Community ‘… by using its own experience as a country that changed from a single-party-regime to a plural regime, from an isolated to an open country, from a closed to a decentralised economy’ (ibid.: 1123). This underscores the idea that Portugal, by supporting enlargement and offering help to new applicant countries, itself would cease to be a ‘learner’ and become one of the democratic core of the European Union. Supporting Eastern enlargement would thus help endorse Portugal’s European identity.

The 2003 parliamentary celebration of the Carnation Revolution was held in the presence of ten of the twelve candidate countries’ Presidents of parliament. Traditional pro-European parties sought to outdo each other in references to Portugal’s success story following the revolution of April 1974, while explicitly linking this experience to the situation in which their Eastern European guests found themselves after the collapse of communism. For example, João Pinho de Almeida (CDS-PP) stated: ‘I would like to honour […] the presidents of parliament of the countries that lived under the yoke of communist dictatorships, by saying the following: you are now about to conquer something that Portuguese democracy enabled us to be part of: European integration. Your presence here adds prestige to this commemoration and, with the example of your countries – liberated at last! – [through a] heroic struggle for liberation […]. This is why the CDS-PP is pleased to honour these nations and welcome them into the bosom of the Europe of peace, cooperation and subsidiarity’ (Diário da Assembleia da República 2003a: 4807). Similarly, José de Matos Correia (PSD) suggested that ‘for such a promising encounter between high parliamentary representatives of European peoples with analogous, painful and enriching historical experiences there would certainly not have been a better framework than the festive celebration of the 25\textsuperscript{th} of April,'
which brought back liberty to the Portuguese men and women and opened the doorway to a unified, democratic and progressive Europe for Portugal’ (ibid.: 4813). In addition, Medeiros Ferreira (PS) pointed out that when addressing the representatives of the accession countries’ parliaments: ‘your presence at the Assembly of the Republic on this day and at this moment is a lively and noble testimony of the importance of 25 April for the development of European solidarity after the fall of the dictatorships [applause from PS, PSD and CDS-PP]’ (ibid.: 4809). Jorge Sampaio (PS), Portuguese President at the time, in an article on Eastern enlargement in the Portuguese daily Público, dedicated an entire paragraph to Portugal and the Carnation Revolution: ‘[I]t was the Carnation Revolution – of which we celebrate its thirtieth anniversary this year – which allowed us to re-open the way to Europe, and which marked the beginning of a new wave of democratizations in the world’, to add later on that ‘participation in the political process of European integration is an identity question’ (Sampaio 2004).

These debates fit well with the conceptualisation of ‘identity endorsement’. By inviting Eastern European officials within the context of both their admission to the EU and the commemoration of the Carnation Revolution, Portuguese political elites sensibly exposed the difference between the Portugal of 1986 and present-day Portugal, the positive connotations of which could only be attributed to EU membership. Now, by ‘passing the torch’ to the CEECs, Portugal symbolically concluded the process of democratisation, stabilisation and opening its borders. One should keep in mind, however, that as far as the process of economic divergence is concerned, Portugal was still far behind the traditional core countries. This was denied by neither of the main political parties as Portuguese politicians continued to position themselves as one of the cohesion countries. An analysis of the use of ‘solidarity’ as a normative concept is useful to understand how this apparent paradox was presented as a coherent story.

3.3. The defence of Eastern enlargement on the basis of ‘solidarity’

We argue that it is possible to separate the use of ‘solidarity’ here into two different meanings that can be attributed to the two logics (of appropriateness and consequences), and that solidarity mattered in two respects: (i) in the overall enlargement discussion, ‘solidarity’ can be viewed as an aspect of the dominant European discourse that was used to spread European democracy, stability and openness to the CEECs. From the moment when the Eastern bloc started to show signs of disintegration, Portuguese politicians verbally supported the process towards full membership, defining it as one of the EU’s moral duties under the flag of ‘solidarity’. In this use the concept can be regarded as a norm to which Portugal adheres, not least because of its own experience. It thus constitutes the moral dimension of the comparison that was described under indicator A. (ii) ‘Solidarity’ can also be viewed as a tool to protect Portuguese interests in negotiations regarding the distribution of enlargement costs. Hence, we need to distinguish between the concept of ‘solidarity’ in the overall debate/decision on the worth of Eastern enlargement, and solidarity as a notion relevant in the implementation of
enlargement. While the former use of solidarity is embedded in the logic of appropriateness, the latter follows more the logic of consequences. Along the lines of March and Olsen the first logic is used to establish fundamental constraints for a decision, whereas the other logic is used to make refinements within the constraints (March & Olsen 1998: 953).

