‘The two-track Europeanisation of football: EU-level pressures, transnational dynamics and their repercussions within different national contexts’

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The two-track Europeanisation of football: EU-level pressures, transnational dynamics and their repercussions within different national contexts

Alexander Brand, University of Mainz
Arne Niemann, University of Mainz
Georg Spitaler, University of Vienna

Abstract

This article contributes to the under-researched literature on the Europeanisation of sports. We distinguish between two modes of Europeanisation (broadly signifying the impact of European integration on the domestic realm): the traditional top-down approach and the neglected societal/transnational Europeanisation track. Both modes are examined with regard to their effects within two national contexts (Germany and Austria), and across two cases: the Bosman ruling (the nationality issue) and European club competitions as an engine of Europeanisation. Our analysis reveals some important differences: the domestic counter-measures regarding the nationality aspect of the Bosman ruling were more subtle and EU-law-compliant in Germany, while the actions undertaken in Austria were, at best, questionably compliant. As for the second case, although Austrian football had undergone an important (Central) Europeanisation period long before Bosman, some more recent developments at the European level – such as pan-European club competition and the parallel formation of top clubs’ representatives – have constituted much stronger dynamics within German football. Finally, we tentatively address this variation in outcomes.

Introduction

Professional sport, in its financial and economic aspects, is subject to European Community (EC) law. Up until the mid-1990s, however, the effects of European integration on the realm of sport were marginal. This changed dramatically with the Bosman ruling of 1995, which constitutes the most significant and well-known of the EU-level developments in the sector. Looking beyond purely EU/European level developments, there is a peculiar paucity of
research addressing the actual impact of EU policy and legislation in the *domestic* sports arena. The ramifications of decisions made at EU level are felt across a range of areas, affecting not only individual actors such as associations and clubs but also the broad structures and institutional set-up of domestic sport in European states.

Parallel to that, after four decades of concentrating their efforts on developments of integration at the European level, in the 1990s, scholars working on the European Union increasingly began to examine the domestic consequences, repercussions and accommodations stemming from European integration, a process that has been termed ‘Europeanisation’ (e.g. Ladrech 1994; Radaelli 2000). We aim, however, at transcending such a narrow notion of Europeanisation, i.e. understood as ‘EU-isation’, by broadening the scope of our analysis (cf. Wallace 2000; Brand and Niemann 2007: 184-185). Patterns of transnational activity within European football and their impact upon domestic football contexts are also analysed in this study. Relatively dense networks of societal actors have emerged across Europe, alongside or rather more separated from integration efforts at EU level. This is true especially for football, where a common ‘European’ frame of reference has been established without EU-level pressure and political action in the first place. This is evident when looking at the development of European club competition, not least the UEFA Champions League, and intensified contacts between clubs and football officials as its corollary. Somewhat autonomous from EU politics and policy-making, such frequent interaction and activities nevertheless constitute a qualitatively different sphere of Europeanisation, and one that is easily overlooked by more traditional accounts.

In what follows, we propose an analysis of two distinct tracks of Europeanisation processes in the realm of football. Thus, our comparison is primarily directed at different dynamics (actors, spheres etc.) of the Europeanisation of football. Mode 1 presents the more traditional take of Europeanisation as change initiated by EU-level action, i.e. here through the case law of the European Court of Justice, which has only been modified through domestic counter-pressures and specific forms of transposition (the ‘nationality issue’ triggered by the Bosman ruling). Mode 2 embodies processes of Europeanisation as change in the respective domestic sports contexts as a result of growing transnational activities (intensified European club competition and resulting further Europeanising effects). Both modes are analysed with regard to their effects within two national contexts, namely Germany and Austria. In a second step, we highlight possible explanations for the different outcomes within these two contexts. Thus, our research objective is two-fold: first and foremost, to analyse and identify two modes of Europeanisation; secondly and subordinately, to tentatively
explain the variation in outcomes for each Europeanisation mode within different national contexts.

Germany and Austria constitute appropriate cases studies for our purpose: the two countries/leagues differ in important respects, making it possible to compare the course and consequence of Europeanisation mechanisms in varying contexts. First, the German Bundesliga, along with the English, Spanish, Italian and French leagues, can reasonably be described as belonging to the top tier of European football leagues, whilst the Austrian Bundesliga is one of the smallest. Second, Germany is one of the founding members of the EC and the European integration process has generally been embraced there, both by political elites and the public. The German case, therefore, allows us to explore the impact of European integration on domestic sport under favourable conditions. Conversely Austria, which did not join the EU until 1995, has a significant tradition of popular Euroscepticism, from which its political elites are not exempt. Third, the two countries have different historical experiences in terms of the transnationalisation of football, with Austria being part of a fairly internationalised Central European football space during the inter-war period, while in Germany no such tradition prevailed.

The article proceeds as follows: first, we delineate our notion of Europeanisation, followed by a brief note on our methodology. Second, we analyse two cases of Europeanisation dynamics (the nationality issue of the Bosman ruling, and European club competition as a Europeanisation engine), thus highlighting the distinct nature of the respective dynamics. Finally, some conclusions will be drawn from our findings, including tentative explanations for the variation in Europeanisation dynamics observed in both instances across the two countries.

Conceptualisation: the notion of Europeanisation

Europeanisation has become an increasingly popular topic for research since the mid-1990s, and in the last decade in particular the field has become something of an academic growth industry. Europeanisation is a fairly broad term even within the field of political science, being applied to a variety of phenomena and processes of change (Olsen 2002). Most frequently Europeanisation refers to domestic change in areas such as policy substance and instruments, processes of interest representation and policy style as well as (political) structures and institutions as a result of EU-level legislation and political decision-making.
The traditional Europeanisation research agenda can thus be said to concern itself primarily with questions of where, how, why, and the extent to which EU integration and governance at the European level precipitates domestic change.

