{"id":12388,"date":"2024-12-12T09:48:18","date_gmt":"2024-12-12T08:48:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cms.zdv.uni-mainz.de\/fb02-internationale-beziehungen\/mainz-papers-on-international-and-european-politics-mpiep\/"},"modified":"2025-09-29T16:38:17","modified_gmt":"2025-09-29T14:38:17","slug":"mainz-papers-on-international-and-european-politics-mpiep","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/internationale.politik.uni-mainz.de\/en\/international-relations\/mainz-papers-on-international-and-european-politics-mpiep\/","title":{"rendered":"Mainz Papers on International and European Politics (MPIEP)"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<\/jgu-base-pageheader>\n
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The Mainz Papers on International and European Politics (MPIEP) are based on current projects of the International Relations Unit and contributions of visiting researchers at the Department of Political Science at the University of Mainz. MPIEP constitute work in progress and are generally intended for submission to reviewed journals at a later stage. To make their production as quick and easy as possible, they are only available online. Authors keep the copyright of their paper. Papers are available in PDF format. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Editorial Board<\/strong>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Prof. Arne Niemann<\/a>Dr. Friedrich Plank<\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This paper analyses the extent of European Union (EU) actorness and effectiveness at the fifteenth United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP) meeting in Copenhagen in December 2009. For over a decade the European Union has been characterised as a leader in international climate policy-making and as an important actor in international climate change negotiations. The COP15 meeting in Copenhagen has overall brought about disappointing outcomes, especially from the perspective of the European Union. This casts doubts on EU leadership and begs the question of what has happened to EU actorness and effectiveness in this field. In terms of actorness we take Jupille and Caporaso (1998) as a point of departure and then specify a more parsimonious actorness framework that consists of cohesion and autonomy. Effectiveness (i.e. goal attainment) is seen as conceptually separate from actorness. Effectiveness is conceptualised as the result of actorness conditioned by the \u2018opportunity structure\u2019, i.e. the external context (of other actors, events and ideas) that enables or constrains EU actions. We hold that the EU\u2019s actorness has been only moderate, especially given somewhat limited preference cohesion. In terms of the opportunity structure in Copenhagen we argue that the high degree of politicisation constrained the EU\u2019s ability to negotiate and thus to attain its goals. Another external factor that had a substantial adverse impact on the EU\u2019s effectiveness at the Copenhagen negotiations was the strong involvement of other actors with rather different positions, namely the United States (US) and the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 2012 Lisanne Groen and Arne Niemann<\/p>\n\n\n\n \n<\/jgu-base-buttonitem>\n\n<\/jgu-base-button><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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This paper proposes an innovative theoretical approach to the analysis of regionalism by taking the impact of extra-regional relations and the influence of external actors explicitly into account. The major motivation for this research stems from the observation of a new wave of regionalism that emerged after the end of the Cold War parallel to increasing globalisation. In contrast to expectations of mainstream integration theories, many of these recent regional integration organisations comprise less developed countries and are located in the Southern Hemisphere despite allegedly unfavourable preconditions. While regionalisms in the South have nevertheless come into existence and exhibit various degrees of success, there is evidence that institutionalised regional cooperation projects in southern regions seem to be comparatively unstable and not always entirely under control of regional actors. Against the background of this puzzling observation, this paper proposes a theoretical framework that attends to this phenomenon and aims to answer the following questions: What explains the emergence, dynamics and effectiveness of regionalism in these regions? If regional circumstances remain constant, do extra-regional relations and external actors have a decisive impact in this respect? While the European integration process has been well scrutinised, systematic and theory-driven research on regionalism outside Europe is still widely missing. By applying cooperation theory and a situation-structural approach to analyse and explain regional integration, the author argues that prevalent patterns of strong and asymmetric interdependence between regional and extra-regional actors may impact the structure of genuine regional problematic situations and put external actors in a position to (in-)directly influence the likeliness and progress of institutionalised regional cooperation. Since strong and asymmetric relations generally prevail between the developed North and the less developed South, regionalisms in the latter regions are likely to be more exposed to external influence. Central assumptions and hypotheses deduced from this theoretical model will be elucidated by brief plausibility probes on empirical examples from the Southern African Development Community (SADC). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Johannes Muntschick 2012<\/p>\n\n\n\n \n<\/jgu-base-buttonitem>\n\n<\/jgu-base-button><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This paper examines the extent to which the EU constitutes a normative power in its relation to the United States in the policy field of counter-terrorism. Normative power is analysed along three dimensions: normative intent (the genuineness of EU normative commitment), normative process (the extent to which an inclusive and reflexive foreign policy is pursued), and normative impact (the development of norms in the third country, in our case study the US). Our empirical analysis focuses on the promotion by the EU of three fundamental rights in the policy-area of counter-terrorism: the prohibition of inhuman treatment of detainees suspected of acts of terrorism, the right to a fair trial for these detainees, and the right to respect for private life and data protection of citizens whose personal data are being processed for counter-terrorism purposes. The findings of this study suggest an only moderate record concerning EU normative power in its relation with the US. For example, our analysis indicates that the EU \u2013 in its promotion of the norm of prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment \u2013 to some extent applied double standards in terms of what it expected from the US and what it expected from its own Member States. Furthermore, the study suggest that while in theory there have been substantive normative changes in the US towards the three norms promoted by the EU in the policy-field of counter-terrorism, these changes have so far only to a limited extent been implemented in practice. The picture arises of strong normative impact on paper but little normative impact in practice. Finally, we hold that side by side with the EU, the Council of Europe acts as a normative power vis-\u00e0-vis the US. The influence of the Council of Europe on the normative basis of the EU and on EU normativity vis-\u00e0-vis third states has so far been underexplored in normative power theory. This study illustrates that the Council of Europe has acted as a driving force behind the EU\u2019s commitment to promote the above norms. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Martha Groothuis and Arne Niemann 2012<\/p>\n\n\n\n \n<\/jgu-base-buttonitem>\n\n<\/jgu-base-button><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The paper assesses the rise of the \u201cglobal South\u201d for its implications regarding U.S. world political hegemony. As the rise of \u201cBRIC power\u201d is more often than not portrayed as intimately tied to a new wave of decline of U.S. hegemony, or at least as a contestation to the formative role of the United States in global politics, it tries to assess the validity of such claims by looking at current developments in Latin America. This regional focus has several merits. First, it specifies a \u201ctarget region\u201d of political strategies allowing for a more differentiated account of how gradually shifting power patterns or potentials indeed translate<\/em> into political consequences \u201con the ground.\u201d Second, shifting patterns of regional<\/em> hegemony might also be indicative of global power shifts. Third, Latin America as a region in itself<\/em> is interesting for our purposes. On the one hand, it is seen as the \u201ctraditional backyard\u201d of the regional hegemon, the U.S.. On the other hand, the region is home to one of the BRIC-states, namely Brazil, which is increasingly being discussed as a regional powerhouse with not only the potential to act as such but also the aspirations to do so. Last but not least, Latin America has recently been deemed of heightened strategic importance by another BRIC-country situated outside the region, namely China. In that sense, if the ascendancy of the BRICs is to be interpreted as the rise of contenders to U.S. hegemony, developments in Latin America should give us a grasp on the emerging form of contestation. In the paper, the activities within the Latin American region on behalf of the U.S., China and Brazil, respectively, are therefore comparatively assessed. Our analysis is structured around four dimensions of power: military, economic, institutional and soft power, which in combination might lead to a more substantiated account of any hegemonic rivalry. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Alexander Brand, Susan McEwen-Fial, Wolfgang Muno and Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann 2012<\/p>\n\n\n\n \n<\/jgu-base-buttonitem>\n\n<\/jgu-base-button><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The paper focuses on the under-researched role of the European Union as a mediator in peace negotiations. It is explorative and mainly conceptual. We develop an analytical framework for investigating the European Union\u2019s mediator effectiveness. To probe its empirical plausibility, we apply it to the case of EU mediation between Serbia and Kosovo (Belgrade-Pristina dialogue). Since the beginning of the 2000s the European Union has been increasingly involved in directly supporting peace negotiations in inter- and intra-state conflict by taking on the role of a third-party mediator. Despite an increasing interest in the EU\u2019s engagement in international mediation by policy-analysts and practitioners, both EU foreign and security policy scholars and students of conflict resolution have been rather reluctant to pay much attention to the role the EU plays in mediation and peace process support. To fill this research gap at least to a certain extent, the paper seeks to answer the following research questions: How can EU mediator effectiveness be appropriately conceptualised? And what factors influence EU mediator effectiveness? Mediator effectiveness is analysed along two dimensions: 1) goal-attainment and 2) conflict settlement. Building on concepts and empirical findings of both European external policy studies and international mediation literature, our investigation of the conditions of mediator effectiveness is structured around four key variables: mediator leverage, mediation strategy, coherence and the conflict context. In our preliminary empirical analysis of the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, we find that the EU has been partially successful in terms of conflict settlement and in attaining its narrowly defined goal in finding a settlement for Northern Kosovo, and only moderately effective in achieving its long-term goals with respect to the mediation effort, which refer to the improvement of living conditions in Kosovo and the normalisation of bilateral relations between Kosovo and Serbia. Our investigation of conditions of EU mediator effectiveness indicates that the EU\u2019s success in mediating a number of agreements between Kosovo and Serbia can be explained by its great leverage vis-\u00e0-vis the conflict parties due to their EU membership aspirations and its interventionist mediation strategy. In addition, external support by third parties and the right timing of the mediation initiative have been conducive to EU success. However, the EU also faces a main dilemma: while a manipulative mediation style might be appropriate to achieve short-term agreements, it is not an adequate strategy to foster mutual confidence and trust between the conflict parties which explains the Union\u2019s relative ineffectiveness in attaining its long-term goals. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Julian Bergmann and Arne Niemann 2013<\/p>\n\n\n\n \n<\/jgu-base-buttonitem>\n\n<\/jgu-base-button><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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In the academic literature it has become common-place to assume that migration is treated as a security issue in the EU, and that EU migration policy has become \u201csecuritised\u201d. However, countervailing tendencies exist: some observers have recently recognised a certain liberal turn in EU migration policy, and securitisation is sometimes applied in the academic literature rather loosely, i.e. to phenomena and developments that may rather follow a different logic, the logic of risk. The paper develops an operationalisation for distinguishing between the two logics empirically. Subsequently we probe the logic of security\/securitisation and the logic of risk empirically through a qualitative content analysis of EU documents on (irregular) migration. Our findings suggest that, while there is evidence for both concepts, the risk logic has dominated the EU discourse in this field in recent years. In addition, it seems that different types of migrants are treated according to different logics in the EU documentation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Natalie Schmidth\u00e4ussler and Arne Niemann<\/p>\n\n\n\n \n<\/jgu-base-buttonitem>\n\n<\/jgu-base-button><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Recent macro-level research argues that economic globalisation negatively affects electoral turnout by constraining the leeway of national governments and thereby rendering elections less meaningful to voters. This article analyses the link between perceptions of the national government\u2019s room to manoeuvre and voter turnout on the individual level. Drawing on the 2001 British General Election, it is shown that citizens who believe that economic globalization leaves the national government with less influence on the economy are less likely to report to have voted. Further findings also support the proposed theoretical model according to which room to manoeuvre perceptions affect turnout via views on the importance of elections and matter specifically for citizens that tend towards the left side of the left-right scale. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Nils D. Steiner<\/p>\n\n\n\n \n<\/jgu-base-buttonitem>\n\n<\/jgu-base-button><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This study compares the US and EU security strategies of the first decade of the 21st century. Our paper focuses on whether the security strategies of both entities are converging or diverging. We argue that the literature has so far failed to compare US and EU security strategies across time, a gap that we seek to close. The paper applies a qualitative-explorative design. Our empirical (discourse and content) analysis is conducted with the data analysis software Atlas.ti. The main finding of our paper is that the US and EU security strategies are very similar in terms of overall objectives, values and declared threats. When it comes to approaching these threats, one still notices substantial differences. Overall, we conclude that the two security strategies have been converging over time. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Julia Klohs and Arne Niemann<\/p>\n\n\n\n \n<\/jgu-base-buttonitem>\n\n<\/jgu-base-button><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The legal documents drafted in April 2013 to enable the EU\u2019s accession to the European Charter of Human Rights represented a further confirmation of the unprecedented victory of democracy and human rights in Europe. However, with the outbreak and evolution of the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, the victory of democracy and human rights in Europe is less straightforward. The conflict highlights the clash over the understanding of human rights between the two major political powers on the European continent \u2013 the EU and Russia. This article complements quantitative data on human rights violations with qualitative discourse analysis of human rights frames. The highly contentious case of the Russian-speaking minority in Latvia is selected as a test case. Presented analysis shows that the Russian-speaking minority in Latvia is lost in translation \u2013 caught between the Latvian notion of non-citizens as a legally justified statelessness and the Russian notion of compatriots, victims of aggressive Western expansion. Neither the Latvian nor the Russian official discourse has recognized the Russian-speaking minority as an autonomous entity; rather for both the minority issue is instrumentalized for domestic and foreign policy reasons – identity is instrumentalized and securitized. The EU, whose hands are tied, is largely absent. The relationship between the actors is polarized and antagonistic, and as the situation of Ukraine shows, has further potential for violence. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Petra Guasti and Arne Niemann<\/p>\n\n\n\n \n<\/jgu-base-buttonitem>\n\n<\/jgu-base-button><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

China and the European Union are the world\u2019s largest importers of natural resources, which make both of them highly dependent on other countries. Both are, hence, greatly challenged on the issue of energy and closely interlinked also on climate change, both areas which will demand changes in energy production, consumption patterns etc. These challenges could lead to competition between the two actors in the request for resources. At the same time, such a common situation could entail great potential for a closer cooperation. However despite the latest summit between the two partners, little indicates for such closer cooperation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, the aim of this paper is to understand which mutual perceptions the EU and China have in energy policy. How does the external energy governance of the EU and China function? Which mutual perceptions do both sides hold and which controversies exist? <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Mich\u00e8le Knodt, Nadine Piefer, Suet-Yi Lai<\/p>\n\n\n\n \n<\/jgu-base-buttonitem>\n\n<\/jgu-base-button><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this article, we suggest a novel conceptual framework for understanding and analyzing EU politicisation. Recent studies on EU politicisation argue that the post-Maastricht era led to the politicisation of EU integration via an increasing citizens\u2019 dissatisfaction. Until then, politics had played only a minor role. Contrary to this account, we argue that European integration has been from the beginning a political process, but an unusual one. To capture its uniqueness we introduce the concepts of politisation as a precondition of politicization and of politification as a depoliticised modality of politicisation. Politicisation is then not something new to EU integration but rather it is constitutive of EU integration itself. We further argue that understanding politicisation requires taking a closer look at its relationship to \u201cpolitics\u201d or \u201cpolitical\u201d, as it is essential to spell out the respective understanding of this key concept \u2013 Grundbegriff in Reinhart Koselleck\u2019s sense. The interpretation of what is considered as politicisation depends on the interpretation of what is politics\/political. We argue in favour of rethinking the concept of politics and its relationship to politicisation in terms that avoid spatial and functional metaphors. To capture the power dynamics involved in European integration, we aim at an understanding of EU politicisation that is at once more historical and based on an actor-oriented perspective on the political. On this basis we discuss the main conceptual weaknesses of studies on EU politicization and conclude by developing some points of our alternative conception. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9Niilo Kauppi, Kari Palonen, Claudia Wiesner<\/p>\n\n\n\n \n<\/jgu-base-buttonitem>\n\n<\/jgu-base-button><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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With the “Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities” adopted in 2009, the EU aims to further develop its capabilities in the field of peace mediation, building also on various mediation experiences made by EU institutions and actors in different conflict regions. Yet, the academic literature has not paid much attention to the EU\u2019s involvement in mediation or mediation support activities. To develop a better theoretical and empirical understanding of EU peace mediation, the Unit of International Politics of the Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz organized a workshop on “The EU as Actor in International Mediation – Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives” which took place in November 2015 in Mainz. The working paper discusses this project in the light of the current research literature and reflects on the results of the presentations and discussions of the workshop. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Julian Bergmann, Friedrich Plank, Arne Niemann<\/p>\n\n\n\n \n<\/jgu-base-buttonitem>\n\n<\/jgu-base-button><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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The working paper addresses the significance, reality and boundaries of solidarity in the European multi-level system. It analyses the requirements for solidarity and the role that solidarity plays in European multi-level governance. We present an effort to conceptualize solidarity in the European multi-level system and to develop a typology of different forms of solidarity. The working paper focuses on the type of intergovernmental solidarity between member states and explores possible boundaries for solidary acts. We illustrate our theoretical and conceptual considerations with insights from two different EU policy fields: energy and migration policy. Both policy fields are characterized by a fundamental lack of solidary actions and thus give some indications for possible boundaries of European solidarity. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