Starting with the first aspect of the notion, in light of the search of Portuguese political elites for a new national identity, Eastern enlargement was the chance to prove for the first time that Portugal had moved to the European core, by taking a decision based on the same kind of European solidarity by which Portugal’s own accession was defended. In other words: the concept reflected Portugal’s full-grown ‘Europeanness’, as Portuguese politicians now acted upon the same norms as longstanding members of the EU. Solidarity in this first sense clearly constituted the dominant political discourse with regard to the overall positioning of the country in the Eastern enlargement debate. For instance, Manuel Alegre (PS), in response to a contribution by the Minister of Foreign Affairs stated: ‘this is also a time for emotion and for the big question, the question that fascinates all Europe: the question of liberty and democracy in the countries of the East. You hardly touched on this question, especially when it comes to the attitude to be assumed by Portugal, as a European country, regarding solidarity towards these processes in motion’ (Diário da Assembleia da República 1996: 749).

Raimundo Narciso (PS) suggested that ‘the PS parliamentary group [...] defends enlargement of the European Union in a spirit of solidarity with the other peoples and states of Europe. [...] we are in favour of an EU enlargement policy that does not lose sight of peace, security, economic and social cohesion, civil rights, democracy and solidarity without exceptions, even though that may also imply some less beneficial consequences for our country’ (Diário da Assembleia da República 1996: 3722). Mário Soares (PS) referring to the Portuguese enjoyment of external support and solidarity through EC accession, pointed out that ‘in the same way, we must show solidarity with those who since 1989 have launched themselves on the road to liberty, putting an end to totalitarian regimes. They deserve, therefore, stimulation and our solidarity, and we must not refuse it. This goes without saying, and not only from the Government, it is the official and unanimous position of all the Portuguese political parties’ (Soares 2002: 318). José Manuel Durão Barroso (PSD), without explicitly using the word ‘solidarity’ suggested that ‘we have always been in favour of enlargement because the contrary would be a refusal to face up to history. And how could we deny others something that we ourselves were generously granted?’ (Sousa 2004).

As for implementation of Eastern enlargement, solidarity has frequently been invoked in the second sense. Vítor Martins (PSD) suggested in the context of debates on ‘flexibility’ and enlargement that ‘we are obliged to strengthen the mechanisms of collective solidarity in the light of the future enlargements. Intensified solidarity is the natural opponent of variable geometry’ (Martins 1999: 47). Jorge Sampaio (PS) also invoked ‘solidarity’ as a thinly disguised means for safeguarding Portuguese interests by asserting that ‘it seems essential to prevent the difficulties posed by the upcoming enlargement from provoking any kind of struggle between member states and from weakening [...] the economic and social cohesion within the European space, and to preserve solidarity as a basic principle of European...’
integration’ (Sampaio 2002a: 3-4). Similarly, Francisco Seixas da Costa (PS) commented on the Agenda 2000 negotiations: ‘[it] is a debate on the distribution of power or, even better, on the preservation of balances within the Union that have prevailed up until today. [...] We came out with this analysis because [...] the Europe of solidarity and the duplication of funds — just to be clear, the Europe that in the end paid for the Common Market with the Economic and Social Cohesion — this Europe started to fall together with the Berlin Wall’ (Seixas da Costa 2002: 141). In addition, Prime Minister José Barroso (PSD), during a visit of his Czech counterpart Spidla, spoke of ‘a united Europe, respecting the principle of equality between states and recognising the basic principle of cohesion and solidarity’, referring to the kind of solidarity that would protect the interests of smaller and less developed member states (LUSA 2004a).