However, it is important to note that Europeanisation is not held to be purely unidirectional here, but rather seen as a two-way-process developing both from the bottom up as from the top down. Top-down perspectives tend to emphasize the consequences of European level decisions at the domestic level (Ladrech 1994; Schmidt 2002). Conversely, bottom-up accounts highlight the influence of national politics on European-level developments (which in turn feed back into the domestic realm). Given that EU member governments and other domestic actors are active participants in events at European level, characterising them as merely reacting to the consequent pressures tells only half the story. On the contrary, domestic actors create and shape the European level policies and institutions to which they have to adjust at a later stage (Börzel 2002).

Further to these top-down (downloading) and bottom-up (uploading) accounts, there is another aspect of Europeanisation that has received little scholarly attention but is nonetheless relevant to our empirical analysis, namely the societal/trans-national dimension. This Europeanisation dimension encapsulates two elements: (1) the level and sphere of change; (2) the type of agency generating or resisting change. The societal dimension, in a very basic understanding, thus addresses the fact that regulation and jurisdiction from Brussels is likely to induce adaptational pressure not only at the political level, but also in rather ‘low political’, societal contexts, in this case the realm of sport and, specifically, football. The transnational dimension, in this sense, describes the actions and reactions of societal actors such as football clubs, football associations or the media to relevant EU regulation and the transnational spaces that they construct in doing so, which in turn impact on the governance of football. This also underscores that the term Europeanisation as used here does not merely denote ‘EU-isation’ (cf. Wallace 2000).

We argue that accounting for the societal and transnational dimension is justified, as otherwise interesting fields of study and important dynamics between the European and the domestic levels would go largely unnoticed. Although it would be wrong to assert that ‘transnational dimensions’ of Europeanisation have only rarely been mentioned, the concept of ‘transnationalism’ itself is less frequently specified and illustrated empirically in Europeanisation studies. Mostly the transnational quality of relationships is merely stated or an ongoing transnationalisation within EU-Europe is simply assumed (e.g. Menz 2003; Winn 2003; Feron 2004). In the context of (European) integration studies, scholars working in the
transactionalist, neofunctionalist or supranational governance perspective have of course somewhat gone beyond that and developed accounts of transnational dynamics (Deutsch 1953; Haas 1958; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997; Niemann 2006). However, their focus was above all on the development of cooperation, institutions and policies at the supranational level, i.e. on (European) integration, rather than Europeanisation.

The core focus of our concept of Europeanisation remains on the process of change in the domestic arena. In addition, Europeanisation should not be confused with ‘harmonisation’ and also differs from ‘convergence’. Europeanisation may lead to harmonisation and convergence, but this is not necessarily the case. Empirical findings indicate that Europeanisation may have a differential impact on national policy-making and that it leaves considerable margin for domestic diversities (cf. Héritier et al. 2001; Caporaso and Jupille 2001). Moreover, as pointed out by Radaelli (2000: 5) there is a difference between a process (Europeanisation) and its consequences (e.g. potentially harmonisation and convergence).

A brief note concerning our methodology: our inferences have been attained through ‘process tracing’. Multiple observations concerning structural dynamics and actors’ attitudes/behaviours have been traced, analysed and discussed. This way integrative knowledge has been gained concerning the nature and composition of (causal) mechanisms and processes (George and Bennett 2005: 205-207). Process tracing has been put into practice through triangulation across different data sources: official documentation, statistical data, secondary literature, major media, and 20 (unstructured and semi-structured) expert interviews with leading actors in the field (from football associations, football clubs and EU institutions).

Subsequently, we analyse two different modes of Europeanisation across German and Austrian football: top-down Europeanisation pressures in case 1 (the nationality aspect of the Bosman ruling), and the societal/transnational dimension of Europeanisation in case 2 (European club competition as a Europeanisation engine).

A comparative analysis of two different modes of the Europeanisation of football

Case 1 – The Bosman ruling: the nationality issue

The transformative developments in German and Austrian football over the last decade may be convincingly attributed to an ongoing Europeanisation process. Indeed the roots of an
interrelated complex of such trends – the increased influx of foreign-born players, attempts to restrict their numbers along with efforts to promote young local talent, and the search for a new ‘transfer regime’ – lie in the seminal Bosman ruling of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 1995. In essence, the ruling consisted of two general findings: first, the traditional system of paying transfer fees for out-of-contract players infringed upon the right of every European (worker) to move freely under Article 48 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) and thus had to be abolished; and second, that ‘nationality restrictions’ imposed as a means to limit the number of foreign players in a football club were illegal in so far as they discriminated against players from countries within the European Union (Foster 2000: 42). The subsequent analysis will concentrate on this second aspect.

As for Germany, both of these findings affected German football, though the effect of the latter was more ‘visible’ for the football community as a whole. The abolition of general nationality restrictions and opening up of the market for players from all other EU countries inevitably precipitated an increase in the number of foreign-born players. But the German Football Association (DFB) liberalized even further and extended the new rights accorded to EU residents (so-called EU-Ausländer) to every member of the European Football Association (UEFA). Thus, in the two German professional leagues at least, the provisions of the Bosman ruling were applied equally to EU residents and UEFA residents, and the statuses of EU-Ausländer and UEFA-Ausländer were essentially equivalent.

This new German system was not the European norm, and the thinking behind it merits examination. One part of the explanation is grounded in the socio-political attitudes of the DFB and its leading actors at the time. Immediately after unification, many in Germany were still influenced and impressed by the dramatic political changes in Europe that had taken place only a few years previously and looked towards a ‘re-unification’ of the continent. Decision makers in the football establishment were no exception, and simply ‘did not want to erect new walls or barriers’, especially towards national associations in Central and Eastern Europe, with whom they had strong institutional links. There was also an element of pragmatic (and anticipatory) thinking to it, since the decision taken by the DFB in the end prevented non-EU European footballers from taking legal action against potential elements of discrimination. Similarly, ongoing processes of European integration and the prospect of eventual enlargement looked set, in time, to consign such differentiation between certain types of Europeans to irrelevance. A further consideration was that the extension of these rights, especially to sportsmen from Central and Eastern Europe, would greatly expand the
pool of potential signings available to German football clubs. By eliminating the payment of out-of-contract transfer fees, Bosman, after all, had stripped clubs of a substantial source of revenue. The licensing procedures governing German football imposed relatively strict financial constraints upon clubs, mandating compliance with comparatively demanding regulations. Opening up the market certainly had a compensatory effect, as it was generally less expensive to sign players from Poland or the Balkans. As Norbert Berthold, economist at the University of Würzburg, explains: ‘It is not hard to understand that the professional clubs did not resist the opening of the market. […] To curb the costs, it made sense for the clubs to press the associations to open the markets in Europe and thus to make sure that less expensive foreign players became available’ (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26 June 2004, p. 11, translation by the authors; also cf. Berthold and Neumann 2005). These two concurrent pressures – the socio-political and the financial – pushed German football officials towards this supererogatory liberalisation.