@ Mich\u00e8le Knodt, Anne Tews<\/p>\n\n\n\n \n<\/jgu-base-buttonitem>\n\n<\/jgu-base-button><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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The new governance mechanisms of the European energy policy proposed by the European Commission in its \u201cWinter Package\u201d will contribute to a redefinition of the European energy and climate governance. This contribution reviews the proposal, its supporting documents and overall stakeholder positions along the criteria of governance efficiency, effectiveness and acceptance in order to assess its ability to support the European energy and climate goals. We find that the proposed governance sums up to a densely-meshed coordination of policies between the European level and Member States. Compared to the present governance, the enhanced mechanism can draw on significant synergies and reduce administrative costs. Our review of stakeholder positions shows a solid acceptance for enhanced coordination. Nonetheless our review identifies some potential flaws in terms of governance effectiveness: With unspecific or not further nationally attributed targets for 2030, the underlying governance structure can get blurred easily. Second, the proposal foresees in some cases direct corrective action of the European level, in the case Member States lag ambition. This surpasses the method of open coordination or could be seen as a case of \u201charder\u201d soft governance which at the same time conflicts with article 194(2) TFEU (right of Member States to determine their national energy mix). Finally, the local level is left out. The proposal misses to link to on-going local actions like the Sustainable Energy and Climate Action Plans (SECPs) to the overall governance structure. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Mich\u00e8le Knodt, Marc Ringel<\/p>\n\n\n\n \n<\/jgu-base-buttonitem>\n\n<\/jgu-base-button><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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The paper explores factors behind the critique of the UK as being perfidious and awkward. It examines Britain\u2019s core beliefs of being a global rather than merely a European power, of having a special relationship with the United States, of being internationalist in terms of trade and, somewhat paradoxically, of taking pride in being pragmatic. These beliefs have led to the rejection of blueprints for integration and a preference for bilateral cooperation rather than multilateral relationships. Post-BREXIT Britain will be confronted with potential dilemmas if the Franco-German tandem leads to closer cooperation on security and defence within the European Union and in cooperation with NATO, especially given an unpredictable United States under President Trump. These dilemmas and Britain\u2019s preoccupation with the consequences of BREXIT suggest that it will have minimal influence on Europe\u2019s future. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Geoffrey Edwards<\/p>\n\n\n\n \n<\/jgu-base-buttonitem>\n\n<\/jgu-base-button><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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Almost three years after the Euromaidan protests in 2013-2014, the circumstances in East Ukraine seem to be burdened by a frozen conflict. Russia is still holding on to the story that the annexation of Crimea was a \u201cfree referendum\u201d of Ukrainian people expressing their desire to belong territorially to Russia. Unsolved conflicts and the future architecture of relations between Russia, Ukraine and the EU need to be redefined and remain a key strategic challenge for the EU. \u201cA consistent and united approach must remain the cornerstone of EU policy towards Russia\u201d (EEAS 2016). As suggested by the EU Global Strategy, to develop a dialogue-led, two-way interaction between equal partners is recognised as promising and, on the other hand, strenuous. The elites within the EU as well as the media should perceive the deficits in their own behaviour and develop new strategies on the ground. This paper presents a media perception study. The central question of this research is how Ukraine and the EU are perceived in Russian media. Three leading Russian newspapers (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Kommersant, Komsomolskaya Pravda) have been selected to analyse the Russian media perception. The study coded over 500 articles that were published in May, September and October 2015. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Asalkhon Shukurova<\/p>\n\n\n\n \n<\/jgu-base-buttonitem>\n\n<\/jgu-base-button><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The UEFA Champions League (CL) has arguably evoked much attention, fascination as well as criticism over the years. While it quickly developed into a commercial success story and a brand name which seemed to draw financially well-endowed sponsors all too easily, it has also increasingly been criticised for its changes in format, its focus on nurturing elite clubs at the expense of grassroots football as well as already having reached some point of saturation and over-exposition towards likely spectators, fans and consumers. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Beneath this discussion of the likely sporting and commercial dynamics around the UEFA Champions League, there has always been some interest in this continent-wide competition as an engine, which supposedly makes Europe hang together more closely. In this regard, the very idea that millions of Europeans watch games \u2013 not only of their beloved clubs, not only of their respective national sides, as research and data suggest \u2013 has fascinated and inspired political and scholarly comment. Elaborating on narratives establishing, and counter-narratives undermining such positive perceptions of the CL, we aim at uncovering the potential of top-level club football competition to function as a political myth. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

If it is true that Champions League finals are more prominent in the minds of Europeans than constitutional patriotism towards the EU Treaties, such unconscious identity work through lifeworldly activities becomes politically relevant. It may reach the stage of a political myth when actors refer to such presumed CL-effects on Europeanised mind-sets and deliberately enhance their importance. In doing so, they may either seek to push a European agenda or to legitimise commercial interests with reference to “the European idea”. Wittingly or not, however, they contribute to the very narrative of the Champions League as a generator of European(ised) mind sets. Countervailing forces which are to undermine this very political myth of the CL include, e.g., the growing criticism of (over-)commercialised football or the League\u2019s presumed negative effects on the integrity of “true football”. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Against the idea of an ongoing Europeanisation of football, most recent data on football fandom throughout Europe and our own emerging research into identity effects of football fandom, we discuss the role of the UEFA Champions League as a generator of Europeanised experiences, frameworks and communities in this paper. In doing so, we are specifically interested in ascertaining whether there is a politically relevant identity-formation under way due to increased awareness of, exposure to and familiarity with European-level competition of top football Clubs. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Alexander Brand \/ Arne Niemann<\/p>\n\n\n\n \n<\/jgu-base-buttonitem>\n\n<\/jgu-base-button><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Paris has written history. The initiation of an internationally binding climate agreement serves as a wake-up call for a rapid transformation of the world’s energy system (UNFCCC 2015). The implementation exposes Europe and especially Emerging Powers to a challenge, which requires a globally coordinated solution. While climate and energy policy had been treated separately in the past, Paris irretrievably interlinked these topics. New forms of political cooperation at the climate & energy nexus between the EU and Emerging Powers such as Brazil, India, China or South Africa (BICS) are required. Yet, reality tells a different story: the EU’s energy and climate policy until now were carried out separately, the EU’s geographical focus in energy policy remains on adjacent countries in the European neighbourhood and on issues related to energy security. Despite being Strategic Partners and engaging in climate and energy dialogues, it seems that the EU is lacking strategic vision and is not perceived as a major actor in energy cooperation with the BICS. Thus, political momentum for energy cooperation and joint governance of scarce resources is vanishing. This paper gives evidence on the mutual perceptions of the EU and four Emerging Powers (Brazil, India, China and South Africa (BICS)). We aim to identify, understand and compare mutual perceptions the EU and the Emerging Powers have in energy policy. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Mich\u00e8le Knodt \/ Natalia Chaban<\/p>\n\n\n\n \n<\/jgu-base-buttonitem>\n\n<\/jgu-base-button><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The European Union (EU) takes pride in having promoted integration, peace and democracy among its member states. This European success story, as perceived by third states interacting with the EU, has a huge bearing on the Union\u2019s soft power and thus on the effectiveness of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The British decision to leave the EU however tarnishes this image and might stir fears and resistance, but also hopes. Nevertheless, thus far, neither the scholarly nor the public debate has paid sufficient attention to third countries\u2019 reactions to the Brexit. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Following a constructivist approach to Foreign Policy Analysis, our paper posits that the EU\u2019s leadership capacity is not only determined by the EU itself, but crucially depends on external actors\u2019 perceptions of the EU. Brexit is likely to have altered these perceptions and has thus restricted the range of motion for EU external action. This paper investigates the perception of Brexit and the \u201cnewEU-27\u201d among the present US administration of Donald Trump by analysing remarks of the president himself as well as commentaries commissioned by the Heritage Foundation, a think tank ideologically close to the President. It finds that Brexit is understood as a confirmation of a realistic worldview that prefers national sovereignty to cooperation and sees the EU as a competitor in a zero-sum game. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Johanna Speyer \/ Arne Niemann<\/p>\n\n\n\n \n<\/jgu-base-buttonitem>\n\n<\/jgu-base-button><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

With the interinstitutional agreement of June 2018 on key directives of the EU Winter Package, the outline of the 2030 framework of EU climate and energy policies is clearly set. This contribution presents an overview on the outcomes of the negotiations in the fields of governance, energy efficiency and renewable energies. We review the supporting negotiation documents and present a screening of stakeholder reactions to the new 2030 framework. Our review of stakeholder positions shows an overall acceptance of the outcomes, combined with deception at the level of ambition of the results and highlighting several flaws in the new framework. The found compromise relies strongly on Member States to fulfil the EU 2030 objectives. The EU level will increase its weight in coordinating national energy policies in an enhanced model of soft governance. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Mich\u00e8le Knodt, Marc Ringel<\/p>\n\n\n\n \n<\/jgu-base-buttonitem>\n\n<\/jgu-base-button><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The European Union (EU) aims to develop \u201cspecial relations\u201d with the eastern and southern neighbourhood of the enlarged EU. What exactly these privileged and special relations entail is still not clear, and the tailored Action Plans do little to clarify this point. Almost fourteen years after launching the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), it is time to take stock of the relations between the EU and its target countries. \u201cOne size fits all\u201d is old news. Focusing on the eastern dimension of the ENP, this paper examines Germany\u2019s internal media perception of individual EU relations with the \u201cnear\u201d neighbours of the Eastern Partnership (EaP). The key questions of this paper are the following: How are the relations between the EU and the eastern EaP countries, Belarus, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, framed and communicated by leading German press outlets and what do these frames and images mean for the EU\u2019s outlook towards the eastern neighbours? <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Katharina Kleinschnitger<\/p>\n\n\n\n \n<\/jgu-base-buttonitem>\n\n<\/jgu-base-button><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