These last four prominent Portuguese politicians provide a notion of solidarity that essentially comes down to this: the European Union of the 1990s was inclined towards cutting down on structural and cohesion funds, in order to keep the costs of enlargement under control. The Portuguese, together with the Spanish, heavily opposed the idea of ‘Europe a la carte’, in which member states are free to benefit from any aspect of European integration that would suit them, while at the same time being able to opt out should the EU come up with something less appealing (interview with Alberto Navarro, former Spanish State Secretary for EU affairs, May 2009; Seixas da Costa 1997: 102; Torres 1999: 85; Fernandes & Soares 2003). It was in their interest to maintain internal support for structural and cohesion funds and the solidarity norm proved extremely useful to achieve this aim. The possibility for an instrumental use of the concept of solidarity, according to Jileva (2004: 17), stemmed from Portugal’s and Spain’s own entries, when it was used by both the Iberian candidates and the EU-10, to put a clear ‘moral stamp’ on the Iberian enlargement.34

Thus, on a general level, ‘solidarity’ can be seen as a norm that fit within the dominant European discourse, which defined Europeanisation as a process of democratization. By staying within this discourse, Portuguese political elites did what was appropriate, while at the same time gaining aspects of a ‘core identity’. On the level of secondary debates, this use of ‘solidarity’ happened to be a convenient tool to further Portuguese interests, particularly during the Agenda 2000 negotiations. Portuguese politicians could use the same concept in a different way on a different level because their material interests on this level coincided with CEEC interests. For example, together with Spain, Greece and the CEECs, Portugal set up the ‘friends of cohesion’ group during the negotiations on the financial perspectives for 2007-2013.

34 Whether or not the Iberian enlargement in 1986 was clearly in the EU-10's interest, the inclusion of Spain and Portugal in the project of European integration had a clear objective: democratic and economic development. In these circumstances, the moral judgement of 'solidarity' was easily invoked. The EU-10 thus unanimously supported Iberian EU membership.
3.4. Accusing opponents (of Eastern enlargement) of xenophobia, provincialism, isolationism

These concepts implicitly refer to the opposition that was created between the old regime and the modern Portuguese democracy. Eurosceptic or enlargement-sceptic stances are expected to be linked to Salazarist politics by means of these concepts. Opponents of enlargement thus constitute an ‘outgroup’ or rival group that is likely to be associated with the politics of the past, as well as xenophobia, provincialism and isolationism, notions that are associated with that past. In addition, it would not be unlikely that such accusations are used pre-emptively, something that did, in fact, occur here.

As further illustrated in the next sub-section, with even the communists supporting enlargement there seemed to be no Eurosceptic political entity left to criticise for opposing the process of Eastern enlargement. However, policy-makers seem to have acted preventatively. For example, António Martins da Cruz (PSD), Minister of Foreign Affairs under Prime Minister Barroso, suggested that with enlargement approaching it became important ‘to make sure that the enlarged community territory will preserve the diversities of its member states and maintain its national identities, by assuring citizens that the Union is a space created for them and not around them. Therefore, it is important to watch out for demagogic tendencies in certain populist groupings trying to demonise the entire process. The authorities of EU member states have an important task in immunising societies against those entities propagating xenophobia’ (Martins da Cruz 2002: 11). President Sampaio used similar expressions to characterise opponents of enlargement during a conference at the European Affairs Committee of the Danish Folketing in 2002: ‘at a time of growing manifestations of xenophobia and intolerance we must eradicate the unfounded fears that cause the burden of all evils to fall on “the other”, the foreigner, he who is different [...]. We must develop a pedagogic approach to prevent our societies from shutting themselves off from the world and developing archaic and isolationist tendencies that can only worsen the problems confronting them’ (Sampaio 2002b; cf. Sampaio 2004).

Seixas da Costa, similarly unable to point to any specific political groups that would oppose Eastern enlargement, nonetheless held that it would be of ‘an enormous historical and political blindness’ (Seixas da Costa 1998: 46) for Portugal to object to the process of enlargement: ‘it would mean that we forgot our own accession to the EEC and the development, sedimentation of democracy and culture of modernity resulting from it, that turned out to be essential for our country’s present and future. To adopt an egoistic attitude towards countries that nowadays strive for that same opportunity would be, at the very least, an act of political cynicism that a country like ours cannot risk assuming’ (ibid.). Although he does not refer to concepts such as xenophobia, provincialism or isolationism, Seixas da Costa depicts Portugal’s support for the Eastern enlargement as so obvious that it would bespeak blindness, cynicism and egoism to oppose the process.