As might be expected, the DFB’s decision led to an influx of players from across Europe. This trend is reflected in the changing make-up of the first division of the Bundesliga. In the early 1990s, prior to the Bosman ruling, the proportion of German, European and non-UEFA players remained fairly steady: approximately 80 percent of players were German-born, 12-14 percent UEFA residents (excluding Germans), 5-7 percent from outside the UEFA area. The period following Bosman and the DFB’s subsequent liberalisation was marked by a steady fall in the proportion of German-born players (to 50 percent in 2005). This decrease was matched by an increase in the number of both UEFA resident and non-UEFA foreign-born players, although the latter remained relatively small (between 12 and 14 percent in 2003 and 2004) compared to the former (up to 38 percent in 2005). 7

Despite the DFB’s expansive liberalisation of the transfer market, certain nationality restrictions on professional clubs’ team sheets remained in place. Not until 2006-07 did the DFB abolish the limit on foreign players entirely. Even then, there remained a mandatory minimum number of players eligible for the German national team and/or stemming from the club's youth system (UEFA’s ‘home-grown players’). The shortage of talented young German footballers had become a generally agreed cause for concern by the late 1990s, and the Bosman ruling, and its extended implementation in Germany, was generally held to be responsible in significant part (Meier 2004: 331). As Gerhard Mayer-Vorfelder, former president of the DFB, stated in 2004, ‘our decision was just to treat all citizens of UEFA member-countries like EU citizens. I now believe that this decision was wrong. […] How can we expect young German forwards to develop in the Bundesliga, if seventy per cent of all
forwards are foreign-born. And it is wrong that the best players will always prevail’ (Kicker, 19 February 2004, translation by the authors). Acknowledging these concerns, the DFB sought alternative means to pursue the promotion and protection of the talent pool for its national teams. In collaboration with the German Football League (DFL), it introduced a raft of regulatory measures for professional and amateur clubs, designed to assist and encourage the development of young German players as far as the confines of domestic and European law permitted. These rules include a requirement that each club in the Bundesliga maintains a training centre for young players (Nachwuchsleistungszentrum). Moreover, a maximum of three players over 23 was imposed on the line-ups of amateur clubs attached to professional teams.

The number of non-EU players in German amateur teams has been cut back from a maximum of six (2002) to three (2004). This kind of ‘steering policy’ was supported by the German Ministry of the Interior, which in 2002 issued a directive that in effect made it impossible for non-EU players to get a work permit unless they were signed by a team in the first or second Bundesliga. In 2003, a follow-up to this directive required that non-EU players must be signed to play in the first team and cannot be loaned out to associate amateur teams (Kicker, 27 January 2003). The nationality-related component of the Bosman ruling, then, can be seen to have imposed significant transformative pressure on German football to which the DFB reacted in mixed fashion. Whilst the ruling precipitated adaptation and counter reaction, full-fledged opposition to European institutions did not emerge. Transposition varied from the progressive (i.e. the decision to extend the definition of ‘EU resident’) to the more conservative (i.e. measures to promote German talent). Nonetheless, the impact of the nationality issues embedded in Bosman on the structures and landscape of German football was very considerable. Most visibly, the composition of the Bundesliga has become less German, more international, and, in a wider sense, more European. The degree of change is most aptly captured by the notion of ‘system transformation’, which denotes a paradigmatic or core policy change.

In Austria, prior to Bosman, regulations allowed either two or three foreign players in the first division, except for a total ban on new signings between 1974 and 1977. This quota was later extended to allow two additional ‘assimilated’ players under UEFA’s ‘3+2-rule’. Building on inter-war Central European footballing links, Austrian football after 1945 continued to attract numerous players and managers from neighbouring states, most notably Yugoslavia, (West) Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, which produced a continuous migratory movement.
of players, especially from the early 1960s (Liegl and Spitaler 2008: 36–73). Even during the Cold War, it was not impossible for some players and managers from Hungary and Czechoslovakia to obtain permission to move to their neutral neighbouring state. The fall of the Iron Curtain in the late 1980s turned Austria into a country of transit and immigration, and the effects were plain in the realm of football, especially in the lower leagues. As transfer restrictions were abolished in Central and Eastern Europe, players made use of their freedom to travel, joining a wider westward migration (Duke 1994: 159). However, as the 1990s wore on Austria gradually lost its special appeal as a destination for Central and Eastern European players.

Austrian football became subject to the Bosman ruling in 1995, consequent to the country's accession to the EU in 1995. Austria followed Germany's lead in going beyond the specific requirements of the ruling, the relevant ministry decreeing in 1996 that up to five third-country nationals would be permitted per club, a number that was later increased to seven. Austria's reasons for this voluntary liberalisation were not entirely dissimilar to Germany's: given that the country’s two professional leagues still mainly attracted foreign players from Central and Eastern Europe (including the former Yugoslavia), Austrian clubs did not want to lose the opportunity to acquire moderately priced players (Liegl and Spitaler 2008: 36–73). The effects of this liberalisation are reflected in a marked increase in the number of foreign players in the post-Bosman era, doubling from 19 percent in 1995 to around 38 percent by 2000. The proportion of players from Eastern Europe and neighbouring countries fell, while that of the rest of (essentially) EU-Europe more than doubled for a time (Liegl and Spitaler 2009: 247).