While much research has analysed the creation of banking union and the ECB\u2019s assumption of bank supervisory responsibilities, less attention has been paid to the modalities of the ECB\u2019s accountability in this context. This paper provides an overview and explanation of the modalities for discharging accountability by the ECB for banking supervision which it fully assumed in November 2014. On this basis, it discusses the accountability framework and provides an overview from the perspective of the broad benchmark provided by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in its 2012 Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, also by considering the practices of other (central bank) supervisors as they are analysed in the IMF\u2019s Financial Sector Assessment Programmes (FSAP). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Demosthenes Ioannou, Cyril Max Neumann, Carina Stubenrauch<\/p>\n\n\n\n \n<\/jgu-base-buttonitem>\n\n<\/jgu-base-button><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In an influential article, Korpi and Palme (1998) challenge the view that targeting benefits at the poor is more redistributive. They explain their findings by pointing to the political feedback effects of welfare state programs on the broadness of political support for them. However, often it is argued that increasing globalization and post-industrialization has fundamentally altered the restrictions that welfare states face and that this has also changed the politics of welfare state expansion and retrenchment (Pierson 2001). Thus, the question arises whether Korpi and Palme\u2019s findings still hold in the age of globalization and austerity. I discuss recent attempts to test Korpi and Palme\u2019s theory and argue that they fall short of testing the central causal mechanisms proposed by them. I also provide some criteria for an adequate test of the theory. I find that the scant evidence we have points towards the continuing validity of the paradox of redistribution under conditions of global economic integration. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 J\u00fcrgen Unger-Sirsch<\/p>\n\n\n\n \n<\/jgu-base-buttonitem>\n\n<\/jgu-base-button><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

It seems reasonable to suppose that Brexit has influence on separatist movements in the EU, making the exit from the EU an actual possibility. This has an impact either on the national level like Italy, which threatens to leave the Eurozone or on sub-national level like Scotland, which threatens to leave the United Kingdom to remain in the EU. Obviously, the direction of the refusal differs in these examples: There is an urge to part from the EU and there is an urge to part from a nation state. The motivation for such behavior is often based on the (perceived) loss of independence. Therefore, it should be assumed that regions want to leave nation states as well as the EU. However, this assumption cannot be observed in studying press coverage or statements made by the respective politicians. There are regions like Scotland or Catalonia which want to leave their nation states but stay in or join the EU. Regarding the rejected loss of independence, this behavior seems irrational, as the gain of power of the separation from a nation state would be lost again when joining the EU. Therefore, analyzing the attitudes of the people in certain regions have towards their nation state and the EU seems a promising tool for further researching this anomaly. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Johannes Rabenschlag<\/p>\n\n\n\n \n<\/jgu-base-buttonitem>\n\n<\/jgu-base-button><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The UK decision to leave the EU poses a challenge to European integration theory at the supranational end of the spectrum. This process of horizontal disintegration by popular vote constitutes a particularly hard case for neofunctionalism, which has assumed a forward-moving integration project based on a “permissive consensus” among European citizens. Unsurprisingly, neofunctionalism has been dubbed “outdated” in view of the British membership referendum. In this paper \u2013 which examines the degree to which neofunctionalism may explain the Brexit process and referendum outcome \u2013 we argue that the theory still significantly adds to our understanding because (1) neofunctionalism may be able to theorise disintegration, to some extent, by tackling the issue of politicisation; (b) neofunctional dynamics, although overridden by other factors, were, and continue to be, present here; (c) neofunctionalism is a dynamic\/transformative theory: a specification of the conditions of spillover can usefully delimit its scope of application \u2013 an exercise to which this paper seeks to contribute. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Arne Niemann, Geoffrey Edwards and Pia Jakobi<\/p>\n\n\n\n \n<\/jgu-base-buttonitem>\n\n<\/jgu-base-button><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The increasing contestation of the liberal international order presents a daunting challenge both to practitioners and academics, within all sub-fields of political science and beyond. In these debates, backlash has become a new buzzword. Yet, its definition remains contested, which not only hampers the concept\u2019s analytical power, but limits our understanding of the respective resistances, taking place on a national as well as international stage. Recently, Karen Alter and Michael Z\u00fcrn have addressed this shortcoming. They define backlash as resistance against policies comprising (1) a retrograde objective, (2) extraordinary goals and tactics and (3) a threshold condition of entering mainstream public discourse. Yet, the concept of backlash arrived at thus proves hardly distinguishable from known concepts of resistance, particularly norm contestation. Based on a cross-disciplinary review of both the variegated use of the term backlash in colloquial and scientific language and established theoretical approaches to resistance in international relations, I develop a conceptualisation of backlash which highlights its specificities: backlash is an in-group resistance against institutions and their fundamental norms. This innovative understanding of backlash, based on institutionalist theory and constructivist norms research, opens up new angles for understanding the phenomenon, particularly its causes. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Johanna Speyer<\/p>\n\n\n\n \n<\/jgu-base-buttonitem>\n\n<\/jgu-base-button><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Within the European Union (EU) and its member states, hydrogen as an energy carrier is assumed to be of key importance for decarbonising different sectors in the fight against climate change. Hence, state and private actors in Europe have engaged in a variety of attempts, strategies and policies, specifically after the EU has announced a specific hydrogen strategy recently. Against this backdrop, this paper seeks to provide an analysis on the debates generated by Europe\u00b4s bet on hydrogen, focusing specifically on the years 2019-2021. Drawing on a discourse analysis that is based on more than 32 000 media reports generated through the database Nexis for the discourse in Europe, it analyses the debates on hydrogen in the European Union from various perspectives and with a focus on a wide range of actors. The paper will specifically examine the debates emerging from the release of the EU hydrogen strategy. Building on a broad set of indicators, it puts an emphasis on discourses on the organisation, application, and opportunities of hydrogen as assigned by private and state actors and engages with debates legislation processes and strategic cooperation in the EU. It thus engages with the discourse on hydrogen in a complex environment with diverging interests of stakeholders, and thus examines debates that still need further empirical research. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Friedrich Plank, Johannes Muntschick, Mich\u00e8le Knodt, Arne Niemann<\/p>\n\n\n\n \n<\/jgu-base-buttonitem>\n\n<\/jgu-base-button><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The climate crisis and the fight against it is one of the most complex challenges humanity faces rightnow. In situations like this, theory and empirical research on international governance has highlightedthe vital importance of leadership to promote action and cooperation. A closer look at theoretic andempirical contributions in the field, however, reveals massive research gaps that seriously hamper ourunderstanding of climate leadership. This paper contributes to closing many of the gaps found. Studyingexemplary leadership in the implementation phase of the Paris Agreement, we use qualitative contentanalysis and a thorough conceptualization of an \u201cideal\u201d climate strategy to analyse and compare currentclimate strategies of the three major emitters and leadership candidates: the European Union, theUnited States and China. Our analysis unsurprisingly finds the EU the most ambitious actor and potentialexemplary leader among the three, but also reveals that China\u2019s strategy is in various aspects more farreaching than its US counterpart. In addition, our conceptualization of climate leadership and ouranalysis provide policy recommendations for improving real-life climate strategies. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Svenja Budde, Arne Niemann<\/p>\n\n\n\n \n<\/jgu-base-buttonitem>\n\n<\/jgu-base-button><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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This paper explores the potential of socio-pedagogical fan work to foster social cohesion across Europe through international exchange. Drawing on the success of German fan projects based on the National Concept for Sport and Security (NKSS), we propose a policy framework to establish similar structures and standards across Europe. German fan projects, which operate independently of football clubs, engage young fans in activities that address social issues, prevent violence, and promote an inclusive fan culture. The proposed framework includes highlighting the importance of socio-pedagogical fan work, promoting best practices from Germany, supporting country-specific adaptations, establishing formal networks for European fan projects, and increasing financial support and recognition. Implementing these strategies can enhance international fan networking, foster a shared European identity, and strengthen social cohesion. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Tobias Finger, Vincent Reinke, Jonas Biel, Arne Niemann<\/p>\n\n\n\n \n<\/jgu-base-buttonitem>\n\n<\/jgu-base-button><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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This policy paper explores the increasing alienation of football fans due to the commercialisation of European club football and their exclusion from decision-making processes. It shows research based on surveys and expert interviews across Germany, Spain, Poland, and Norway and reveals growing fan discontent which threatens football\u2019s potential to foster social cohesion and community identification. The paper argues for enhanced fan participation in governance through institutionalized consultation, legal reforms, and support for fan engagement initiatives. It proposes specific measures that aim to counteract fan alienation, maintain football\u2019s social relevance, and strengthen European identity and cohesion through the sport. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Tobias Finger, Vincent Reinke, Jonas Biel, Arne Niemann<\/p>\n\n\n\n \n<\/jgu-base-buttonitem>\n\n<\/jgu-base-button><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Qualitative research in political science and international relations increasingly adapts various methods to analyse politics, policies, and polities. With complex dynamics and environments specific to these analyses, scholars face severe data challenges. Against this background, we provide insights into systematically collecting additional evidence through the analysis of large amounts of media bulletins e.g. through the Nexis database and examination of standardized and thus comparable documents such as country reports. These tools might be able to inspire triangulative approaches to political science analyses and allow for the collection of micro-level data in contexts of limited data availability, while providing systematic and replicable access. We argue that specifically qualitatively inspired research efforts benefit from these reports. This paper provides detailed instruction for collecting data with these tools, analyses best-practices, and outlines possibilities to systematically examine very large amounts of reports. Moreover, by engaging with examples of studies that have made use of these tools, we reflect on possibilities and challenges for the acquisition and evaluation of reports. This study thus provides fruitful information for scholars struggling with limited data access in complex research environments and facilitates the systematic and replicable evaluation of huge and comprehensive data in a viable and precise manner. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Friedrich Plank, Ingo Henneberg<\/p>\n\n\n\n \n<\/jgu-base-buttonitem>\n\n<\/jgu-base-button><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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The Mainz Papers on International and European Politics (MPIEP) are based on current projects of the International Relations Unit and contributions of visiting researchers at the Department of Political Science at the University of Mainz. MPIEP constitute work in progress and are generally intended for submission to reviewed journals at a later stage. To make … Continued<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2297,"featured_media":0,"parent":12247,"menu_order":1,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-12388","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"content_raw":"\n

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The Mainz Papers on International and European Politics (MPIEP) are based on current projects of the International Relations Unit and contributions of visiting researchers at the Department of Political Science at the University of Mainz. MPIEP constitute work in progress and are generally intended for submission to reviewed journals at a later stage. To make their production as quick and easy as possible, they are only available online. Authors keep the copyright of their paper. Papers are available in PDF format. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Editorial Board<\/strong>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Prof. Arne Niemann<\/a>Dr. Friedrich Plank<\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This paper analyses the extent of European Union (EU) actorness and effectiveness at the fifteenth United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP) meeting in Copenhagen in December 2009. For over a decade the European Union has been characterised as a leader in international climate policy-making and as an important actor in international climate change negotiations. The COP15 meeting in Copenhagen has overall brought about disappointing outcomes, especially from the perspective of the European Union. This casts doubts on EU leadership and begs the question of what has happened to EU actorness and effectiveness in this field. In terms of actorness we take Jupille and Caporaso (1998) as a point of departure and then specify a more parsimonious actorness framework that consists of cohesion and autonomy. Effectiveness (i.e. goal attainment) is seen as conceptually separate from actorness. Effectiveness is conceptualised as the result of actorness conditioned by the \u2018opportunity structure\u2019, i.e. the external context (of other actors, events and ideas) that enables or constrains EU actions. We hold that the EU\u2019s actorness has been only moderate, especially given somewhat limited preference cohesion. In terms of the opportunity structure in Copenhagen we argue that the high degree of politicisation constrained the EU\u2019s ability to negotiate and thus to attain its goals. Another external factor that had a substantial adverse impact on the EU\u2019s effectiveness at the Copenhagen negotiations was the strong involvement of other actors with rather different positions, namely the United States (US) and the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 2012 Lisanne Groen and Arne Niemann<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This paper proposes an innovative theoretical approach to the analysis of regionalism by taking the impact of extra-regional relations and the influence of external actors explicitly into account. The major motivation for this research stems from the observation of a new wave of regionalism that emerged after the end of the Cold War parallel to increasing globalisation. In contrast to expectations of mainstream integration theories, many of these recent regional integration organisations comprise less developed countries and are located in the Southern Hemisphere despite allegedly unfavourable preconditions. While regionalisms in the South have nevertheless come into existence and exhibit various degrees of success, there is evidence that institutionalised regional cooperation projects in southern regions seem to be comparatively unstable and not always entirely under control of regional actors. Against the background of this puzzling observation, this paper proposes a theoretical framework that attends to this phenomenon and aims to answer the following questions: What explains the emergence, dynamics and effectiveness of regionalism in these regions? If regional circumstances remain constant, do extra-regional relations and external actors have a decisive impact in this respect? While the European integration process has been well scrutinised, systematic and theory-driven research on regionalism outside Europe is still widely missing. By applying cooperation theory and a situation-structural approach to analyse and explain regional integration, the author argues that prevalent patterns of strong and asymmetric interdependence between regional and extra-regional actors may impact the structure of genuine regional problematic situations and put external actors in a position to (in-)directly influence the likeliness and progress of institutionalised regional cooperation. Since strong and asymmetric relations generally prevail between the developed North and the less developed South, regionalisms in the latter regions are likely to be more exposed to external influence. Central assumptions and hypotheses deduced from this theoretical model will be elucidated by brief plausibility probes on empirical examples from the Southern African Development Community (SADC). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Johannes Muntschick 2012<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This paper examines the extent to which the EU constitutes a normative power in its relation to the United States in the policy field of counter-terrorism. Normative power is analysed along three dimensions: normative intent (the genuineness of EU normative commitment), normative process (the extent to which an inclusive and reflexive foreign policy is pursued), and normative impact (the development of norms in the third country, in our case study the US). Our empirical analysis focuses on the promotion by the EU of three fundamental rights in the policy-area of counter-terrorism: the prohibition of inhuman treatment of detainees suspected of acts of terrorism, the right to a fair trial for these detainees, and the right to respect for private life and data protection of citizens whose personal data are being processed for counter-terrorism purposes. The findings of this study suggest an only moderate record concerning EU normative power in its relation with the US. For example, our analysis indicates that the EU \u2013 in its promotion of the norm of prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment \u2013 to some extent applied double standards in terms of what it expected from the US and what it expected from its own Member States. Furthermore, the study suggest that while in theory there have been substantive normative changes in the US towards the three norms promoted by the EU in the policy-field of counter-terrorism, these changes have so far only to a limited extent been implemented in practice. The picture arises of strong normative impact on paper but little normative impact in practice. Finally, we hold that side by side with the EU, the Council of Europe acts as a normative power vis-\u00e0-vis the US. The influence of the Council of Europe on the normative basis of the EU and on EU normativity vis-\u00e0-vis third states has so far been underexplored in normative power theory. This study illustrates that the Council of Europe has acted as a driving force behind the EU\u2019s commitment to promote the above norms. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Martha Groothuis and Arne Niemann 2012<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The paper assesses the rise of the \u201cglobal South\u201d for its implications regarding U.S. world political hegemony. As the rise of \u201cBRIC power\u201d is more often than not portrayed as intimately tied to a new wave of decline of U.S. hegemony, or at least as a contestation to the formative role of the United States in global politics, it tries to assess the validity of such claims by looking at current developments in Latin America. This regional focus has several merits. First, it specifies a \u201ctarget region\u201d of political strategies allowing for a more differentiated account of how gradually shifting power patterns or potentials indeed translate<\/em> into political consequences \u201con the ground.\u201d Second, shifting patterns of regional<\/em> hegemony might also be indicative of global power shifts. Third, Latin America as a region in itself<\/em> is interesting for our purposes. On the one hand, it is seen as the \u201ctraditional backyard\u201d of the regional hegemon, the U.S.. On the other hand, the region is home to one of the BRIC-states, namely Brazil, which is increasingly being discussed as a regional powerhouse with not only the potential to act as such but also the aspirations to do so. Last but not least, Latin America has recently been deemed of heightened strategic importance by another BRIC-country situated outside the region, namely China. In that sense, if the ascendancy of the BRICs is to be interpreted as the rise of contenders to U.S. hegemony, developments in Latin America should give us a grasp on the emerging form of contestation. In the paper, the activities within the Latin American region on behalf of the U.S., China and Brazil, respectively, are therefore comparatively assessed. Our analysis is structured around four dimensions of power: military, economic, institutional and soft power, which in combination might lead to a more substantiated account of any hegemonic rivalry. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Alexander Brand, Susan McEwen-Fial, Wolfgang Muno and Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann 2012<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The paper focuses on the under-researched role of the European Union as a mediator in peace negotiations. It is explorative and mainly conceptual. We develop an analytical framework for investigating the European Union\u2019s mediator effectiveness. To probe its empirical plausibility, we apply it to the case of EU mediation between Serbia and Kosovo (Belgrade-Pristina dialogue). Since the beginning of the 2000s the European Union has been increasingly involved in directly supporting peace negotiations in inter- and intra-state conflict by taking on the role of a third-party mediator. Despite an increasing interest in the EU\u2019s engagement in international mediation by policy-analysts and practitioners, both EU foreign and security policy scholars and students of conflict resolution have been rather reluctant to pay much attention to the role the EU plays in mediation and peace process support. To fill this research gap at least to a certain extent, the paper seeks to answer the following research questions: How can EU mediator effectiveness be appropriately conceptualised? And what factors influence EU mediator effectiveness? Mediator effectiveness is analysed along two dimensions: 1) goal-attainment and 2) conflict settlement. Building on concepts and empirical findings of both European external policy studies and international mediation literature, our investigation of the conditions of mediator effectiveness is structured around four key variables: mediator leverage, mediation strategy, coherence and the conflict context. In our preliminary empirical analysis of the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, we find that the EU has been partially successful in terms of conflict settlement and in attaining its narrowly defined goal in finding a settlement for Northern Kosovo, and only moderately effective in achieving its long-term goals with respect to the mediation effort, which refer to the improvement of living conditions in Kosovo and the normalisation of bilateral relations between Kosovo and Serbia. Our investigation of conditions of EU mediator effectiveness indicates that the EU\u2019s success in mediating a number of agreements between Kosovo and Serbia can be explained by its great leverage vis-\u00e0-vis the conflict parties due to their EU membership aspirations and its interventionist mediation strategy. In addition, external support by third parties and the right timing of the mediation initiative have been conducive to EU success. However, the EU also faces a main dilemma: while a manipulative mediation style might be appropriate to achieve short-term agreements, it is not an adequate strategy to foster mutual confidence and trust between the conflict parties which explains the Union\u2019s relative ineffectiveness in attaining its long-term goals. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Julian Bergmann and Arne Niemann 2013<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the academic literature it has become common-place to assume that migration is treated as a security issue in the EU, and that EU migration policy has become \u201csecuritised\u201d. However, countervailing tendencies exist: some observers have recently recognised a certain liberal turn in EU migration policy, and securitisation is sometimes applied in the academic literature rather loosely, i.e. to phenomena and developments that may rather follow a different logic, the logic of risk. The paper develops an operationalisation for distinguishing between the two logics empirically. Subsequently we probe the logic of security\/securitisation and the logic of risk empirically through a qualitative content analysis of EU documents on (irregular) migration. Our findings suggest that, while there is evidence for both concepts, the risk logic has dominated the EU discourse in this field in recent years. In addition, it seems that different types of migrants are treated according to different logics in the EU documentation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Natalie Schmidth\u00e4ussler and Arne Niemann<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Recent macro-level research argues that economic globalisation negatively affects electoral turnout by constraining the leeway of national governments and thereby rendering elections less meaningful to voters. This article analyses the link between perceptions of the national government\u2019s room to manoeuvre and voter turnout on the individual level. Drawing on the 2001 British General Election, it is shown that citizens who believe that economic globalization leaves the national government with less influence on the economy are less likely to report to have voted. Further findings also support the proposed theoretical model according to which room to manoeuvre perceptions affect turnout via views on the importance of elections and matter specifically for citizens that tend towards the left side of the left-right scale. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Nils D. Steiner<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This study compares the US and EU security strategies of the first decade of the 21st century. Our paper focuses on whether the security strategies of both entities are converging or diverging. We argue that the literature has so far failed to compare US and EU security strategies across time, a gap that we seek to close. The paper applies a qualitative-explorative design. Our empirical (discourse and content) analysis is conducted with the data analysis software Atlas.ti. The main finding of our paper is that the US and EU security strategies are very similar in terms of overall objectives, values and declared threats. When it comes to approaching these threats, one still notices substantial differences. Overall, we conclude that the two security strategies have been converging over time. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Julia Klohs and Arne Niemann<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The legal documents drafted in April 2013 to enable the EU\u2019s accession to the European Charter of Human Rights represented a further confirmation of the unprecedented victory of democracy and human rights in Europe. However, with the outbreak and evolution of the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, the victory of democracy and human rights in Europe is less straightforward. The conflict highlights the clash over the understanding of human rights between the two major political powers on the European continent \u2013 the EU and Russia. This article complements quantitative data on human rights violations with qualitative discourse analysis of human rights frames. The highly contentious case of the Russian-speaking minority in Latvia is selected as a test case. Presented analysis shows that the Russian-speaking minority in Latvia is lost in translation \u2013 caught between the Latvian notion of non-citizens as a legally justified statelessness and the Russian notion of compatriots, victims of aggressive Western expansion. Neither the Latvian nor the Russian official discourse has recognized the Russian-speaking minority as an autonomous entity; rather for both the minority issue is instrumentalized for domestic and foreign policy reasons - identity is instrumentalized and securitized. The EU, whose hands are tied, is largely absent. The relationship between the actors is polarized and antagonistic, and as the situation of Ukraine shows, has further potential for violence. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Petra Guasti and Arne Niemann<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

China and the European Union are the world\u2019s largest importers of natural resources, which make both of them highly dependent on other countries. Both are, hence, greatly challenged on the issue of energy and closely interlinked also on climate change, both areas which will demand changes in energy production, consumption patterns etc. These challenges could lead to competition between the two actors in the request for resources. At the same time, such a common situation could entail great potential for a closer cooperation. However despite the latest summit between the two partners, little indicates for such closer cooperation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, the aim of this paper is to understand which mutual perceptions the EU and China have in energy policy. How does the external energy governance of the EU and China function? Which mutual perceptions do both sides hold and which controversies exist? <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Mich\u00e8le Knodt, Nadine Piefer, Suet-Yi Lai<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this article, we suggest a novel conceptual framework for understanding and analyzing EU politicisation. Recent studies on EU politicisation argue that the post-Maastricht era led to the politicisation of EU integration via an increasing citizens\u2019 dissatisfaction. Until then, politics had played only a minor role. Contrary to this account, we argue that European integration has been from the beginning a political process, but an unusual one. To capture its uniqueness we introduce the concepts of politisation as a precondition of politicization and of politification as a depoliticised modality of politicisation. Politicisation is then not something new to EU integration but rather it is constitutive of EU integration itself. We further argue that understanding politicisation requires taking a closer look at its relationship to \u201cpolitics\u201d or \u201cpolitical\u201d, as it is essential to spell out the respective understanding of this key concept \u2013 Grundbegriff in Reinhart Koselleck\u2019s sense. The interpretation of what is considered as politicisation depends on the interpretation of what is politics\/political. We argue in favour of rethinking the concept of politics and its relationship to politicisation in terms that avoid spatial and functional metaphors. To capture the power dynamics involved in European integration, we aim at an understanding of EU politicisation that is at once more historical and based on an actor-oriented perspective on the political. On this basis we discuss the main conceptual weaknesses of studies on EU politicization and conclude by developing some points of our alternative conception. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9Niilo Kauppi, Kari Palonen, Claudia Wiesner<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

With the \"Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities\" adopted in 2009, the EU aims to further develop its capabilities in the field of peace mediation, building also on various mediation experiences made by EU institutions and actors in different conflict regions. Yet, the academic literature has not paid much attention to the EU\u2019s involvement in mediation or mediation support activities. To develop a better theoretical and empirical understanding of EU peace mediation, the Unit of International Politics of the Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz organized a workshop on \"The EU as Actor in International Mediation - Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives\" which took place in November 2015 in Mainz. The working paper discusses this project in the light of the current research literature and reflects on the results of the presentations and discussions of the workshop. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Julian Bergmann, Friedrich Plank, Arne Niemann<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The working paper addresses the significance, reality and boundaries of solidarity in the European multi-level system. It analyses the requirements for solidarity and the role that solidarity plays in European multi-level governance. We present an effort to conceptualize solidarity in the European multi-level system and to develop a typology of different forms of solidarity. The working paper focuses on the type of intergovernmental solidarity between member states and explores possible boundaries for solidary acts. We illustrate our theoretical and conceptual considerations with insights from two different EU policy fields: energy and migration policy. Both policy fields are characterized by a fundamental lack of solidary actions and thus give some indications for possible boundaries of European solidarity. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