Overall, the above suggests that the Portuguese political elites pointed to certain concepts/phenomena — such as xenophobia — which are inherently opposed to modern
Portuguese identity, as constructed by (and within) the dominant discourse, in order to illegitimate opposition to enlargement. This is entirely in keeping with the notion of identity endorsement. By accusing opponents of Eastern enlargement to be associated with the fascist past, Portugal’s political elites emphasised and reinforced the country’s development into a modern, progressive, democratic and pro-integrationsist country at the EU’s core.

3.5. Pro-European discourse gains dominance

Should the political discourse described at the beginning of this section gain dominance over time – and thus influence which norms and values have validity – this would indicate that identities were in fact ‘clear’, as hypothesised in section 2. Actors previously operating outside of the dominant Europeanist discourse would feel to a certain extent forced to make a shift towards the dominant discourse because their stances would otherwise be disqualified as illegitimate. As a consequence, they would be very likely to remain at the margins of the political spectrum, without being able to participate in decision-making processes regarding European integration.

Three quarters of the Assembly of the Republic supported Portugal’s accession to the European Economic Community, with only the communists withholding their support. The parties supporting membership were the PS, with Mário Soares as Portugal’s most important and influential advocate of EU membership, the PSD (formerly known as PPD/PSD) and the CDS-PP (formerly known as CDS). Within this context, it should be interesting to see how the PCP, being the only communist party in Portugal to maintain representation in parliament up to the present day, developed its positions on enlargement and on secondary debates such as the Agenda 2000 and the treaties of Amsterdam and Nice.

During the first decade after the Carnation Revolution, the PCP had interpreted Portugal’s accession to the EU as a counter-revolution. The PS, the communists’ traditional political rival, had committed ‘their ultimate betrayal of the working-class’, which was explicitly linked to their Europeanism (Dunphy 2004: 113). Both the communist and the dominant Europeanist discourse thus evaluated political stances on the basis of what they believed to be the principles of April 25th, 1974. However, these principles were defined differently and policies regarding European integration, in both cases explicitly linked to these principles, pointed in the exact opposite direction. Both discourses continued when the PS agreed to a proposal foreseeing election of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage. The PCP, again, spotted ‘plots to subvert the “gains of April”’ (ibid.) and opposed the proposition.

The turning point for the communists came in 1988, when the PCP ‘acknowledged some of the inherent benefits of Portugal’s accession to the EU’ (Costa Lobo 2003: 108). This change may of course have been inspired by the fact that the party wanted to participate in the first European elections, which it had deeply reviled at first. As pragmatic as it may have seemed, this change could not, of course, go without a change of discourse. The PCP approved of the EU Association Agreement with the Czech Republic and Slovakia as ‘a
deepening of cooperation between free and sovereign states’ (Diário da Assembleia da República 1994b: 2332). This altered discourse also became gradually noticeable during the enlargement debate. Essentially, the PCP agreed with the pro-European parties PS, PSD and CDS-PP on the need to separate enlargement from the debate on the need for profound institutional changes. PCP-leader Honório Novo drew attention to the fact that institutional reform had not been used as an argument in any of the previous rounds of enlargement. The communists interpreted this as a strategy adopted by bigger and richer countries to impose their will on smaller and weaker member states (Diário da Assembleia da República 2000a: 1046-1047).

The remarkable shift made by the PCP since the late eighties from profound Eurosceptics to Euro-critics that no longer opposed the European project as such becomes particularly clear in the way its party leader Honório Novo defended the PCP’s vote against the Nice Treaty: ‘we want and we wish more Portugal and more Europe. Nice will perhaps realise more Europe for some and less Europe for all. I am asking you, Prime Minister, would not this be the right time to stop this ‘steamroller’ in order to do some collective reflection on the necessary future for this European Union?’ (Diário da Assembleia da República 2000b: 1209). ‘The EU’, according to this statement, was no longer inherently wrong. However, ‘this EU’ did not meet communist standards of solidarity among EU member states and should thus be opposed. This can be interpreted as a considerable shift towards the dominant discourse.