By the turn of the century, the view that Bosman, and the liberal application thereof by Austrian football authorities, had had a deleterious effect on Austrian football was commonly held by both the football community and the mainstream media. In 1999, after losing a decisive European Championship qualifier, the (Croatian born) Austrian national team manager Otto Baric blamed ‘too many foreign players’ in the league and a small pool of potential Austrian team players respectively for the weak international results (Kurier, 9 June 1999: 22). This was backed by the major sports papers, with daily Kurier headlining ‘the flood of mercenaries is overrunning our future’ (ibid.). Metaphors of flooding or the ‘bursting of a dam’ (Die Presse, 27 June 2001: 3) were present in media discourse in the following years, accompanied by laments about allegedly ‘cheap’, ‘mediocre’ and ‘third class foreign players’ in the Austrian league (Liegl and Spitaler 2008: 142-3). It was also argued that Austrian clubs and the small Austrian Bundesliga had lost their competitiveness in the new
deregulated European players’ market.

Chief amongst these concerns was the apparent adverse effect of the new regulations on the development of young Austrian footballers. This perception led both the Football League and political agents to take counter-measures. The first of these was the so-called 9+9 rule, a Gentlemen’s Agreement adopted in 2001 whereby clubs voluntarily undertook to select at least nine players eligible for Austrian national teams to be listed on the match sheet. This initiative was backed by the right-wing populist Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) which had entered government in a coalition with the conservative Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) in 2000. While the free marked oriented Austrian Minister for Economic Affairs Martin Bartenstein (ÖVP) was cited in the media in favour of liberalizing the quota for third-country-nationals, the Austrian Minister of Sports Susanne Riess-Passer (FPÖ) insisted on counter measures and claimed in accordance with the Freedom Party’s general anti-immigration policy: ‘You cannot open all gates for buying cheap foreigners’ (Kronen-Zeitung, 2 June 2001).

Despite the 9+9 rule's apparent contravention of the basic tenets of the Bosman ruling, regulations were only challenged in the second professional league, where the rules were even more restrictive. In 2001 the Austrian Federal Court of Justice ruled in favour of five claimants to the effect that the promotion and cultivation of young talent did not justify discrimination against EU-citizens (Karollus 2006: 67). In any event, the 9+9 rule was almost instantly scuppered in the first year of its existence by the immediate defiance of one of the bigger clubs, Sturm Graz (Reisinger 2003).

Searching for an alternative, the club chairmen of the Bundesliga were prompted to devise an extended premium system which rewarded the use of Austrian players. Under this system, money earned from broadcasting rights is paid into the Österreicher-Topf (the Austrians pot), and passed on to clubs achieving a quota of 11 Austrian players out of 18 players on the match sheet (fielded players and substitutes), and according to the number of minutes that Austrian-eligible players actually spent on the field. The legality of this arrangement has been questioned, since it introduces incentives to discriminate against EU-foreigners (Skocek and Weisgram 2004: 323). But it has not yet been challenged, largely because it is voluntary. Finally, since 2004 the general admission of third-country nationals to Austrian professional football has been governed by legislation covering essential, specifically qualified foreign employees (‘Schlüsselarbeitskräfte’). There is no longer a legal restriction per club (but a national quota for key employees in professional sports), and running alongside the aforementioned incentive system this amounts to almost de facto full liberalisation (Liegl and
Most Austrian clubs however try to meet the requirements of the ‘Austrians pot’ and the number of non-nationals in the Austrian Bundesliga has dropped from 41 per cent in 2003/4 to 31 per cent in 2010/11 (Liegl and Spitaler 2009: 247; Österreichische Bundesliga 2011).

There are interesting parallels to be found between the German and Austrian cases: on the one hand, a liberalisation over and above that which is strictly required by the Bosman ruling, largely aimed at securing the availability of moderately priced players from Central and Eastern Europe to domestic clubs; on the other, measures aimed at mitigating the impact of an influx of foreign players on the training of young and talented players eligible for the national team. While German reactions exhibited a degree of subtlety and deference to the constraints of EU law, the Austrian measures were more questionable in terms of compliance. Another interesting difference arises from the key actors involved in the respective countries. While the German measures were devised and implemented chiefly on the initiative of the football association, supported at times by the ministry of the interior, in Austria it was the media (promoting a discourse against ‘mediocre foreign players’), parts of the FA, the league (and its member clubs), and influential politicians which drove the reaction to Bosman. In both cases, however, the effects of Bosman and its implementation are plain to see in the composition of football squads in both countries: by the mid-2000s, foreigners accounted for around 50 percent of players in the German Bundesliga and approximately 40 percent in the Austrian Bundesliga (Liegl and Spitaler 2009: 247). Nevertheless, in contrast to the German situation, the stronger focus on counter measures in the Austrian context has led to a recent decrease of non-national players in Austrian professional football.

Case 2 – European club competition as an engine of Europeanisation

So far we have predominantly looked at the adaptational pressures stemming from the European Union level and the specific German and Austrian responses toward these pressures. In contrast, this section deals more with transnationally and domestically induced changes which have had a (substantial) bearing on the policies, structures and attitudes governing German and Austrian football. Arguably, the most important factor in that respect is the UEFA Champions League, i.e. the evolution of European club competition towards the formation of a pan-European league. This constitutes a qualitative break with the former
format of European club competition. This is evident given the fairly high level of continuity as regards the relatively constant participation of a host of top teams and the frequency of their interaction.

Since the early 1990s there had been increasingly strong pressures on UEFA from the big European clubs and media groups to expand European club-level football competition in order to exploit its commercial potential. UEFA welcomed such ideas given the possibility of (further) raising its profile and status. As a result, UEFA enlarged the European Champion Clubs’ Cup in 1992/1993 to include a league format, which became the ‘Champions League’. Again at the initiative of media companies and the largest European clubs, which at times mildly threatened with the exit option (a European breakaway league), the league format was expanded in 1997, a step that was acquiesced by UEFA. This allowed for more participants and increased the number of matches played, thus raising revenues. Once established, the Champions League itself became a source and engine of Europeanisation, thus setting off a ‘second round’ of Europeanisation dynamics (cf. Bugdahn 2005: 183).