@ Mich\u00e8le Knodt, Anne Tews<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The new governance mechanisms of the European energy policy proposed by the European Commission in its \u201cWinter Package\u201d will contribute to a redefinition of the European energy and climate governance. This contribution reviews the proposal, its supporting documents and overall stakeholder positions along the criteria of governance efficiency, effectiveness and acceptance in order to assess its ability to support the European energy and climate goals. We find that the proposed governance sums up to a densely-meshed coordination of policies between the European level and Member States. Compared to the present governance, the enhanced mechanism can draw on significant synergies and reduce administrative costs. Our review of stakeholder positions shows a solid acceptance for enhanced coordination. Nonetheless our review identifies some potential flaws in terms of governance effectiveness: With unspecific or not further nationally attributed targets for 2030, the underlying governance structure can get blurred easily. Second, the proposal foresees in some cases direct corrective action of the European level, in the case Member States lag ambition. This surpasses the method of open coordination or could be seen as a case of \u201charder\u201d soft governance which at the same time conflicts with article 194(2) TFEU (right of Member States to determine their national energy mix). Finally, the local level is left out. The proposal misses to link to on-going local actions like the Sustainable Energy and Climate Action Plans (SECPs) to the overall governance structure. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Mich\u00e8le Knodt, Marc Ringel<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The paper explores factors behind the critique of the UK as being perfidious and awkward. It examines Britain\u2019s core beliefs of being a global rather than merely a European power, of having a special relationship with the United States, of being internationalist in terms of trade and, somewhat paradoxically, of taking pride in being pragmatic. These beliefs have led to the rejection of blueprints for integration and a preference for bilateral cooperation rather than multilateral relationships. Post-BREXIT Britain will be confronted with potential dilemmas if the Franco-German tandem leads to closer cooperation on security and defence within the European Union and in cooperation with NATO, especially given an unpredictable United States under President Trump. These dilemmas and Britain\u2019s preoccupation with the consequences of BREXIT suggest that it will have minimal influence on Europe\u2019s future. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Geoffrey Edwards<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Almost three years after the Euromaidan protests in 2013-2014, the circumstances in East Ukraine seem to be burdened by a frozen conflict. Russia is still holding on to the story that the annexation of Crimea was a \u201cfree referendum\u201d of Ukrainian people expressing their desire to belong territorially to Russia. Unsolved conflicts and the future architecture of relations between Russia, Ukraine and the EU need to be redefined and remain a key strategic challenge for the EU. \u201cA consistent and united approach must remain the cornerstone of EU policy towards Russia\u201d (EEAS 2016). As suggested by the EU Global Strategy, to develop a dialogue-led, two-way interaction between equal partners is recognised as promising and, on the other hand, strenuous. The elites within the EU as well as the media should perceive the deficits in their own behaviour and develop new strategies on the ground. This paper presents a media perception study. The central question of this research is how Ukraine and the EU are perceived in Russian media. Three leading Russian newspapers (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Kommersant, Komsomolskaya Pravda) have been selected to analyse the Russian media perception. The study coded over 500 articles that were published in May, September and October 2015. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Asalkhon Shukurova<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The UEFA Champions League (CL) has arguably evoked much attention, fascination as well as criticism over the years. While it quickly developed into a commercial success story and a brand name which seemed to draw financially well-endowed sponsors all too easily, it has also increasingly been criticised for its changes in format, its focus on nurturing elite clubs at the expense of grassroots football as well as already having reached some point of saturation and over-exposition towards likely spectators, fans and consumers. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Beneath this discussion of the likely sporting and commercial dynamics around the UEFA Champions League, there has always been some interest in this continent-wide competition as an engine, which supposedly makes Europe hang together more closely. In this regard, the very idea that millions of Europeans watch games \u2013 not only of their beloved clubs, not only of their respective national sides, as research and data suggest \u2013 has fascinated and inspired political and scholarly comment. Elaborating on narratives establishing, and counter-narratives undermining such positive perceptions of the CL, we aim at uncovering the potential of top-level club football competition to function as a political myth. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

If it is true that Champions League finals are more prominent in the minds of Europeans than constitutional patriotism towards the EU Treaties, such unconscious identity work through lifeworldly activities becomes politically relevant. It may reach the stage of a political myth when actors refer to such presumed CL-effects on Europeanised mind-sets and deliberately enhance their importance. In doing so, they may either seek to push a European agenda or to legitimise commercial interests with reference to \"the European idea\". Wittingly or not, however, they contribute to the very narrative of the Champions League as a generator of European(ised) mind sets. Countervailing forces which are to undermine this very political myth of the CL include, e.g., the growing criticism of (over-)commercialised football or the League\u2019s presumed negative effects on the integrity of \"true football\". <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Against the idea of an ongoing Europeanisation of football, most recent data on football fandom throughout Europe and our own emerging research into identity effects of football fandom, we discuss the role of the UEFA Champions League as a generator of Europeanised experiences, frameworks and communities in this paper. In doing so, we are specifically interested in ascertaining whether there is a politically relevant identity-formation under way due to increased awareness of, exposure to and familiarity with European-level competition of top football Clubs. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Alexander Brand \/ Arne Niemann<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Paris has written history. The initiation of an internationally binding climate agreement serves as a wake-up call for a rapid transformation of the world's energy system (UNFCCC 2015). The implementation exposes Europe and especially Emerging Powers to a challenge, which requires a globally coordinated solution. While climate and energy policy had been treated separately in the past, Paris irretrievably interlinked these topics. New forms of political cooperation at the climate & energy nexus between the EU and Emerging Powers such as Brazil, India, China or South Africa (BICS) are required. Yet, reality tells a different story: the EU's energy and climate policy until now were carried out separately, the EU's geographical focus in energy policy remains on adjacent countries in the European neighbourhood and on issues related to energy security. Despite being Strategic Partners and engaging in climate and energy dialogues, it seems that the EU is lacking strategic vision and is not perceived as a major actor in energy cooperation with the BICS. Thus, political momentum for energy cooperation and joint governance of scarce resources is vanishing. This paper gives evidence on the mutual perceptions of the EU and four Emerging Powers (Brazil, India, China and South Africa (BICS)). We aim to identify, understand and compare mutual perceptions the EU and the Emerging Powers have in energy policy. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Mich\u00e8le Knodt \/ Natalia Chaban<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The European Union (EU) takes pride in having promoted integration, peace and democracy among its member states. This European success story, as perceived by third states interacting with the EU, has a huge bearing on the Union\u2019s soft power and thus on the effectiveness of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The British decision to leave the EU however tarnishes this image and might stir fears and resistance, but also hopes. Nevertheless, thus far, neither the scholarly nor the public debate has paid sufficient attention to third countries\u2019 reactions to the Brexit. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Following a constructivist approach to Foreign Policy Analysis, our paper posits that the EU\u2019s leadership capacity is not only determined by the EU itself, but crucially depends on external actors\u2019 perceptions of the EU. Brexit is likely to have altered these perceptions and has thus restricted the range of motion for EU external action. This paper investigates the perception of Brexit and the \u201cnewEU-27\u201d among the present US administration of Donald Trump by analysing remarks of the president himself as well as commentaries commissioned by the Heritage Foundation, a think tank ideologically close to the President. It finds that Brexit is understood as a confirmation of a realistic worldview that prefers national sovereignty to cooperation and sees the EU as a competitor in a zero-sum game. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Johanna Speyer \/ Arne Niemann<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

With the interinstitutional agreement of June 2018 on key directives of the EU Winter Package, the outline of the 2030 framework of EU climate and energy policies is clearly set. This contribution presents an overview on the outcomes of the negotiations in the fields of governance, energy efficiency and renewable energies. We review the supporting negotiation documents and present a screening of stakeholder reactions to the new 2030 framework. Our review of stakeholder positions shows an overall acceptance of the outcomes, combined with deception at the level of ambition of the results and highlighting several flaws in the new framework. The found compromise relies strongly on Member States to fulfil the EU 2030 objectives. The EU level will increase its weight in coordinating national energy policies in an enhanced model of soft governance. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Mich\u00e8le Knodt, Marc Ringel<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The European Union (EU) aims to develop \u201cspecial relations\u201d with the eastern and southern neighbourhood of the enlarged EU. What exactly these privileged and special relations entail is still not clear, and the tailored Action Plans do little to clarify this point. Almost fourteen years after launching the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), it is time to take stock of the relations between the EU and its target countries. \u201cOne size fits all\u201d is old news. Focusing on the eastern dimension of the ENP, this paper examines Germany\u2019s internal media perception of individual EU relations with the \u201cnear\u201d neighbours of the Eastern Partnership (EaP). The key questions of this paper are the following: How are the relations between the EU and the eastern EaP countries, Belarus, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, framed and communicated by leading German press outlets and what do these frames and images mean for the EU\u2019s outlook towards the eastern neighbours? <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Katharina Kleinschnitger<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