In spite of this careful change of discourse, Prime Minister Guterres responded that opposing the Treaty would mean opposing enlargement, as it constituted an essential part of the overall process. He noted that ‘according to the PCP, whatever happens, even if it be in accordance with their will, everything that is European is bad’ (ibid.: 1210). This suggests that criticism from politicians who are already known for their Euroscepticism does not appear to be taken seriously; i.e., their criticism is not legitimate within the dominant discourse. On the other hand, when the first association agreement between the EU-12 and the Czech Republic and Slovakia was submitted to the Assembly of the Republic, the PCP’s vote in favour of ratification was greeted with a pat on the back from the PSD (Diário da Assembleia da República 1994b: 2332).

Overall, the PCP came to solidly support Eastern enlargement (Diário da Assembleia da República 2001: 3906; Diário da Assembleia da República 2003b: 417). Enlargement towards the East was promoted because it would lead to real convergence and economic and social cohesion (ibid.: 3907). This was a severe ideological rupture with the past, when Portugal’s own membership was opposed because it would increase inequality (Diário da Assembleia da República 1977: 3015). The EEC, then, was regarded as a threat to Portugal’s newfound freedom and democracy, while the resolution of the PCP’s 2006 conference on 20 years of EU membership reads: ‘we need a [...] convergence of the powers of progress and peace within Europe, with the conviction that the biggest contribution of the Portuguese people to a Europe of cooperation [...], of economic and social progress, of peace and friendship with all countries of the world, is a resumption and realisation of the project of democratic, patriotic and internationalist development that was initiated with the Revolution of April’ (PCP 2006: 2332).
1. This quote defines the European project as a process of democratisation and convergence, now fully integrated with the communist story, while it used to be seen as sabotaging communist values.35

Apart from the Communist PCP, the dominant pro-European discourse also affected the right-leaning CDS-PP. Under party leader Manuel Monteiro this traditionally pro-European party adopted a more Eurocritical attitude during parts of the 1990s in an attempt to stop the party’s electoral decline. The party leadership however realised that to be eligible for a place in government with the centrist PS and PSD, who have alternated in power since 1976, joining the pro-European discourse was indispensable (cf. Costa Lobo 2007).

In sum, we argue that the pro-European discourse became the dominant one, thus defining the boundaries of what is seen as legitimate. This also affected the (hitherto or temporarily Eurosceptic) parties, which could not afford to be marginalised in the debates and thus modified their views on the European project. This development of the dominant discourse suggests that the modern (Europeanist) Portuguese identity was unambiguous and clear.

Conclusions

In view of the above analysis it seems that mainstream accounts cannot (adequately) explain Portugal’s support for the fifth enlargement of the European Union. First, welfare-related explanations are unconvincing because it was likely that Portugal would face a moderate GDP loss as a result of Eastern enlargement. Second, geopolitical approaches do not suggest clear positive or negative implications emanating for Portugal from the fifth enlargement round. Although one could argue either way, perhaps most importantly in geopolitical terms, the 2004/2007 enlargement implies an eastwards shift of the EU’s centre of gravity, something that cannot be (and has not been) seen as an advantage for Portugal. Third, explanations based on ‘rhetorical action’ are also not persuasive. There is enough reason to believe that Portugal was not ‘rhetorically trapped’ into enlargement. Perhaps, most importantly in that respect, the possibility and even desirability of enlargement had already been expressed by prominent Portuguese politicians early on, before the explicit enlargement debate (and processes of rhetorical action) had even begun.

Instead, we argue that Portuguese support for Eastern enlargement is closely related to Portugal’s renewed European identity. Portugal’s own accession to the EU was essentially a political decision, made to ensure stability and democratic development. During the last decade of the Estado Novo, ‘Europe’ increasingly came to be seen as the alternative to Salazarist politics of isolation and colonialism. When Portugal officially applied for membership in 1977, a vast majority of the Portuguese political spectrum saw this as a

35 This apparent change of tune was defended with the argument that Portugal’s own accession had been the product of elite efforts rather than of popular demands, which, according to the PCP, was not the case with the CEECs.35
decisive step towards democracy, stability and openness. This was an ideal climate for a particular pro-European discourse to arise, in which ‘Europe’ was defined as a project intended to spread these values. European integration has, ever since the country’s own accession, consistently been defined in terms of furthering democracy, stability and openness.