The Champions League has turned into a real focal point for the more competitive German clubs, a development paralleled across other big European football leagues. The rationale is two-fold. First, the participation in the Champions League is financially very lucrative. For example, in the season 2009/2010 Bayern München earned almost twice as much by reaching the CL-final than through national TV marketing (normally the largest source of revenue for German professional clubs) – € 45.34 million as against € 28.63 million.\(^8\) In 2010/11, Schalke 04 generated € 39.75 million through CL-participation (going out in the semi-finals), while only earning a comparatively modest € 24.11 million through their share of the selling of national broadcasting rights.\(^9\) Due to the less lucrative different domestic TV-marketing conditions, participation in the Champions League is even more important for the top German clubs than for their English, Spanish or Italian rivals in order to stay competitive on the European level. English clubs can at least up until now\(^10\) draw on huge earnings through their massive national (as well as international) broadcasting contracts. Top Italian clubs could raise very considerable revenue up until 2010, because the pay-TV sector was decentralized until then. In 2010, a central marketing model of TV rights has been introduced again, but with a far higher level of overall revenues than in the German case (Croci et al. 2011). And in Spain both free- and pay-TV is marketed on an individual basis, which benefits the most attractive teams disproportionately.
Secondly, the Champions League has also become a focal point for the bigger German (and other European) clubs because it has developed into a top brand. Part of the success story is that it contracts over eighty TV partners in about 230 countries and territories and has continuously increased its world-wide audience/broadcasting quota. In addition, Champions League matches have often generated a higher average attendance than games in the biggest domestic leagues. Another indicator for the development of the Champions League brand is the continuity and fidelity of its sponsors: Ford, Mastercard and Amstel/Heineken have all sponsored the Champions League from the outset or joined shortly after. Sony is also developing into a long-term partner.

Overall, our interviewing of officials at the bigger German Bundesliga clubs has revealed that the Champions League brand and its monetary implications have substantial appeal to them. Clubs like Borussia Dortmund and Bayer Leverkusen are aware that their performances in the Champions League have considerably raised their images nationally and internationally and that their membership in the G-14 forum (the self-selected lobbying group of European top teams that existed until 2008) was primarily owing to that. Overall the Champions League has altered the economic structure of European club football. Given domestic (broadcasting) background conditions, it is of particular appeal to German Bundesliga clubs.

Perhaps one of the most interesting dynamics concerning the Europeanisation of German football in the wake of the gradual evolution of the Champions League was the parallel evolution of new forms of European transnational sports lobbying groups, in which top German clubs were heavily involved. We claim that an additional layer of Europeanisation dynamics is inherent in such transnational activities, not least with regard to the workings of the so-called G-14 (2000-08) and its successor, the European Club Association (ECA, since 2008). The G-14, as a self-selected and self-recruiting group of (finally 18) big European football clubs, exhibited the legal structure of a European Economic Interest Group (EEIG) and was, thus, a lobby group on behalf of the mainly commercial (common) interests of leading European clubs. Encouraged by the proposal to establish a European break-away league in 1998, several clubs decided to form the G-14 as a lobbying venue despite the fact that UEFA successfully appeased them with a (revenue increasing) change of format of the Champions League (Kruse and Quitzau 2003: 15).

Three German clubs had been members of the G-14: Bayern München from its start, while Borussia Dortmund and Bayer Leverkusen were invited to join in 1999 and 2002, respectively. At the Management Committee, the de facto leading organ of the G-14, the
‘German voice’ had been for some time Vice Chairman Karl-Heinz Rummenigge, who through holding important positions at Bayern München and being involved with the DFL, FIFA and the G-14 simultaneously got the nickname ‘ambassador of the G-14’. This underscores that from its very inception, leading German clubs have been deeply involved with this lobbying effort. Throughout its existence, the G-14 in turn generated dynamics at three different levels – vis-à-vis the European Commission, vis-à-vis UEFA/FIFA and ‘inward-looking’ among its members. Arguably, all three dimensions constitute specific and hitherto only rarely noticed aspects of Europeanisation processes in the realm of football.

The G-14’s early decision to open an office in Brussels already in 2001 reflected the fact that the top clubs regarded the European Commission by then as a potential ally (vis-à-vis the various associations) in reforming football according to the ‘business perspective’ (Ducrey et al. 2003: 34). Thus, while the G-14 had not been recognised by either UEFA or FIFA as an official organisation, the Commission allowed the G-14 to explain its position as employer of footballers in the talks between FIFA and the Commission about a new transfer regime in 2001. UEFA, not surprisingly, exhibited a somewhat distanced relationship to the G-14 throughout all the years.

Looking at G-14’s dissolution in 2008, two issues capture our attention which might illuminate the specific German interests and ‘quarrels’ with this grouping. First, the internal coherence of the G-14 was obviously far more precarious than all rhetoric concerning largely overlapping interests of big European clubs had suggested at the beginning. This seems to be true particularly regarding the situation of intensified competition and rivalry against the background of a ‘crisis of football in Europe’, i.e. the pressure to generate (more) revenue, to compete for players, the struggle to finance their salaries (as well as the debate concerning a salary cap) and the whole issue of different licensing procedures in the face of mounting debts on behalf of some European top-tier clubs. Competition in the Champions League and the – from a ‘German’ perspective and especially that taken by Bayern München’s Rummenigge – skewed chances of German clubs to win the tournament given the hugely different capabilities to finance top players played an important part in these debates. Thus, as long as the G-14 could be used as a tool to influence UEFA (regarding the selling of broadcasting rights of the Champions League, for instance), it seemed to be a promising venue. When specific demands – for example, the German demand for a salary cap as a means to establish a fair level of competition – were introduced, the G-14’s consensus crumbled, finally leading to the situation that Bayern München criticised the other clubs involved for their egoism and moved towards engaging UEFA as a potential ally (see Kicker
Not least the advancement of the so-called Financial Fairplay rules through UEFA (UEFA 2010a), which will apply to all clubs that want to compete in the UEFA Champions League starting 2015\textsuperscript{13}, can be regarded as a result of this temporary alliance between certain former G-14-members (most prominently, chairman Rummenigge) and the UEFA. Although evidence is rather spurious, it seems plausible to interpret the introduction of such a regulation through UEFA – against the initial will of European top clubs, but in line with the preferences of top German clubs articulated for almost a decade – in such a manner. It has been suggested that it was Karl-Heinz Rummenigge’s personal relationship, and accordance on the need for such rules, with UEFA chief Platini that made the agreement on sound financial policies possible in the light of more or less tacit resistance on behalf of other European top clubs (\textit{FAZ}, 28 January 2011; \textit{Handelsblatt} 15 April 2011).