While much research has analysed the creation of banking union and the ECB\u2019s assumption of bank supervisory responsibilities, less attention has been paid to the modalities of the ECB\u2019s accountability in this context. This paper provides an overview and explanation of the modalities for discharging accountability by the ECB for banking supervision which it fully assumed in November 2014. On this basis, it discusses the accountability framework and provides an overview from the perspective of the broad benchmark provided by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in its 2012 Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, also by considering the practices of other (central bank) supervisors as they are analysed in the IMF\u2019s Financial Sector Assessment Programmes (FSAP). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Demosthenes Ioannou, Cyril Max Neumann, Carina Stubenrauch<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In an influential article, Korpi and Palme (1998) challenge the view that targeting benefits at the poor is more redistributive. They explain their findings by pointing to the political feedback effects of welfare state programs on the broadness of political support for them. However, often it is argued that increasing globalization and post-industrialization has fundamentally altered the restrictions that welfare states face and that this has also changed the politics of welfare state expansion and retrenchment (Pierson 2001). Thus, the question arises whether Korpi and Palme\u2019s findings still hold in the age of globalization and austerity. I discuss recent attempts to test Korpi and Palme\u2019s theory and argue that they fall short of testing the central causal mechanisms proposed by them. I also provide some criteria for an adequate test of the theory. I find that the scant evidence we have points towards the continuing validity of the paradox of redistribution under conditions of global economic integration. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 J\u00fcrgen Unger-Sirsch<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

It seems reasonable to suppose that Brexit has influence on separatist movements in the EU, making the exit from the EU an actual possibility. This has an impact either on the national level like Italy, which threatens to leave the Eurozone or on sub-national level like Scotland, which threatens to leave the United Kingdom to remain in the EU. Obviously, the direction of the refusal differs in these examples: There is an urge to part from the EU and there is an urge to part from a nation state. The motivation for such behavior is often based on the (perceived) loss of independence. Therefore, it should be assumed that regions want to leave nation states as well as the EU. However, this assumption cannot be observed in studying press coverage or statements made by the respective politicians. There are regions like Scotland or Catalonia which want to leave their nation states but stay in or join the EU. Regarding the rejected loss of independence, this behavior seems irrational, as the gain of power of the separation from a nation state would be lost again when joining the EU. Therefore, analyzing the attitudes of the people in certain regions have towards their nation state and the EU seems a promising tool for further researching this anomaly. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Johannes Rabenschlag<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The UK decision to leave the EU poses a challenge to European integration theory at the supranational end of the spectrum. This process of horizontal disintegration by popular vote constitutes a particularly hard case for neofunctionalism, which has assumed a forward-moving integration project based on a \"permissive consensus\" among European citizens. Unsurprisingly, neofunctionalism has been dubbed \"outdated\" in view of the British membership referendum. In this paper \u2013 which examines the degree to which neofunctionalism may explain the Brexit process and referendum outcome \u2013 we argue that the theory still significantly adds to our understanding because (1) neofunctionalism may be able to theorise disintegration, to some extent, by tackling the issue of politicisation; (b) neofunctional dynamics, although overridden by other factors, were, and continue to be, present here; (c) neofunctionalism is a dynamic\/transformative theory: a specification of the conditions of spillover can usefully delimit its scope of application \u2013 an exercise to which this paper seeks to contribute. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Arne Niemann, Geoffrey Edwards and Pia Jakobi<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The increasing contestation of the liberal international order presents a daunting challenge both to practitioners and academics, within all sub-fields of political science and beyond. In these debates, backlash has become a new buzzword. Yet, its definition remains contested, which not only hampers the concept\u2019s analytical power, but limits our understanding of the respective resistances, taking place on a national as well as international stage. Recently, Karen Alter and Michael Z\u00fcrn have addressed this shortcoming. They define backlash as resistance against policies comprising (1) a retrograde objective, (2) extraordinary goals and tactics and (3) a threshold condition of entering mainstream public discourse. Yet, the concept of backlash arrived at thus proves hardly distinguishable from known concepts of resistance, particularly norm contestation. Based on a cross-disciplinary review of both the variegated use of the term backlash in colloquial and scientific language and established theoretical approaches to resistance in international relations, I develop a conceptualisation of backlash which highlights its specificities: backlash is an in-group resistance against institutions and their fundamental norms. This innovative understanding of backlash, based on institutionalist theory and constructivist norms research, opens up new angles for understanding the phenomenon, particularly its causes. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Johanna Speyer<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Within the European Union (EU) and its member states, hydrogen as an energy carrier is assumed to be of key importance for decarbonising different sectors in the fight against climate change. Hence, state and private actors in Europe have engaged in a variety of attempts, strategies and policies, specifically after the EU has announced a specific hydrogen strategy recently. Against this backdrop, this paper seeks to provide an analysis on the debates generated by Europe\u00b4s bet on hydrogen, focusing specifically on the years 2019-2021. Drawing on a discourse analysis that is based on more than 32 000 media reports generated through the database Nexis for the discourse in Europe, it analyses the debates on hydrogen in the European Union from various perspectives and with a focus on a wide range of actors. The paper will specifically examine the debates emerging from the release of the EU hydrogen strategy. Building on a broad set of indicators, it puts an emphasis on discourses on the organisation, application, and opportunities of hydrogen as assigned by private and state actors and engages with debates legislation processes and strategic cooperation in the EU. It thus engages with the discourse on hydrogen in a complex environment with diverging interests of stakeholders, and thus examines debates that still need further empirical research. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Friedrich Plank, Johannes Muntschick, Mich\u00e8le Knodt, Arne Niemann<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The climate crisis and the fight against it is one of the most complex challenges humanity faces rightnow. In situations like this, theory and empirical research on international governance has highlightedthe vital importance of leadership to promote action and cooperation. A closer look at theoretic andempirical contributions in the field, however, reveals massive research gaps that seriously hamper ourunderstanding of climate leadership. This paper contributes to closing many of the gaps found. Studyingexemplary leadership in the implementation phase of the Paris Agreement, we use qualitative contentanalysis and a thorough conceptualization of an \u201cideal\u201d climate strategy to analyse and compare currentclimate strategies of the three major emitters and leadership candidates: the European Union, theUnited States and China. Our analysis unsurprisingly finds the EU the most ambitious actor and potentialexemplary leader among the three, but also reveals that China\u2019s strategy is in various aspects more farreaching than its US counterpart. In addition, our conceptualization of climate leadership and ouranalysis provide policy recommendations for improving real-life climate strategies. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Svenja Budde, Arne Niemann<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This paper explores the potential of socio-pedagogical fan work to foster social cohesion across Europe through international exchange. Drawing on the success of German fan projects based on the National Concept for Sport and Security (NKSS), we propose a policy framework to establish similar structures and standards across Europe. German fan projects, which operate independently of football clubs, engage young fans in activities that address social issues, prevent violence, and promote an inclusive fan culture. The proposed framework includes highlighting the importance of socio-pedagogical fan work, promoting best practices from Germany, supporting country-specific adaptations, establishing formal networks for European fan projects, and increasing financial support and recognition. Implementing these strategies can enhance international fan networking, foster a shared European identity, and strengthen social cohesion. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Tobias Finger, Vincent Reinke, Jonas Biel, Arne Niemann<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This policy paper explores the increasing alienation of football fans due to the commercialisation of European club football and their exclusion from decision-making processes. It shows research based on surveys and expert interviews across Germany, Spain, Poland, and Norway and reveals growing fan discontent which threatens football\u2019s potential to foster social cohesion and community identification. The paper argues for enhanced fan participation in governance through institutionalized consultation, legal reforms, and support for fan engagement initiatives. It proposes specific measures that aim to counteract fan alienation, maintain football\u2019s social relevance, and strengthen European identity and cohesion through the sport. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Tobias Finger, Vincent Reinke, Jonas Biel, Arne Niemann<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Qualitative research in political science and international relations increasingly adapts various methods to analyse politics, policies, and polities. With complex dynamics and environments specific to these analyses, scholars face severe data challenges. Against this background, we provide insights into systematically collecting additional evidence through the analysis of large amounts of media bulletins e.g. through the Nexis database and examination of standardized and thus comparable documents such as country reports. These tools might be able to inspire triangulative approaches to political science analyses and allow for the collection of micro-level data in contexts of limited data availability, while providing systematic and replicable access. We argue that specifically qualitatively inspired research efforts benefit from these reports. This paper provides detailed instruction for collecting data with these tools, analyses best-practices, and outlines possibilities to systematically examine very large amounts of reports. Moreover, by engaging with examples of studies that have made use of these tools, we reflect on possibilities and challenges for the acquisition and evaluation of reports. This study thus provides fruitful information for scholars struggling with limited data access in complex research environments and facilitates the systematic and replicable evaluation of huge and comprehensive data in a viable and precise manner. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Friedrich Plank, Ingo Henneberg<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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