Further enlargement also had important implications for modern Portuguese identity. By fully supporting Eastern enlargement, which was facilitated through the context of a favourable socio-economic climate, Portugal could act together with the ‘European core’, and Portugal would become more ‘core’, i.e. more European. For Portuguese political elites, supporting Eastern enlargement therefore became an act of ‘identity endorsement’, the confirmation, (re-)production and reinforcement of existing identity constructions. Several indicators have substantiated this explanation:

A logic of appropriateness based on criteria of similarity and congruence suggests that references to Portugal’s own experiences with membership would be common, something that has indeed been found here. The pre-1990 political systems in the CEECs (and their experience) have been compared with Portugal under fascist dictatorship. In addition, expectations concerning CEEC post-membership development were made on the basis of Portugal’s own membership experience. As early as 1989 Eastern European demand for EU membership was linked to Portugal’s desire for accession roughly a decade earlier. In 2003, the link between the two processes was still an essential part of the dominant discourse, when Eastern European parliamentary presidents were invited to the annual 25 de Abril celebration.

The ‘solidarity’ indicator constitutes another significant aspect of the dominant discourse. Eastern enlargement was defended by Portuguese politicians on the basis of solidarity because this has been held as an important value for the realisation of Portugal’s own accession. Solidarity has been an important aspect of the Portuguese political discourse throughout the entire enlargement process, from the beginning in 1989 until the end in 2004/2007.

The third indicator suggests that opponents of the fifth enlargement would be accused of xenophobia, provincialism and isolationism. Although examples were hard to find in absence of real political opponents of enlargement within Portuguese politics, when members of government addressed their criticism towards opponents of enlargement in general terms, their line of argumentation was predominantly based on these concepts.

A final indicator suggests that a pro-European discourse would gain dominance. This has indeed happened over time. With a solid majority of parliament already favouring Portuguese EC accession, those parties at the margins could not maintain their fundamental rejection of the EC/EU path over time. The pro-European discourse gaining further strength increasingly defined the boundaries of what is seen as legitimate. This also influenced parties, like the Eurosceptical communist PCP, or the temporarily Eurocritical CDS-PP, which subsequently adjusted their stances on European integration in order to enhance their legitimacy. This suggests that identities can be seen as constituting a clear logic.
As pointed out by March and Olsen (2004), a logic of appropriateness can exist alongside a logic of consequences. Within this context, two distinctions have been made. First of all: a clear logic prevails over an unclear logic. With regard to Portugal’s stance in the Eastern enlargement debate, rationalist logics would suggest (or might lead us to) somewhat diverging and ambiguous (i.e. unclear) conclusions. The rule/identity-based logic that has been advanced in this paper, on the other hand, does not seem to leave room for diverging/ambiguous interpretations, which suggests that the latter is a clear logic. The second distinction suggests that one logic is used for major decisions, whereas the other one is used to determine the refinements. In the case of Eastern enlargement the decision to expand constituted the major decision, while the institutional decisions flanking enlargement at Nice, the Agenda 2000 and the conditions defined in the Accession Treaties can be seen as refinements. This distinction has proven to be a useful one because it allowed us to distinguish between the logic of appropriateness, i.e. the ‘clear’ logic, dominating the major decision, and the logic of consequences capturing more of the refinements. It also provides an alternative to Schimmelfennig’s separation between drivers and brakemen, as member states’ stances in secondary debates are no longer interpreted as attempts to accelerate or frustrate the enlargement process per se.

There is reason to suggest that the notion of identity endorsement can also shed light on other empirical questions and puzzles related to European integration, and particularly EU enlargement. For example, it may be argued that the Eastern enlargement debates in ‘similar’ member states such as Spain and Greece can be interpreted in like manner, as both countries, like Portugal, experienced the fragility of democracy during the years before gaining membership (e.g. Fishman 2003; Royo 2004, 2008) and are (or at least have been) generally committed to ‘more Europe’.