Second, although the morphing of the G-14 into the ECA in 2008 was the result of a deal between UEFA and the erstwhile G-14 (Brand/Niemann 2011: 71-3)\textsuperscript{14}, the ECA can hardly be described as a quiet sub-branch of UEFA by now. This is true despite the fact that the introduction of the Financial Fairplay Rules, as described above, rest on a common effort by ECA members and UEFA. Recent developments, not least the renewed threat by ECA chairman Rummenigge that top European clubs might leave the UEFA Champions League and form a breakaway league in 2014 (\textit{The Guardian}, 27 July 2011) only signal that such coalitions and constellations are rather shaky. Thus, on the one hand the ECA has recently lauded vocally the European Commission’s Communication on Sport, most notably the passages on the autonomy of sport from eventual EU regulation ambitions (ECA 2011). On the other hand, it has also made clear that European club activism on behalf of their specific interests vis-à-vis UEFA and FIFA – e.g. with regard to the expansion of the international match calendar, or the issue of compensation payments to clubs for the release of their players to their national teams – has certainly not come to an end (\textit{The Guardian}, 27 July 2011; DRadio 2011).

A third layer of transnational Europeanisation dynamics in the wake of the development of the Champions League can only be hinted at: one might also regard the top clubs’ activism as an engine which fuelled the gradual evolvement of a proto-European identity among club officials, players as well as spectators. While for the last two groups of actors, almost no studies exist so far\textsuperscript{15}, our interviews with leading German club football representatives hinted at the following aspect: relatively dense patterns of interaction and the formation of transnational groupings of top clubs might have led to a slightly altered frame of reference (participation in \textit{European} club competition as the ultimate aim) on behalf of the
respective German club representatives. As opposed to UEFA, which is constituted through *national* associations (Lehmkuhl 2004: 182), the peculiar *transnational* character of the G-14 was based more on personal relationships between top executives, which had frequent contact with each other and acted on the basis of interests, which had been assumed to overlap for a good part.

With regard to Austrian football, one has to recognize first that at least the Champions League is rather like the exception to the rule of non-participation in club competition at the top level. Only three Austrian clubs have played in the group stages of the Champions League so far, and only once has an Austrian team made it to the then-existing second (group) stage: SK Sturm Graz in the 2000-1-season. The Champions League for the most part remains a distant dream, a miracle panacea. To count on participation in the League’s group stage can be a (very) risky undertaking for Austrian clubs, as the example of FC Tirol in 2001 indicates: the club, which was burdened with a mortal debt, banked on reaching the CL group stage. Shortly after it failed to get the better of Lokomotiv Moscow in the last qualifying round it had to file for bankruptcy (Adrian and Schächtele 2008: 165-67). Such meagre performance nowadays stands in sharp contrast to the formative impact of Austrian football on the game throughout Europe in the first half of the 20th century.

The early transnational networks that defined Austrian football then – obviously unrelated to the EC/EU – were of undeniable significance for an early wave of Europeanisation in the realm of football: not least the multinational heritage of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy ensured that Austrian football was internationally oriented from the outset and – according to today’s measures – fairly internationalised (Horak 1992; Horak and Maderthaner 1996). In the inter-war years, Viennese teams already had rather international squads, and the preeminent competition in the region was the so-called ‘Central European Triangle’, a three-way competition between Vienna, Prague and Budapest. Some authors contend that frequent regional contacts, matches and peer group orientation constituted a trans-boundary Central European football space (Marschik 1998; Marschik and Sottopietra 2000). In 1927, this led to the so-called Mitropa-Cup, a club tournament contested chiefly within this triangle (but also including Yugoslavia and Italy), arguably a forerunner of now well-established competitions at European level (Mittag and Legrand 2010).

As has been said, this contrasts with today’s standing of Austrian football as well as the degree of influence of Austrian club officials regarding the Champions League format and eventual participation in transnational activities in that context. This is not to say that
European club competition is irrelevant for the Austrian case. Even though the structure of revenues/financing of clubs differs markedly from that of other European leagues, especially with regard to the very substantial reliance of some of the big clubs upon the financial backing by a large sponsor,\textsuperscript{17} participation in European football (still) substantially enhances the competitiveness of Austrian clubs. This is only reinforced by the fact that relatively low revenues emanate from the broadcasting right deals. Currently (2010-2013) the Football League receives a total of 17 million Euro per year paid by both public television ORF and Pay-TV Sky to all 20 clubs of the \textit{Bundesliga} (\textit{Der Standard}, 31 March 2010). In contrast to the German case, where broadcasting issues have enormous implications for the clubs’ finances, broadcasting revenues therefore make up a relatively minor share of the average \textit{Bundesliga} club’s total annual earnings, which amounts to around € 10 million per year.\textsuperscript{18}

Thus, although the European club competitions may not be so much part of clubs’ budget calculations (since it cannot be taken for granted to reach the financially lucrative stage of these competitions at all), participation in these tournaments is nevertheless what the more ambitious, competitive and/or traditional Austrian \textit{Bundesliga} clubs, such as Red Bull Salzburg, SK Rapid and FK Austria are aiming for. In this regard, participation in the (group stage of the) Champions League would be like hitting the jack-pot; the revenue of € 13 million generated by SK Sturm Graz through making it to the group stage of the Champions League in 2000-1 alone (\textit{Kurier}, 26 April 2009: 32) was bigger than the entire annual budgets of most Austrian professional clubs at that time. This brings a clear competitive advantage for national competitions, although Sturm did not benefit from it due to speculative and unsuccessful transfers and higher personnel costs.

But also the UEFA Cup/Europa League can be financially lucrative to Austrian clubs, as the example of Austria Vienna that reached the quarter final of the UEFA Cup in 2004-5 indicates.\textsuperscript{19} With the new Europa League, appearance in the group stage (for which one still needs to qualify however) became more lucrative than for the old UEFA Cup group stage, with higher guaranteed revenues. In the season 2009-10 four Austrian clubs entered the group stage of the Europa League, thus gaining a minimum of guaranteed € 900,000 from UEFA, with additional €120,000 per victory and €60,000 for a draw, and considerable revenues from ticket sales and television rights. In the following seasons, two (2010/11) and then three Austrian (2011/12) clubs qualified for the group stage. Even if these participation rates are higher than in the old UEFA Cup throughout the last seasons, they are still an extra for Austrian clubs, not a regular and normal undertaking to be relied upon in the regular budgeting even of the big clubs.
Finally, and largely resembling the small visibility of Austrian clubs in European competitions, there has only been a limited Austrian contribution to transnational club fora. No Austrian club has been a member of the G-14, while, because each European association is represented there, three Austrian clubs belong(ed) to the European Club Forum (ECF) and its successor, the European Club Association (ECA). Within the ECF Working Group ‘Marketing and Communication’, the representative of one of these Austrian clubs (SK Rapid) was involved in an initiative from smaller European leagues (Belgium, Switzerland, Scotland and Scandinavian countries), opting for a modification of the UEFA-Cup knock-out-system that increasingly proved to be a financial ‘lottery’ for smaller clubs. This was eventually taken up by UEFA with the Europa League group-stage-system, which, as mentioned before, offers more budget security and assured revenues for the participating clubs. Thus, at least in this case, an Austrian actor tried to use transnational fora to pursue its interests; however, Austrian clubs were not involved in the designing of the transnational framework of ECF/ECA itself.

In summary, due to the lesser involvement in European club tournaments and only marginal exposure of Austrian clubs at the transnational level, some of the Europeanisation mechanisms detectable in the German case simply do not exist in the same way in the Austrian case.

What is important from our point of view is that an increasingly complex web of transnational networks and relationships has been established in the wake of the establishment and evolution of the Champions League, which became the engine of further transnational Europeanisation. The embodiment of this was the G-14, and to a lesser degree (for reasons of internal homogeneity) today’s ECA grouping that superseded it. German actors played and continue to play a crucial role in the design of this, while the Austrian football scene was not present in the shaping of these developments. Success of Austrian clubs in European tournaments has become sporadic in the last years, arguably contributing to the invisibility of Austrian clubs and their representatives in European club fora. Compared to its heritage as a founder of Central European football as transboundary activity in the first half of the 20th century, Austrian football has become more inward-oriented, less visible and less involved in European-wide transboundary groupings. Thus, some of the Europeanising mechanisms observable in other countries (the impact of the Champions League on clubs’ strategies; activism of clubs’ representatives in the shaping of transnational club fora) are less relevant for the Austrian case by now.
Conclusion

The above cases presented two different Europeanisation modes within two national contexts, respectively. While it could be shown that there exist at least two distinct dynamics of Europeanisation in the realm of football – top-down pressures stemming from EU-level political action vs. transnational crossloading dynamics which flourish rather autonomously from EU-level decisions – it is the variation in outcomes which merits further attention. Our comparison of both the German and the Austrian cases reveals that there are a number of similarities. Firstly, with regard to the implications of the Bosman ruling for the nationality issue, both countries liberalised beyond what was strictly necessary, partly because of similar desires of the clubs to keep up their financial and sporting competitiveness though the signing of moderately priced players from Central and Eastern Europe. Secondly, this triggered very significant changes amounting to a system transformation in both countries. Thirdly, both countries took counter-measures several years later.

Overall, however, the differences outweigh the similarities, with German football post-Bosman more obviously responding to, engaging with, and being driven by Europeanisation processes and pressures than its Austrian counterpart. This was also true for both modes/cases analysed here. (1) Concerning top-down pressures emanating from the ECJ’s Bosman ruling, the counter-measures regarding the nationality aspect were more subtle and EU-law-compliant in Germany, while the actions undertaken in Austria were, at best, questionably compliant. They resulted in a decreased percentage of foreign football players in the Austrian Bundesliga in the last decade. What is more, the question of compatibility with EU rules only gradually emerged as a theme in Austrian debates. (2) Although Austrian football had undergone an important (Central) Europeanisation period long before Bosman – a process that was not paralleled in Germany – some more recent developments at the European (but not EU-) level have been of much more importance for German football. Pan-European club competition and the parallel formation of top clubs’ representatives in the context of the establishment of the Champions League are a case in point. Austrian actors took part in these processes – if at all – merely as interested spectators.

How can we account for these differences? As for the nationality issue of the Bosman case and differences in the respective strategies to cope with it (case 1) we tentatively point to a combination of factors, i.e. dichotomies outlined in the introduction: first, the ‘longstanding
membership paired with pro-integration political elites/public vs. more recent membership along with more Eurocritical elites/public”- dichotomy seems to have played a role in case 1. The case analysis suggests that the decisions leading to the more restrictive Austrian counter-measures to the Bosman ruling have been influenced both by the fact that a Eurosceptic party formed part of the Austrian government (and actively intervened), and by the somewhat chauvinistic media discourse. Arguably both such aspects would have been more difficult to occur/sustain in the German context. Second, there is the ‘big-small’ dichotomy. Arguably smaller countries (usually with less competitive leagues) and their respective football associations tend to be more susceptible to a crowding out of young talent eligible to national teams, as the Austrian case also indicates.