In addition, it seems that identity endorsement could contribute to our understanding of the phenomenon that the people and elites of the countries that joined the EU in 2004/2007 seem to be (significantly) more enthusiastic about further enlargement than long-standing member states (e.g. Dixon 2010; European Commission 2005; Polish News Bulletin 2004). Cost-benefit analyses would, apart from certain potential advantages, reveal certain risks for the ten Central Eastern European member states, emanating from further enlargement.36 (Hence, the

36 The fact that the (potential) new member states have substantial economic similarities (e.g. size of the agricultural sector, wage levels, etc.) with the CEEC could have adverse material consequences for the latter, as described in section 1 for the case of Portugal (see also Mateus et al. 2004 on the possible effects of Eastern enlargement for Portugal for reasons of economic similarities to the new member states). For instance, further enlargement would have negative redistributive effects for the CEEC in terms of EU funds. The budgetary costs of Croatian accession have been estimated to amount to about one billion Euro per year for structural funds alone (Lejour, Mevar and Verweij 2008: 16), and the budgetary costs for the accession of Turkey have been rated as twice as big as the 2007 enlargement (Belke 2005: 55). In addition, further enlargement could enhance trade competition – Turkish accession would most likely put the CEEC textile sector under considerable strain (Lejour et al. 2005: 117) – and possibly trade diversion: there is the potential danger that the strong EU economies would shift some of their trade from the CEEC 10 to the new member states that cannot completely be made up by increased trade of the CEEC 10 with the acceding countries (cf. Lejour, Mevar and Verweij 2008: 19). On a different note, with Western Balkan enlargement, smaller EU-
logic of consequences does not appear to be a clear one.) On the other hand, there are some initial/tentative indications that point towards aspects of identity endorsement. For instance, a number of politicians, such as the Bulgarian Foreign Minister, have substantiated their support for EU enlargement to the Western Balkans by referring to the ‘historical responsibility’ their government would have to assist the ongoing democratisation process in those countries (e.g. BBC 2010). Along similar lines Timus (2006) argues that the legacy of Communism may explain post-Communist member states’ support for post-Communist candidate countries’ accession to the EU. In addition, identity endorsement may also provide insights into other domestic developments within the context of European integration, such as those related to the current Euro crisis. Here, substantial fractions of the political and economic elites of some countries, such as Portugal, seem to have, at least initially, put considerably more faith in the work and solutions of the EU (and the IMF) than those of their own governments (e.g. Expresso 2010).

To what extent, this – as well as the support of the CEEC of further enlargement – may be due to processes that confirmed or reproduced existing identity constructions, remains to be further investigated elsewhere. However, the above suggestions indicate that there is substantial scope for further research emanating from this study.

states (like the CEEC 10, except Poland and Romania) would experience substantial losses in individual voting power. Hence, CEEC 8 support for further (Balkan) enlargement in order to enhance the influence of smaller states vis-à-vis bigger member states seems does not constitute a convincing explanation (Mylona 2007: 25).

As for the current situation in Portugal and the perceived link between EU integration and democracy, Mario Soares (PS), former Prime Minister and President, for example, has blamed neoliberal forces within the EU for bringing Europe to the edge of the abyss, instead of blaming the European Union in itself (Expresso 2011b). For Henrique Raposo, a columnist for Expresso, the PS still lacks an anti-European narrative (Expresso 2011b) According to political scientist António Pinto da Costa, “euroscepticism does not have political representation in Portugal.” (Expresso 2012a). His analysis is backed by recent polls, which show no sign of a possible decline of support for traditional pro-European parties (cf. Expresso 2012b). However, recent election results in Greece have shown that voters do know their way to both extremes of the political spectrum when austerity measures are no longer perceived as acceptable. It remains to be seen whether the dominant pro-European discourse can be maintained in case of any future aggravation of the current economic crisis in Portugal.
References


Diário de Notícias (1986b, 1 January), “Ganhar o desafio europeu só com estabilidade e paz”, p. 3.


Expresso (2010, 29 November), ‘PCP acusa líder do PSD de ceder na soberania do país’.


George, Alexander, and Bennett, Andrew (2005), Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.


http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2012-012a.htm