Case 2 has illustrated, however, that the sole focus on direct EU policies, indirect pressures emanating from EU-level policies and a host of bottom-up processes of engagement and resistance towards such policies, does not offer a complete picture of Europeanisation. Processes of transformation and transfiguration within the sphere of European football cannot be accounted for without analysing dynamics autonomous from EU-level decision-making. European club competitions and increasing transnational activism in the wake of their implementation and evolution mark cases in point. However, there is a considerable degree of variation across the various national football contexts in Europe. The comparison between Germany and Austria indicates that the strength of bottom-up engagement with European sports policy might vary according to the size and structure of the respective markets and leagues. In Germany the general position of the more competitive Bundesliga clubs in the wider European football ‘market’ induces them to really focus on European club competitions, and especially the Champions League, to stay competitive on a European level, not least given the less advantageous national TV market conditions compared to those enjoyed by their English, Spanish and Italian rivals. In Austria, European club competitions are less of a focal point for the top clubs, partly given the lesser likelihood of qualifying in the first place (and the risks attached to banking on, or speculating with, participation therein), and also in view of the fact the big clubs can rely on the backing of large sponsors. And whereas Austria’s main contribution to European club competition and the various forms of transnational activity in its wake seems to be primarily of historical nature, important trends in the transnational dimension of the Europeanisation of football can hardly be understood without an account of the activities of German top clubs and their representatives. Ensuing sports actors’ networks across Europe add an important layer of Europeanisation dynamics far beyond any EU-induced change.
More generally, we conclude that domestic factors can substantially condition Europeanisation processes. Domestic-level actors, such as clubs, association and leagues (as well as their interrelationships) and trans-national actors such as UEFA on the one hand, specific football cultures and heritages on the other hand, may constitute important conditioning elements and buffers to EU-level pressure. Although the EU can exert substantial adaptational pressure, there have been ways of escaping some of the consequences of adaptation or weakening the pressure itself. The impact of European integration is even then effectively mitigated, if domestic and transnational agents are not involved during the formation of a policy and/or decision, but only in the implementation stage. A more ‘conservative’ transposition of law may, to some extent, compensate for non-involvement in the decision-making, thereby substantially impacting upon the transposition of EU-level pressures, as the measures taken to promote young German and Austrian players have shown in case 1. In addition, Europeanisation taken as liberalisation does not mean homogenisation, as policy and sports actors had (and still have) considerable leeway in deciding upon how to transpose such regulations.

The tentativeness of the conditioning factors explaining variation between our two countries, and the existing scope for additional cross-country comparisons – that also reflect yet different sports policy models, a wider geographical distribution and membership duration (possibly also looking at non-members) – thus clear the ground for further research.

References


**Notes**

Our study concentrates on football, the sport that has been the subject of most European-level decisions. Football is both the most popular and financially lucrative sport in Europe. Its influence cuts across political, economic, social and cultural spheres, and may be taken as an adequate proxy for European sport more generally.

Before the transposition of Bosman, the so-called ‘3+2 rule’ applied. It allowed European teams to field three foreign players and two ‘assimilated players’, i.e. those who had played in the respective country for at least five consecutive years.

Interview with Dr. Theo Zwanziger, then Managing President of the DFB, by telephone, January 2005.

As has been the case later on in rulings by the European Court of Justice in other countries/leagues: see Deutscher Handballbund v. Maros Kolpak, Case C-438/00 [2003] ECR I-4135 (Martins 2004); and Igor Simutenkov v. Ministerio de Educación y Cultura and Real Federación Española de Fútbol, Case C-265/03 ECR [2005] I-2579 (García et al. 2011).

Interview with Gerhard Mayer-Vorfelder, then President of the DFB, by telephone, January 2005.

This data has been obtained from IMP AG Ismaning/Germany.

Cf. Pawlowski et al. (2010) who have shown that increasing payouts from persistent Champions League appearances have indeed helped European top clubs to further dominate domestic league competitions (which, of course, increases the probability of returning to Champions League competition).


But see the most recent rulings of the ECJ on football issues, the so-called „Murphy ruling” of 2011 (Cases 403/08 and 429/08).

Between 1992-93 and 2003-4 the Champions League has generated an average attendance of 37,073, more than any national football league during that period. Unofficial estimates since 2004 also put the average attendance within the last five years between approx. 40,000 and 46,000 (see the figures at www.worldfootball.net/).

The rules will take full effect in 2015; from 2011 to 2015 a transitional framework of rules will apply.

The international associations agreed to pay compensation fees to clubs for the release of their players to international tournaments (Geey and Lima, 2008), while the G-14 dropped all its running legal disputes against UEFA/FIFA and ceased to exist.

For an exception see (on English fans): Levermore and Millward, 2007.

Interview Hockenjos v.a. Interview Christian Hockenjos, Managing Director at Borussia Dortmund, 2005; (anonymous) interview German club official, 2006. See also the Ducrey et al. (2003: 60) as well as Levermore and Millward (2007: 150-1).

According to Deloitte, 60 percent of the Austrian football league members’ revenues derive from sponsoring (season 2007-8), which represents the highest number among ten researched Western European leagues (Sinnreich 2009: 49).

For example, in the case of FK Austria, television revenues represented 12 percent of the overall budget of €15 million (season 2008-9), compared to 70 percent from sponsor revenues and 15 percent from ticket sales (Kurier, 10 March 2009: 29).

Club representatives gave estimates of €4 million revenues for the UEFA-Cup-season 2004-5 (including television rights and ticket sales) before taxes (Neue Kronen Zeitung, 9 April 2005: 90).

As of today, these are FK Austria, Red Bull Salzburg and SK Rapid.

Interview with Werner Kuhn, Managing Director of SK Rapid, per telephone, 2011.